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PREFACE 
These papers on the legiSlatures of Iowa Kansas, Missouri, and ebraska 
were prepared originall) for the use of participants In the ~hd-America 
Assembly on State Legislatures in American Politics held in Iowa City on 
December 2-4, 1966. The Assembly, made up of citizens legislators, and 
academicians from each of the four states, was sponsored by the Insti-
tute of Public Affairs with the assistance of The Amencan Assembly of 
Columbia University and the C ttizens' Conference on State Legislatures. 
Publication of these reVIsed papers will make available to c1bzens and 
scholars a wealth of mformation about the legislative mstitutlons m four 
Important midwestern states Whtle each author has 'Hewed the legiSla~ 
ture m hiS state with a somewhat different perspective, all have sought 
to provide an analysiS of some aspect of the development of legislatures 
in each state, their political environment, their everyday operations, and 
some of the important forces influencing them. \Ve hope publication of 
these papers will stimulate wider comparative analysiS of state legislative 
processes 
Dean Zenor Drrector 
Insbtute of Pubbc A£farrs 
The University of Iowa 
July 1, 1967 
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CHAPTER 
1 
Introduction 
S A M U E L C. P A T T E R S 0 N 
T H E U "l I \ E R S I T Y 0 F I 0 \V A 
J\rnerican state legislatures are highly institutionalized political groups. 
l\.tost state legislatures exhibit characteristics and ha\ e traditions that 
have developed over a period of at least a hundred years These legislative 
bod1es are remarkably stable, uniform, coherent. complex, autonomous, 
and adaptable in therr mtemal procedures, processes, practices, and 
organ12ation On the broadest canvas, state legislatures do not present a 
drastiCallv different picture today than they did m therr early years. If 
a state legiSlator were transported back in time to a session of Ius legiSla-
ture m the nineteenth century, he would not fmd the legislative way of 
life in that era unrecogniZable or unfamiliar. 
On the other hand, i.f American legislatures are roughly the same in 
general outline as they were in the last century, their differences m detail 
are great and rmportant Demands on the legislatures for deciSions have 
increased \\·ith each generation, and the scope and variety of modem 
legislative proposals doubtless would have flabbergasted the nmeteenth-
century legislator Rapid transportatwn and communiCation have changed 
the nature of the relationships between legislators and constituents Struc-
tural changes, like reapportionment, umcamerahsm, or committee stream-
lining, have changed the legislative landscape in significant ways. 
Changes m state legiSlative institutions have not been linear, movmg in-
<lCrutably and invanably from less-developed to more-developed, nor have 
legislatl\ e modernizations been even across the slates State legislatures 
have had therr ups and do\vns And, toda\ the legtslature of California 
is far more professiOnaliZed than that of North Dakota. The state legisla-
tures have adapted to changes m their pohttcal envrronments in a vanety 
of ways. \Vhether they have, m general, adapted adequately or not IS a 
question in great diSpute toda} 
EC0'\0\.UC E-...:VIRONMENT 
The Mtdwest IS, by most defm1bons, a large regwn, and the states of 
[1] 
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Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska constitute only a part of 1t. These 
four states are the agncultural heartland of the Midwest, spanning the 
Missouri River and bordered on the east by the MISsissippi. Iowa 1s one 
of the richest agricultural areas m the world, containing 25 per cent of 
all the Grade A soil m the United States and ranking second among the 
states m the value of farm products sold. As Table 1 indicates, the other 
states are also heavily agncultural; all four rank in the top eight states 
In the nation m value of fann products sold. All are below the national 
average in proportions of persons employed in manufactunng, and above 
the national average in percentage of persons engaged in agnculture. 
Famung is least important m MISSOuri, but MISsouri is more industrialized 
than the other three states Value added by manufacturing m MISsouri 
IS about equal to the combmed totals for Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska, 
and per cap1ta personal mcome lS about 10 per cent lugher m Missouri 
than m each of the other states. In addition, among these states Kansas 
ranks high in the production of mmerals, rankmg about tenth m the nation 
In the value of minerals produced. 
Iowa 
Kansas 
l\.1 issouri 
Nebraska 
United States 
Table 1 
Economic Characteristics of Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, and Nebraska 
Average Value Per Cent 
Per Acre of Farm Employed in 
Land Manufacturing 
$253 82 18.6 
100.04 16.5 
112.40 24.7 
88.66 12.2 
115.15 27.1 
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
• 
Per Cent 
Employed in 
Agriculture 
20.7 
13.3 
9.5 
21.2 
67 
The populations of the four states are very white, Anglo-Saxon, and 
Protestant. The populations of these states are also rather unusual in the 
proportions of old people among them, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska 
rank highest among the Amencan states 1n the percentage of therr people 
who are sixty-five years of age or older. The Iowa population is the most 
rural among those of these four states, and it has no city over 250,000 
inhabitants. Missourians are more concentrated in metropolitan centers, a 
quarter of the people of Missouri hve in two large urban areas. Though 
Nebraska ranks fifth in the nab on in the rural proportions of its population, 
a fifth of its Citizens live in Omaha. All four states fall below the national 
[2] 
• 
% 85 and over 
% rural 
% non-white 
% foreign hom 
Medtan school 
years completed 
by adults 
INTRODUCilON 
Table 2 
Social Charactensttcs of lo\va Kansas, 
Mtssoun, and ebraska 
Iowa 
% Rank 
11.9 1 
24.0 4 
1.0 47 
14.0 29 
11.3 15 
Kansas 
% Rank 
11.0 8 
14 7 13 
48 31 
94 36 
11.7 10 
~fissouri 
% Rank 
11.7 2 
12.5 17 
9.0 20 
8.5 37 
98 39 
lv tbraska 
% Rank US. 
11.8 3 92 
21.9 5 75 
2.6 37 11.3 
18.3 20 19.0 
116 12 106 
average in foreign born or immigrant populations. However, although 
MISsouri is below the national average in educational level, lO\\'a, Kansas, 
and 1\ebraska are well abo\e the median for the whole country m the 
educabonalle\ els of theu people. 
POLITICAL ENVIRON~!E~T 
These four states exhibit political traditions and mores which are "ery 
much individualistic and localistic Th1s 1s exemplified in Nebraska by 
very pronounced econom1c conservatism, evidenced by the absence of 
state sales and illcome taxes untu very recently. The political 1ocahsm of 
Kansas and Iowa is indicated by the very high relative proportions of 
expenditures for public sen lCes, hke pubhc \veliare or school programs, 
made by local governments. These states rely heavily on local property 
taxes to finance governmental seniCes. MlSsoun chffers fairly sharply 
from Iowa Kansas, and Nebraska ill Its relatively greater degree of mtra-
state centralization of pubhc programs For mstance, in contrast to the 
other three states, welfare programs are m Missoun almost entrrely fi-
nanced from state and federal, rather than local, expenditures 
Over the last quarter of a century, Iowa and M1ssouri have had two-party 
competitive politics at the state-\\ Ide level, although of course Republicans 
have been more often elected ill Iowa, and Democrats more often elected 
m MISsouri Two-party politics has been weaker in Kansas and Nebraska, 
both of which lean toward the Republicans Political styles In these four 
states d1ffer, so that Iowa politics reflects some of the pohtiCal puritarusm 
more noticeable in Wisconsin and f\.1innesota, wh1le ?vfissouri politics is 
more urban, patronage-oriented, and more open to political manipulation. 
Nebraska politics is very much a poht1cs of nonpart1sansh1p; m Kansas 
temperance, oil, populism, and cattle mix in curious ways such that Demo-
cratic public officials often are more conservative than Repubhcans 
[3] 
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Year of Year of 
First First 
Territorial State 
State Legislature Legislature 
Iowa 1838 1846 
Kansas 1854 1861 
:Mi~souri 1812 1821 
Nebraska 1854 1867 
Table 3 
CharacteriStics of State Legislatures in Iowa, Kansas, 
M1ssoun, and Nebraska 
Size 
House Senate 
124 61 
125 40 
163 34 
Unicameral 
50 
Official 
Name of 
Legislature 
General 
Assembly 
Legtslature 
General 
Assembly 
Legislature 
• 
Limits on 
Years in Length of 
Which Sess. Regular 
Are Held Sessions 
Odd None 
Annual 0 Odd years, 
90 Leg1s days, 
Even years 30 
Calendar days 
Odd Approx. 195 
Calendar days 
Odd None 
0 Budget scss10ns m even-numbered years. 
Legislative 
Service 
Agency 
Legislative 
Research 
Bureau ( 1955) 
Legtslative 
Council ( 1933) 
Committee on 
Legtslative 
Research ( 1943) 
Legislative 
Council ( 1937) 
&; 
8 
~ 
0 
a 
fA 
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JNTRODUCTION 
The legiSlatures of these four states present mteresbng laboratones for 
analysis The papers wluch foliO\\. provide oven.1ews m rich detrul of 
the legiSlative bodies in each state. All of these legislatures trace back to 
well before the CIVIl \Var. Although they are smular In many ways, each 
has developed somewhat differently; the 1\ebraska leg1slature IS unique m 
its one-house structure !v1ISsouri, with the oldest of these four legislatures, 
has perhaps changed the least in Its basic organiZation The ebraska 
legiSlature is the youngest, but It has undergone the most dramatic change 
in organ12ation The Kansas legislature IS the only one of the four wluch 
has met annually for some tune, and Its legislators were among the piO-
neers m the legislative council movement Nebraska s Iegtslative counctl, 
a less auspicious success than the Kansas counctl, was organized in 1937 
Iowa and MISsouri have not utilized the legislative councu method of 
opera bon. 
In spite of Its long expenence of Republican legiSlative dominance, the 
Kansas legiSlature seems to engage m party-lme voting much more than 
the other states The Nebraska uniCameral IS about as genuine!} non-
parbsan as any human group could be expected to be Iowa and Missouri 
legislatures fall between these extremes, where roughly between one-tlurd 
and two-fifths of the legislative votes have been on a party basis Rural-
urban confhct probably has been sharper in Missoun than m the other 
Table 4 
New Members, Party Politics, and Representation 
m the LegiSlatures of Iowa, Kansas, 
MISsouri, and Nebraska 
Per Cent of 
First-term 
Members 
State 1963 
Iowa 25 
Kansas 24 
Missouri 34 
Nebraska 35 
f Figure not available. 
Legislative 
Party 
C ompetttiveness 
Limited two-
party 
One-party 
Republican 
Dommant 
Limited two-
party 
Nonpartisan 
[5] 
%Party 
Votes ~n 
Lower 
House 
47 
( 1955-65) 
73 
( 1953-57) 
36 
( 1945-46) 
Changes in 
Representation 
(smallest % of 
state pop which 
could elect House 
ma7ority) 
1961 1964 
45 
19 19 
20 t 
37 44 
:MIDWEST LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 
three states, with its great population concentration in two urban centers. 
Pressure-group politics has perhaps been most intense in Nebraska, pos-
Sibly because party organization has not been present in its legtslature to 
mediate pressure-group demands 
In the papers which follow, the authors describe and analyze the sahent 
features of the legislatures m the four states. Each paper approaches the 
legislature from a somewhat different purvie\v, although there are many 
points of comparison. These analyses draw upon mterviews with legisla-
tors, experience with legislative service, and official documents and reports. 
They underscore the diversity of the states, in the sense that they suggest 
that no political or legislative formula IS likely to work universally m 
every state 
This volume is intended to be a set of analyses of four state legt.slatures, 
and not diagnoses of ailments nor prescnptions for reforms. DiscussiOns 
of legiSlative reform are important and useful-perhaps more vitally needed 
today than ever before-but discussion must be informed. These studies, 
along with the more general works of the American Assembly, the Citizens' 
Conference on State Legislatures, the National Municipal League, the 
Council of State Governments, the National Conference of Legislative 
Leaders, and other organizations, will help to provide background to 
legislators and citizens in their discussions of legislative organization and 
change . 
[6] 
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CHAPTER 
2 
Legislative Politics 
in Iowa 
R 0 N A L D D. H E D L U N D 
U N I V E R S I T Y 0 F \V I S C 0 N S I N - M I L W A U X: E E 
AND 
C H A R L E S W. \V I G G I N S 
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
A state legtslature does not operate m a vacuum. The major implication 
of thiS rather sunple observatlon IS that it is very dllficult to understand 
the way a legislature functions unless one first has some knowledge of the 
environment \VIthin wluch It operates. Therefore, our analysis of the 
Iowa legislature will focus initially on a few important external factors 
which may affect Its abtlity to function. Subsequent sections will deal 
with the maJOr internal operations of the legiSlature and some salient 
characteristics of legtslators I 
'IHE LEGISLATURE's ENVIRONMENT 
A number of factors operate in the legislative enVIronment, however, we 
will concentrate on three which appear to be relevant to an understand-
ing of the Iowa legislative system. These factors are the socio-economic 
characteristics of Iowans agencies through which demands are made 
upon the legislature, and public atntudes toward the legislature. 
Socio-Economic Milieu Iowa legiSlators are selected from an environment 
which is very homogeneous in terms of the social and economic character-
istics of residents Approxnnately 99 per cent of the state's population IS 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the assiStance of the Honorable John M. 
Ely, Jr., State Senator from Lmn County, William R. Kendrick, Chief Clerk of the 
Iowa House of Representatives, and Bernard Duclos of Iowa State University 
for theu assiStance in obtaining portions of the data used in this study. 
[7] 
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white, and over 85 per cent IS Protestant 2 Although numerous ethruc or 
natwnahty groups are found m the state, their members tend to be \veil 
dispersed geographically 3 Our IIDpression IS that ethnic group Identifica-
hon is not very strong In terms of wealth, Io\vans can be charactenzed 
as predommantly middle class, m other \vords, the very rich and very 
poor constitute only a small part of the state's population The ma1or 
consequence of this homogeneity can be seen in the kinds of demands 
made upon state government, mcluding the legislature. These demands 
are rarely based upon ractal, religtous, ethnic, or class interests 
One aspect of the Iowa socto-econom1C mtlteu stands out as a major ex-
ception to this observation. Throughout the first half of this century, a 
maJOrity of Iowans lived on farms and m small rural villages Gradually, 
as a result of improved farm technology and the slumps which penod1cally 
struck the agricultural sector of the state's economy, rural residents began 
to move to urban communities. Durmg the 1950-1960 period, more than 
50,000 individuals left the rural-agncultural community in search of 
JObs in urban-industrial centers in Iowa and in other states 4 By 1960, a 
majonty of Iowa residents restded m urban regions 
Rural to urban migration has produced a changing emphasis in the 
demands made upon state government. Foremost among the newly em-
phasized demands has been the desire of urban residents for a greater 
\ oice (or equal representation ) in the political decision-making process, 
espectally in the legislative assembly. Another consequence of this move-
ment has been increased pressure from urban residents for greater state 
support of governmental services of direct benefit to them. The continuing 
controversy over the distribution of state road money is an example In 
addibon, pressure for a liberalization of state governmental pohcies hav-
ing strong moralistic overtones-liquor control, parimutuel betting, etc.-
appear to have become more mtenslfied \vith the urbanization of the 
state 5 Finally, demands for policies designed to aid a growing industrial 
labor force-increased unemployment compensation and workmen's com-
2 Unless otherwise noted, data on the characteristics of Iowans are taken from 
1960 census reports of the US. government. The percentage of Iowans who are 
Catholics ( 15) is significantly below the national average of 23 per cent, see the 
Official Catholic Directory (New York, 1960). 
3 For a diScussion of nationality groups in Iowa, see Homer L. Calkin, .,The 
Coming of the Foreigners," The Paltmpsest 43 (April 1962 ), 145-208 
4 For a discussion of the general 1mphcations of socio-economic changes m 
Iowa see ((Iowa-A State in Economic and Social Transition-A Panel Presenta-
tion" 30 Iowa Business Digest (December 1959). 
5 Stgnmcant differences between urban and rural residents have existed on the 
liquor-by-the-drink question, Wlth urbamtes tending to take a "wet" posihon and 
rurahtes a "dry" position, for example, see the Iowa Poll of The Des ·/>.Joines 
Register and Tribune (May 13 1962). For the similar urban-rural differences 
on the legalization of parimutuel betting on horse and dog racing, see the Iowa 
Poll of The Des Moines Register and Tnbtme (September 18, 1966) 
[8] 
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pensabon benefits, mdustnal safet} Ia,,s, etc -ha\<e become more pro-
nounced w1th the rural to urban populatiOn mo"ement. 
Demand Channels The demands made upon legislatures by interests m 
societ} are channeled through a number of mstitutlonal mechanisms. In-
terest groups, political parties, and the goven1or are among the most 
important of these mechanisms in the Iowa political S\ litem. 
Throughout most of its history, Iowa has had what political scientists 
refer to as a smgle dominant interest group structure DUI ing the latter 
half of the nmeteenth cenhiry \'.1 hen the st,1te was bemg settled the rail-
roads tended to "call the shots' on Important pubhc pobcy questiOns 6 
The railroads' po".rer stemmed m part from the overridmg desire on the 
part of Io,va political leaders, as well as res1dents for the economic 
development of the state. Farrnmg mterests \vere particularly concerned 
·w1th opening up transportation outlets to Chicago and eastern population 
centers 
For the greater part of thiS centurv another interest group, the Iowa 
Farm Bureau Federation, has tended to dominate the state's political 
system 7 The Farm Bureau's influence stemmed from its large well-dis-
tributed membership, fmancial resources and superior orgamzation Of 
particular significance to the Bureau's mfluence m state legislative politics 
was the O\i errepresentation of rural areas m the legislahtre. 
During the short span of time smce 1964, when the legislature was reap-
portiOned on a population basiS under a federal court order, It would 
appear that the Farm Bureau has no longer been playing a dominant role 
In legislabve aifarrs Yet, It would be mcorrect to argue that a partiCular 
interest group has replaced 1t, or that such an event IS hkely to happen 
in the foreseeable furore \Vhat has happened IS that the Interest group 
power struchlre has changed from one of single interest group dommance 
to a more plurahsbc pattern The maJOr ImplicatiOn of this change IS that 
interest groups will experience d1ffermg rates of success (or fmlure) in 
their attempts to mfluence the state legislarure In other \\ ords, mterest 
groups w1ll win on some pubhc polic\ questions and lose on others 
If the political parties In the leg1slahue become more cohe<iJve and thus 
more mfluential m the shaping of legislative deciSions, as appears to be 
the trend, mteresl group representatives may be requ1red to work through 
them to a greater extent if they are to mfluence legislati\<e pohctes. The 
net result over the long nin probablv will be an overall declme In the 
mfluence of mterest groups within the Iowa legislative system. 
6 See BenJamin F Shambaugh ( ed ), Statute Law-Making in Iowa ( Iowa Ctty: 
State H1stoncal Soctety of Iowa, 1916), especially pp 628-631. 
7 For an analysiS of the role of the Iowa Farm Bureau in state legislative pohttes 
dunng its penod of dommance, see Charles Wtlltam Wiggms "Interest Group 
Power Within State Legislative Systems· The Case of the Iowa Farm Bureau 
Federation" (unpublished Ph D. dissertabon, Waslungton University, 1964). 
[9] 
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During most of its lustory, Iowa has had a one-party dominant pohbcal 
party system, with the Republican Party holdmg the upper hand. From 
1857 to 1955, for example, the Democratic Party was able to capture 
the governorship in only four of the forty-nine elections. In adrubon, 1t 
managed to wm control of both houses of the state legtslature on only 
two occasions, both of which were durmg the years of the Great Depres-
sion. To the extent that there were conflicts over public pohcies m the 
state dunng the era of Repubhcan dominance, they tended to be fought 
out among factions within the donunant party 
During the 1950s, the partisan complexion of the state began to change 
as Democratic strength gradually mcreased. This strength became more 
Vlstble m 1956, when the Democratic Party captured control of the gov-
ernorship for the first bme since depressiOn days and narrowed the 
Republican margm in the leg1slauve assembly. After expenencmg a tem-
porary setback m gubematonal and legiSlative election fortunes m 1960, 
an elecbon Influenced very much by national political issues, Democrats 
recaptured control of the governorship in 1962 and have held 1t to date. 
In addition, partly because of reapportionment, Democrats won a ma-
JOrity of seats in the legislature in 1964 
Although the Democrats have won the governorship in the most recent 
elections, it would appear questionable to assume that the Iowa political 
party system IS still a one-party dominant system, this tune with the 
Democrats in the driver's seat. A more appropriate classification would 
be that it is a very competitive two-party system, with each of the two 
major parties having a good chance of achieving victory. The election of 
Year 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Table 1 
Partisan Identifications of Iowa Electorate, 1956-66 
( m percentages) 
Republican Democratic Independent 
54 41 5 
51 43 6 
50 43 7 
48 41 11 
49 42 9 
47 40 13 
46 41 13 
47 36 17 
42 48 10 
42 52 6 
44 47 9 
Source: The Iowa Poll of The Des }..f omes Register and Tribune, May 1, 1966 
[10] 
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1966 m which the Republicans staged a dramatic comeback from the 
"1964 catastrophe" could appear to support tlus contentlon. 
Table 1 shows the dlstnbution of part.J.san Identifications among the 
Iowa electorate dunng the past decade The data in the table reveal 
that smce 1959 the Republican Party has not enJoyed the allegiance of a 
maJOrity of the state's electorate. In turn, with the exception of one year 
( 1965), the Democratic Party has not managed to marshal the loyalty 
of a maJOrity of eligible voters, even though accordmg to the most recent 
poll, it enJO)S a slight advantage over the Republican Part} Generally, 
the data on the dlStnbution of partisanship support the class1.hcation of 
Iowa as a two-party state 
Year 
1942 
1944 
1946 
1948 
1950 
1952 
1954 
1956 
1958 
1960 
1962 
1964 
1966 
Table 2 
LegiSlative Candidates \Vithout Opposition in General 
Election, 1942-66 
(in percentages) 
SetUlte House Both Chambers 
17 25 24 
40 49 47 
26 5 13 
24 25 25 
0 3 2 
36 24 27 
10 1 2 
3 3 3 
5 4 4 
3 3 3 
17 15 15 
3 4 4 
8 2 3 
The change toward a greater balance between the parties-in-the-electorate 
has been generally associated With a change in the amount of competition 
for leg1slabve posts Data mdiCating the amount of competitiOn for these 
posts during the 1942-1966 penod are presented 1n Table 2. The table 
reveals that from 1942-1950, there was a tendency for a large number 
of candidates, most of vvhom were Republicans, to run without any 
oppositiOn in the general elecbon. However, in all elections since 1952, 
w1th the exception of 1962, the proportion of candidates without opponents 
In the general election has been small 
If the level of party competition remams high, there will be a tendency 
for the parties to become more cohesive. In add1hon, the pat ties will be-
come a more mstrumental force m the legiSlative policy-making process. 
[11] 
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One net result should be that the parties will become more significant as 
channels through \\·hiCh demands are made upon state government. 
The Iowa governor can be regarded as a thrrd channel through \vhom 
demands are made on the state legislature The governor has the poten-
tial to be an unportant channel by virtue of lus status as the state's highest 
elected official State constitutional and stahttory provisiOns gn e the 
gove1nor a number of ways to influence legiSlative decision mal<Ing For 
example, he has the opporhmity to outhne what he behe,es to be the 
maJOr needs of the state through his state of the state and maugural 
messages to the legislahrre. The go\ ern or also has the authont} to pro-
pose the biennial state budget This pov. er IS signifiCant because the gov-
ernor in proposmg the state budget establishes the format, or frame of 
reference, for the budget deliberatiOns of the legislahrre. The go' ern or 
also can Influence legtslati\ e dectswns by virtue of his pov •. er to veto bills 
passed by the legislature 8 In addition to his formal powers, the governor 
has usually been able to mfluence legtslah\ e decisiOns because of lus posi-
tion <lS a leader of the maJonty partv m the legiSlahlre. 
The maJOr post-war trend 1n the role of the Iowa governor m the operations 
of the legislature has been his assumption of a more assertive role 1n pro-
posmg and supporting specific legtslahve proposals. Traditionally, Iowa 
governors have not been known for their involvement in legislative decision 
making. However, two relatively recent precedents in executive-legislative 
relations suggest that Iowa governors are playmg a more assertive role. 
The ftrst occurred in 1961, when Governor Erbe called a spectal pre-
sessiOn Republican caucus with the hope that a joint executive and legts-
lative position on reapportiOnment could be formulated.9 The second 
precedent occurred during the 1965 sesswn when Governor Hughes 
visited a Senate Democratic caucus and urged support of a bill repealing 
the state's "right-to-work" la\\ Hughes' actiOn was regarded as precedent-
settmg in that It was the first tune m the lustor} of the state that a gov-
ernor had been known to VISit a legiSlative party caucus while the legisla-
ture was in sesswn. 
Public Attitudes. How do Iowans evaluate their legislature? Does the 
legislature operate within an envrronment of pubhc attitudes which are 
favorable or unfavorable toward it? 
Table 3 shows the results of surveys taken by the Iowa Poll of The Des 
Moines Register and Tribune concernmg Iowans' general evaluations of 
the JOb performances of three recent legtslatures. For the purpose of com-
8 Compared with all prevwus sessiOns post-war governors have used thel.I' veto 
power more frequently. From 1856 to 1943. governors vetoed two b1lls on an 
average per session. During the 1945-1966 period, an average of five b1lls have 
been vetoed each sesswn. 
9 Frank T Nye, "The 59th General Assembly of Iowa>" The Paltmpsest, 42 
(November 1961 ), 525. 
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panson, the results of surveys evaluating the job performances of the 
state's four most recent governors are also included 10 If the questions 
asked about the performances of the leg1slature and governor can be con-
sidered comparable, one gets the dtstmct tmpression that Io,vans' have 
a sign1f1cantlv lower, or less favorable, assessment of the job performance 
of the legislature than they do of the go\ em or. 
These differences m peoples evaluations may re'lult from hvo factors Fust, 
Table 3 
Iowans' E\ aluations of the Legislature and Governor 
(in percentages) 
Object and Year High 
Evaluation 
Low No Opinion 
Legtslature 
1959 28 48 24 
1963 25 60 15 
1965 28 53 19 
Governor 
Leo Hoegh 
Dec., 1955 41 40 19 
May, 1956 46 39 15 
Herschel Loveless 
Nov, 1957 55 20 25 
July, 1960 65 17 18 
Norman Erbe 
July, 1961 45 24 31 
Sept., 1962 49 25 26 
Harold Hughes 
June, 1963 56 16 28 
Jan., 1966 73 12 15 
Source 
The evaluation scores in this table are based upon figures appearing in the fol-
lowing Iowa Polls of The Des Moines Register and Tribune: January 19, 1964; 
May 1, 1966, August 22, 1965, and May 10, 1959 
10 In evaluatmg the JOb performance of the leg15lature, the Iowa Poll asked its 
respondents, "How would you rate the JOb of the past session of the leglSlature, 
excellent, good, fair, poor, or no opinion?" The high evaluation scores m Table 3 
constitute the combmed "excellent" and "good" responses to the JOb performance 
quest10n, wh1le the "low" evaluation scores constitute the combmed "fair" and 
"poor" responses In evaluating the governor's job performance the Iowa Poll 
asked respondents, "Do you approve or d1sapprove of the way lS 
handling hts job as governor of Iowa?" The high-low scores in Table 3 are the 
same as the "approve-disapprove'' poll responses. 
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people may find it easier to be critical of a collegial group than of a single 
individual. Second, the differences may stem from the failure of the legiS-
lature to fulfill the people, s expectations of It Pnor to the 1965 sessiOn, 
for example, the Iowa Poll asked a sample of Iowans what they expected 
the next legislature,s JOb performance would be Companng these results 
with those of a poll taken after the legislature adJourned, one fmds that 
the performance of the 1965 leg1Slature did not fulfill people,s expecta-
tions.11 
LEGISLATIVE ORGAJI..'IZA TION 
For the most part, the organiZabon of an} given sessiOn of the Iowa 
legislature-selectlon of leadership, establishment of committees, and 
adoption of procedural rules-Is a party matter. In orgaruzmg the as-
sembly, the majority party plays the dominant role. 
In the following discussion concerning the organization of the Iowa legis-
lature, the maJOr emphas1S will be on the practices employed by the Re-
publican Party. This is necess1tated by the fact that, except for hvo re-
cent sessiOns (the 1965 and the 1967 Senate), the Republicans have 
controlled both houses in all sessiOns during the post-war years However, 
signifiCant Democratic departures in 1965 from Republican practices 
will be pain ted out. 
Before getting into an exammation of leadership, the committee system, 
and procedures, brief mention should be made of what appears to be a 
general principle of IO\\a legislative organiZation This prmciple is that 
each sessiOn of the legislature IS organized on an ad hoc basis. Unhke the 
U.S. Congress, which is characterized by a continuity of leadership, 
committee chairmen, and committee membership, significant changes in 
these aspects of organization occur in the Iowa legislature. In other words, 
even though the same formal leadership positions and standing committees 
generally have existed durmg the post-\var years, the personnel occupy-
ing leadership posibons, committee chairmanships, and committee mem-
berships have changed readily durmg this penod Probably the most stable, 
or permanent, aspect of Iowa legislative organiZation has been the pro-
cedural rules which prov1de guidelines fm the orderly consideration of 
legislative proposals. 
Leadership. Any legislative body, if it is to function smoothly, must have 
leadership Leaders are rmportant figures m the legislative process in 
that they are elected by rank and file legislators to make instrumental 
deciSIOns affecting the W\ ISlOn of labor and responsibilities among legis-
lators, the manner and order in which leg1slat1ve proposals are to be 
11 Before the 1965 session convened, 55 per cent of Iowans thought the legis-
lature would do an excellent to good job, while only 29 per cent thought its job 
would be farr or poor, see the Iowa Poll of The Des Moines Register arid Trzbune 
(January 31 1965) 
[14] 
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coilSldered, and the interpretation and enforcement of procedural rules. 
How are leaders of the Iowa legislature selected? \\hat types of indi-
\.'lduals ha\ e usually been selected? \\"hat are the rmportant powers that 
they \Held? In attempting to answer these questions, we will be con-
cerned onlv with those legislators \Vho occupy official legiSlative and 
partY leadership positions. \Ve recognize, however, that some mfluential 
persons m the legislature may hold no formal leadership pos1bon. 
Both the speaker of the House of Representath es and the pres1dent of 
the Senate (the lieutenant governor) usually are regarded as the majontv 
party leaders in their respective houses Th{ spc•aker is in effect, elected 
by the majority party caucus held pnor to the le~ISlativc sessiOn I2 It 
has not been unusual in Iowa for speakersh1p contests to de\. elop and 
for several candidates to campaign prior to the caucus. In the years Since 
World War II, as many as eight candidates have vied for the speakershtp, 
and on more than one occasiOn the incumbent speaker has faced oppositiOn 
Among the many factors which have entered into speakershtp electiOns 
have been prominent public policy questions (liquor-by-the-drmk yellow 
oleomargarme, taxes, the school bus question), regwnal consideratioJLc;, 
the role of interest groups (most notably m the past, the Iowa Farm 
Bureau), and personal follO\.\ings 1n the legislature. In 1965 the go\.emor 
had a particularly prominent role m the selection of the speaker, a major 
departure from past practices when gubernatorial interference in the 
selection of leg.slabve leaderslup would have been regarded as Improper. 
Once selected, the speaker has ver; considerable legislative pO\.\ er in 
organizing the legislature Under the rules, he pro\.tdes for committees, 
asstgns members to them, and appoints thetr chamnen. In addition, bills 
are referred to committee by the speaker, and he can thus mfluence the 
course of legislative consideratiOn of issues. 
The lieutenant governor pres1des over the Senate as Its president, though 
he IS not formally a member of the Senate and ts not elected by the 
senators But he does have substannal mfluence O\. er the work of the 
Senate. Not only IS he ordinanly regarded as the leader of the Senate 
maJOnty, but also he appomts committees, refers btlls to them, and m-
terprets and enforces the rules of procedure.13 
W1th the exception of 1953. when the House Democrats selected no 
floor leader, both parties have selected floor leaders at every session 
12 The mformation in thiS section dealing w1th the selection of House and 
Senate leaders has been obtained from newspaper stories, a series of articles on 
each legislative session smce 1953 by Frank T Nye Jr , in The Palimpsest, and 
personal interviews with legislators and others closely associated with the Iowa 
legislature 
1.3 For a discussiOn of the President's authority in Senate voting, see Jacob 
A. Swisher, "Iowa Government in Action," The Palimpsest, 30 (October 1949 ), 
316-317. 
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of the legiSlature since World War II On two occasions in the post-war 
yerus, th1s post has been a steppmgstone to the House speakerslup for 
the House ma1onty leader Smce 1959, House Repubhcans have also 
chosen an assiStant maJonty leader when they controlled the House, a 
practice adopted by the Democrats m 1965. Also in 1965 Senate Demo-
crats estabhshed the posibon of asslStant maJOrity leader for the frrst trme. 
Committee Structure. Large organizations require some division of labor 
to operate effectively. In legislative orgaruzatwns this is accompliShed 
most markedly m the committee structure. In Iowa the structure of legiS-
lative committees does not differ m any stnking way from practices m 
other Amencan legislatures m the use of standmg, select, JOmt, and m-
tenm committees. The number of comnnttees in the House and Senate 
has fluctuated since 1945 from eighty-eight in 1947 (fifty-four in the 
House and thuty-four m the Senate) to thuty in 1965 (fifteen in the 
House and fifteen m the Senate). The usually larger number of com-
mittees m the House reflects, of course, the larger House membership, it 
may also have been associated with the way in which the elected speakers 
developed support for their candidacy before the majority caucus. 
The 1965 legislature not only drastically reduced the number of House 
and Senate standing committees, but It also substantially reduced the 
number of committee assignments for each representative. In most ses-
sions prior to 1965, members of the House and Senate served on six or 
seven committees, but in the SIXty-frrst General Assembly most leg15lators 
served on only three committees. This practice was generally followed 
m the Repubhcan controlled SIXty-second session of the Iowa House. 
Session 
51st 
52nd 
53rd 
54th 
55th 
56th 
57th 
58th 
59th 
60th 
6lst 
62nd 
Table 4 
Standing Committees in the Iowa Leg15lature, 1945-1967 
(m numbers) 
Number of Committees 
Year House Senate 
1945 55 32 
1947 54 34 
1949 39 35 
1951 37 36 
1953 38 34 
1955 37 39 
1957 35 39 
1959 40 31 
1961 42 30 
1963 41 30 
1965 15 15 
1967 21 14 
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The v.ork of the legtslature IS not e\•enl} divided among Its committees 
though an analysiS of committee workloads m 1963 and m 1965 does 
indicate that a somewhat more balanced workload \\as achieved durmg 
the latter session . Even so in 1965 the judiciary, governmental subdhi-
sion, transportation, and governmental affairs committees together handled 
57 per cent of the bills mtroduced in the House, \\ hile 20 per cent of 
the bills referred in the Senate went to the judiCiary committee. 
The chairmen of legislative committees certainly are key ftgures in the 
Iowa legtslau-ve process Smce they are selected by the presidmg officers, 
they are not independent of the party leadership as are chairmen of con-
gressiOnal committees. Sernority as the basiS for selecting chairmen IS of 
only slight importance In Iowa, and fust-term lcgtslators have often been 
appomted committee chairmen. In fact, minonty party members have 
sometlmes been selected to chair mmor committees m the post-war years. 
Furthermore, chairmanships have not been very stable in the sense of 
gomg to the same people from sessiOn to sessiOn In Iowa, it IS usual for 
more than half the chairmen m one legislative sessiOn to be appomted as 
chairmen of different committees m the next sessiOn. In 1949 more than 
80 per cent of the preVIous chairmen chaired different committees! Be-
yond this, It IS not unusual for about half of the comm1ttee chairmen m 
any one session to be new to the JOb, not havmg served as a committee 
chairman in a previOus sessiOn 
Legislattve Procedures. The formal rules of procedure In the Iowa legis-
lature are, like the rules of procedure In most Amencan legislatures, the 
bearers of legiSlative traditions. Though they do not cover all conungen-
cies, the rules are fauly complex And sometimes, when the un\vntten 
rules permit, the wntten rules are violated. We shall diScuss some of the 
unwntten rules presently 
Much of the formal legislative process In the General Assembly IS familiar 
to anyone aware of the workways of Amencan legiSlabve hfe, but un-
like the practice of the Congress or lower houses in some states, the com-
mittee of the whole procedure IS very seldom used m the Iowa House. 
The state constitution requues that a ma1onty of all members approve 
the passage of legislation, and procedures are available which encourage 
maximum attendance on the floors of the houses. One charactensbc of 
legislative procedure in Iowa worthy of special note IS that of the use 
of steenng and sifting committees The steering committees are calendar 
committees, appomted by the presiding officers at about mid-sessiOn to 
rearrange the order of prionties in scheduling bills for floor consideration. 
As a legislative sessiOn nears Its end, the steermg committees have been 
dissolved to be replaced by sifting committees The latter committees are 
given very w1de latitude to schedule legislation in the final days of the 
sessiOn These committees have been controversial because of the secrecy 
of their very crucial deliberations, in 1965 the rules of both houses were 
[17] 
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amended to require that all meetings of the sifting committees be open 
to the pubhc and that committee votes be a part of the pubhc record 
LEGISLATIVE F ACll.I'l'IES, STAFF, AND SERVICES 
Compared w1th Congress, the facihtles, staff, and services provided Iowa 
legislators can be described as mmunal. Most lmowledgeable persons, in-
cluding legislators themselves, admit that much room for improvement 
eXISts m thiS aspect of the legiSlature. 
Facilities. To an Iowa legislator, his "office" is usually a desk and small 
fihng cabmet found on the floor of the House or Senate. In other words, 
except for the legtslative leaders, separate private offices are not pro-
vided legislators. Thus, if a leg1slator recetves a visit ((on the hill" from 
a constituent, he usually must have a chrur brought to hiS desk so that 
the constituent can be seated, or he VISits \Vlth the constituent in the 
rotunda or the capital cafetena Although plans are being made to pro-
VIde party floor leaders w1th pnvate offices during the 1967 sesswn, 1t 
\Vould seem that the problem of providmg the overwhelmmg ma1onty of 
legislators With such space will not be alleVIated in the near future. 
Staff Individual legislators and standing committees are provided no 
professional staff assistance. Each legislator is permitted to hire a secre-
tary (or clerk) who occupies a charr next to the legislator on the floor. 
It IS not unusual to find a legislator quietly dictating letters to his secre-
tary while floor proceedings are in progress. A pool of typewnters IS 
available behind each chamber for the use of the secretanes. 
Chairmen of standing committees receive no special staff assistance. In 
fact, the secretary of a committee chairman doubles as the secretary of 
the committee 
Servzces The major serVIce agencv of the lo\va legislature is the Legis-
lative Research Bureau Organized m 1955, the bureau is the maJOr 
btU-drafting, and, as 1ts name denotes, fact-finding agency of the legiS-
lature. Any legiSlator may avail htmself of the services of the bureau 
Our impression is that so many legtslators utilize the services of the bu-
reau, especially during a sesswn, that its facilities and staff oftentimes 
appear to be overtaxed. A recent innovation in the operations of the bu-
reau has been an attempt to mtegrate House and Senate leaders into 1ts 
research activities. In 1965, the legislature enacted a law providing that 
House and Senate leaders would automatically serve on the research 
committee which oversees the work of the bureau. Supporters of thts 
law contemplated that pohcy recommendations gro\ving out of between-
sessiOn bureau studies would tend to go for naught less often u the 
legiSlative leadership \vere brought more directly mto the research process 
In addition to the bureau, the code edttor, an employee of the Iowa Su-
preme Court, has usually provided legislators \Vith bill-drafting serviCes 
On occasiOn, an assistant attomey general in the attorney general's offiCe 
[18] 
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has also been assigned the responsibihty of helpmg legiSlators draft bills 
on request.. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 10\VA LEG ISLA TORS 
A legiSlature IS more than an abstract representative body, a political 
organtZabon, or a set of procedures It IS a collection of indiVIdual men 
and women \.\ ho, wlule vaned m background and experience, present 
the observer \.\Ith many interesting regularities In therr charactenstics 
and recruitment The legiSlature IS not a microcosm of the general popu-
lation m the attnbutes of its members Rather, legislative recruitment IS 
such that certain lands of Individuals tend to become legislators and others 
do not. What are these descnpt1ve characterubcs of Iowa legiSlators? 
Age Elected officials frequently are characteriZed as mature mdividuals 
who enter pubhc office only after they have obtamed extensive expen-
ence elsewhere. Tlus characterization appears to be accurate for many 
pubhc officials, mcluding lo\.\ a state legiSlators U smg the age of futy 
as a divtding pomt for companson underscores thiS fact because more 
than half of the members of the House and Senate for every sess10n smce 
1945, except for the two most recent ones ( 1965 and 1967) have passed 
that age when they entered the legislature Throughout thiS penod, how-
ever, there has been a trend evident m both houses to elect a greater 
proportion of younger members Wlth each succeedmg sess10n In the 
1965 and 1967 sessions nearly a third of the House members were forty 
years of age or younger wlule about three-fifths of the members of the 
Senate for these same sess10ns were futy years of age or younger This 
trend may result from an increasmg mterest m serv1ee as a state legislator 
by younger persons as well as a conscious effort by the pohtical parties, 
parbcularly the urban Democrats in 1965, to recruit younger persons to 
run for the legtslature. 
Comparing this age distribution with that reported in the 1960 census of 
Iowa underscores the overrepresentat10n of mdividuals beyond the age 
of fifty in the Iowa legislature. About 57 per cent of Iowa's adult popu-
lation is less than futy years of age, wlule only 44 per cent of the legtsla-
tors sitting m the 1961 sesswn were less than fifty years of age. 
Education. According to the 1960 census, 54 per cent of Iowa's popula-
tion over the age of twenty-five had not completed four years of high 
school, 30 per cent had completed high school, and 16 per cent had 
attended college Comparing these figures with those from members of 
the legtslature (see Table 5) reveals that members of this elected body 
are more likely to have had some type of post-h1gh school tram1ng than 
IS true among the general population. If we consider prev1ous census 
figures, the same trend appears to occur for the entrre penod smce 
World War II. For example, the 1950 census showed that 61 per cent 
of the population had not completed four years of high school, 25 per 
[19] 
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cent had completed high school, and 14 per cent of the population had 
attended college 
Throughout the post-war pen od the proportion of members of both 
houses \.vho have attended college has generally increased, in spite of a 
slight decrease since the middle 1950s among members of the House. 
This trend, especially pnor to 1965, is due in part at least to a decreasmg 
number of legiSlators who have had professiOnal legal traming beyond 
college, rather than to a decreasmg number of legislators m the "high 
school or less" category This IS perhaps eVIdence of a groWing tendency 
to elect mdniduals \\ ho are generalists rather than specialists m therr 
educational trainmg, as \\ell as the tendency for greater numbers of In-
chvlduals to attend college. Some of the mcreases in the proportion of 
Iowa legislators in the 1965 sessiOn \\. ho ha\ e only high school or Yoca-
tional traming may be traced to the reapportionment of 1964, which re-
sulted m the election of a larger number of Democratic legislators from 
the mdustnal centers of the state 
Occupation Members of state legislatures throughout the United States 
tend to be recruited from some of the C(prestigous" occupahons 14 Most 
notable have been such occupations as attorney, businessman, and white-
collar occupations. Certam pos1t10ns, parhcularly those related to the legal 
profession, are generally considered as appropriate "training grounds" 
for legislators. Persons \nth serviCe and lower status occupations do not 
appear in state legislatures to the degree that they are found among the 
general public For example, the 1960 census found that 17 per cent of 
the male \vorking force 1n l O\\ a were engaged in professions or mana-
gen al occupations, 22 per cent were farmers or farm managers, and the 
remainder, 61 per cent, \\. ere m clen cal, service, or blue-collar professions 
Table 6 indicates that farmmg and legal professions have been parbcularly 
overrepresented in all post-war state legislatures 
Concurrent \ VIth the increasmg number of farmer-legislators was the de-
creasing number of lawyer-legislators-particularly in the Senate. This 
drop in the number of lawyers elected to the legislature rna} be due m 
part to an increasing unattractiveness of legislative serviCe-relatively 
low salary and damage to an indiv1dual's legal practice. Also of consider-
able interest is the sizable increase, In the 1965 session, in representatives 
who held blue-collar positions over that of previous sesswns and the 
dramatic decline with the 1966 election. The increase resulted in large 
measure from the Democrabc landslide of 1964, \vlule the decrease can 
be traced to the return of the Repubhcan party to po"ver 
Relzgion In addition to O\. errepresenhng certain educational and occupa-
tiOnal sectors of our society, members of our state legislatures tend in 
14 See Malcolm E . Jewell and Samuel C Patterson, The L egaslative Process m 
the Untted States (New York. Random House, 1966), p. 108. 
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Table 5 
Education of Iowa Stale Legislators and SessiOn-1945-1967 
(in percentages) 
51st 52nd 53rd 54th 55th 56th 57th 58th 59th 60th 61st 62nd EDUCATION 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 
HOUSE 
High school or le.ss 
Some type of trade 
25 20 23 22 23 22 22 31 32 29 27 21 
0 0 0 2 2 6 5 ~ trammg 1 1 1 0 2 Some amount of ~ collc~e 35 39 41 45 48 54 52 47 45 48 41 44 ~ Professional training 
::3 beyond college 14 11 12 7 4 2 4 2 1 2 3 2 ~ ,_., Some amount of 
"d to graduate training 7 12 6 8 7 6 6 6 8 8 10 10 0 ....... t'4 '--J Law degree 19 18 17 18 19 17 17 14 13 11 13 18 ~ 
::J 
SESA.TE ~ High school or less 17 11 9 6 12 12 16 19 17 15 20 23 ~ z Some type of 
~ 
0 trade trainin~ 0 0 2 4 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 2 ~ Some amount of 
college 30 40 46 45 44 45 43 37 38 50 49 51 Professwnal training 
beyond college 4 4 9 11 10 6 2 2 8 8 0 2 Some amount of 
graduate trammg 4 6 9 6 4 8 12 20 16 6 .. 9 2 Law degree 45 39 26 28 25 25 25 22 21 21 21 18 
Source 
The data for th1s table, and for subsequent tables (except Tables 8 and 10) were acquired from: Iowa Offrcial Register, 1945-1965 
editions (Des ~1omes State Pnnting Board); and The Des .~foines Sunday Register, December 18 and 25 1966, and January 1, 1967 . 
OCCUPATION 
Farmer 
Lawyer 
Professional 
Businessman 
,....., 
Newspaperman 
~ Salesman 
~ Blue Collar 
Other ( retired ) 
Fanner 
Lawyer 
Professional 
Businessman 
Newspaperman 
Salesman 
Blue Collar 
Other ( retired ) 
51st 
1945 
32 
17 
19 
26 
2 
2 
0 
2 
16 
38 
14 
22 
4 
0 
0 
6 
Table 6 
Occupations of Iowa State Legislators and Session-1945-1967 
(in percentages) 
52nd 
1947 
31 
14 
26 
18 
6 
4 
0 
1 
18 
33 
20 
16 
4 
2 
0 
6 
53rd 
1949 
39 
12 
19 
15 
6 
3 
3 
4 
20 
25 
20 
20 
2 
6 
0 
6 
54th 
1951 
35 
13 
21 
17 
8 
3 
1 
4 
26 
24 
16 
22 
2 
8 
0 
2 
55th 
1953 
38 
15 
12 
19 
7 
4 
1 
5 
32 
22 
8 
22 
6 
6 
2 
2 
• 
56th 
1955 
57th 
1957 
HOUSE 
46 42 
13 15 
10 9 
17 21 
2 1 
6 4 
1 1 
6 9 
SENATE 
30 30 
20 20 
14 16 
20 22 
6 2 
4 4 
2 2 
4 4 
. 
58th 
1959 
45 
13 
7 
19 
0 
5 
3 
9 
24 
18 
20 
24 
2 
4 
6 
2 
59th 
1961 
45 
11 
14 
15 
0 
6 
2 
7 
33 
18 
16 
20 
0 
6 
4 
4 
60th 
1968 
45 
9 
14 
17 
0 
6 
1 
8 
38 
16 
16 
14 
2 
8 
2 
4 
6lst 62nd 
1965 1967 
32 35 
13 14 
12 14 
13 18 &; 
3 2 (") ~ 
9 2 
i 10 2 10 13 
~ 
25 26 
0 
a 
15 18 ~ 
18 12 
23 29 
2 2 
8 7 
5 3 
3 3 
51st 52nd 
RELIGION 1945 1947 
Protestant 93 96 
Catholic 7 4 
JewiSh 0 0 
,..... 
~ 
'-' Protestant 94 97 
Catholic 6 3 
JeWish 0 0 
Table 7 
Religion of Iowa State Legislators and Session-1945-1967 
(in percentages) 
58rd 
1949 
89 
11 
0 
94 
6 
0 
54th 
1951 
96 
4 
0 
92 
8 
0 
55th 
1953 
97 
3 
0 
93 
7 
0 
56th 
1955 
57th 
1957 
HOUSE 
94 94 
6 6 
0 0 
SENATE 
91 86 
9 14 
0 0 
58th 
1959 
90 
10 
0 
84 
14 
2 
59th 
1961 
93 
7 
0 
89 
9 
2 
60th 
1963 
90 
10 
0 
90 
10 
0 
61st 62nd 
1965 1967 
68 83 ~ 
32 15 
1 2 
"'d 
79 74 
0 
a 
21 25 fh 
0 0 ~ 
.... 
0 
~ 
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varying degrees to dllfer from the population in their rehgious affiliation 
In Iowa, which is predominant!} a Protestant state, the percentage of 
members of either house of the state legiSlature who identify themselves 
c1s P1 otestants has dropped below 85 per cent on only five occas10ns 
Three of these exceptions can be traced dtrectly to the 1964 Democratic 
landslide, the 1965 House and Senate sess10n, and the 1967 Senate ses.-
SlOn Thus the Democratic landshde produced deviation from the past 
trend m terms of religious afflhat10n as well as age, educatiOn, and occu-
patiOn of Iowa legiSlators 
Place of birth. Previous studies ha\.e observed that most pubhc officials 
are '1ocal boys," hom and raiSed w1thm the diStrict they now represent 15 
\Vhlie the data presented here do not permit us to test this hypothesis, 
they suggest that throughout the post-war period the overwhelmmg ma-
JOnty of state legiSlators have been native Iowans. Most of the non-native 
legislators were born in the mtddlewestern portion of the United States, 
wtth the largest number being from a neighboring state The proportion 
of Iowa-born legislators corresponds closely with the 1960 census, which 
reported that 81 per cent of Iowa's population was hom in Iowa 
Organizational Affiliations. Politicians frequently have been labeled "Join-
ers" because of their propensity to belong to all types of organizations. 
Thts tendency probably results as much from their outgomg nature as 
from their desire for exposure to potential supporters. It IS necessary to 
reVIew a fev.r biographies of state legislators to reahze the number and 
vartety of membershtp held by these public officials Iowa legiSlators 
appear to fit the image of bemg JOiners 
A few select observations demonstrate this point. The number of mem-
bers belonging to veterans' organizations has shown a marked increase 
smce World War II (from 21 per cent m 1945 to 40 per cent in 1965) 
A drop in the number of legislators belong1ng to agricultural organiZations 
stems from the decrease m the number of farmers elected in 1964 How-
ever, the most striking fact eVIdent from the organizational data lS that 
at least seven out of every ten members of either house belong to some 
type of club or organization. Thus the fortunes of many organized groups 
are probably enhanced because they have potential support from their own 
members who sit within the legtslature. 
Political Affiliations In addthon to the numerous organizational affilia-
tions of the legislators, studies indicate that a comparatively large number 
of them have had some previous experience in one or more levels of 
government, either in an elective or appointive capacity. These studtes 
found that in California, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, WISconsin, Min-
nesota, and Pennsylvania between 37 and 66 per cent of the state legiSla· 
15 IbU:l., pp. 102-103. 
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tors had held some type of pohtical position.16 \Vhen \\e consider the 
comparati\' ely low le\ els of pohtical participation by the general public, 
the data concerning previous political positwns held by legislators are 
qwte striking.17 
The data for Iowa seem to suggest that its legislators have had less 
previous pohtical expenence than their counterparts mentioned above. 
Since the data about Iowa \\ere gathered through the use of the official 
state regiSter, while data from the other states relied on in ten Ie\\ s \V1th 
legiSlators, the differing method used to gather data may account for some 
of the vanabon noted in the results. Regardless of th1s difference, it IS 
apparent that members of the Iovva legisl,lture have been more active m 
politics and are much more likel; to ha\ e held a public or party position 
than the population of the state in general. 
Pnor to the 1964 election there was a fairly constant increase m the pro-
portion of members of the House \-..ho had pre\IOus expenence on the 
county and municipal le\els The 1965 sessiOn, however, witnessed a 
drop of about 5 per cent m the number of members ha\ mg held county 
and municipal offices \Vhile this absence of previous political expenence 
may have affected the public Image of the legislature as a clehberab\e 
body It does not appear to ha"e affected the willingness of legtslators 
to deal \\ Ith a \\Ide variety of controversial ISSues. As cl matter of fact, 
these Ieg~slators may ha\'C been more free from inhibitions and external 
restraints than the more politicall) expelienccd leg1slators in previous 
sessiOns. 
This decrease m the proportion holding prior public office 1s particularly 
noteworthy when compared \\'ith the mcrease in the number holdmg posi-
tions m their party p110r to elcctwn to th£ lcgisl.1turc. This suggests th.1t a 
greater number of part} actiHsts are bemg recruited to run for legtslanve 
office than was pre\ wusly the case, and that party wo1 k has become an rm-
portant factor 1n the recruitment process. It 1s, howe\. er, premature to 
posit this as a ntle go\ emmg the future. 
Mule there have been some fluctuations among members of the House 
With regard to the proportiOn havmg held pubhc offices pnor to the1r 
electwn to the legislature dunng the post-war period, these fluctuations 
are not as marked nor as extreme as the trend among senators The 
16 Ibid., p 116 
17 Supportmg thiS contention of low CJtlzen participation are two recent surveys 
of a national sample reported m Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter 
(New York. John Wuey & Sons Inc , 1960) summanzed below 
"Do you belong to any political club or organ17ations?" 
"D1d you do any other work for one of the 
1952° 1956° 
2% 3% 
pohtical parties or candidates?" 3% 3% 
0 Entnes are proportions of total samples answermg affumatlVely. 
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trend for senators to be elected at a younger age suggests that a period 
of "apprenticeship,'' during which legJ..Slative aspirants served m pubhc 
positions on the county and local levels, is no longer as common as it was 
in previous decades. Thus, It J..S more likely today that an indiVIdual will 
be elected state senator without having previous experience in public 
offices than in previous decades. 
In addition to noting the number of Iowa legislators who have had previ-
ous experience with government, it is important to note the types of 
positions involved. The most frequently mentioned county offices among 
both senators and representatives of the post-war period were those of 
county attorney and county supervisor. During the 1940s and the early 
1950s, the county attorney was the most frequently mentioned, but be-
ginning with the Fifty-mghth General Assembly ( 1959) the county super-
visor's post began to receive more mention , especially by members of 
the H ouse. The most frequently mentioned local office throughout the 
period was school board member, a nonpartisan office. This suggests that 
a sizable portion of the previous experience of Iowa legislators in public 
offiCe has been in some ways related to a representational role in the 
deliberative body. 
Two prominent themes running throughout this section on the legislators 
as individuals have been ( 1 ) overrepresentation of certain sectors of 
society in terms of age, education, and occupation, and ( 2) the disrup-
tion of many trends brought about by the 1964 election. Both themes 
have been amply underscored throughout this discussion and in the 
various tables. It is, however, appropriate at this point to note that the 
1966 electlon reinstated, m part at least, some of the trends which can 
be traced back to 1945. There is, for mstance, an increase in the number 
of farmers sitting in both houses after a drastic reduction because of 
the 1964 elecbon. We cannot at the same time assess precJ..Sely what 
the future trends m legislator background characteristics will be on the 
basis of the 1966 election. It would seem probable, however, that in the 
long run there will not be the radical departures evidenced by the 1964 
election. 
TilE LEGISLATIVE ACTOR IN IOWA 
Previous sections have focused on the legislative process and the individu-
als recruited as legislators for the Iowa General Assembly. These are 
some of the major elements of the legislative system operating in Iowa. 
One of the more interesting yet largely unexplored aspects of this system 
IS the study of an individual's behaviOr within the legislature. Tlus sec-
tion V\.Ul examine some of the rna JOT frames of reference \vhich influence 
the behavior of Iowa leg1slators. 
The Legisl.ative Party As previously noted, the organization of both 
houses of the Iowa General Assembly after each election is undertaken 
[26] 
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by the members of the dominant party. Leadership positions are filled 
by the members of that party, and the party's platform frequently be-
comes the guide for legtslation Wlule the legiSlators m each party look 
to the state organlZation for certam types of leadership, expediency di<>-
tates that the members of each party in each chamber form therr own 
ad hoc party for the duration of the legiSlative sess10n. The pnmary 
responsibility of thiS orgam..zation is to unite its members behind a legts-
lative program In performmg thiS function the legislative party becomes 
an rmportant frame of reference for understandmg legislative behaVIor 
This point has been well establiShed by numerous scholars who, although 
studymg different legtslatures, have found the party to be the smgle 
most rmportant factor explainmg voting patterns m roll calls Thus, It IS 
necessary for us to cons1der the legiSlative party operating m the Iowa 
legislature. 
One ma1or aspect affecb.ng the status of a pohtical party is the competi-
tiveness between the parties m the legislature. Until recently Iowa has 
been characterized by numerous analysts as a modified one-party Re-
publican state. The graph (Figure 1) represents the proportion of Re-
publican members of both houses of the legislature for the 1925-1967 
period This would seem to support the contention that except for very 
brief interludes Iowa has been a Republican state. But, as we have noted 
preVIously, this IS not entirely accurate, particularly \vtth regard to recent 
trends Wlule it is undesrrable to establish an absolute minimum at which 
the minority party can be srud to offer effective opposition, It is doubtful 
that e1ther house in the Iowa legiSlature experienced an effective opposi-
tion party for more than siX sessions out of the twenty-two bemg con-
sidered 18 Thus we may Infer that during many sess10ns interparty com-
petition was of less sigrufiCance than rural-urban or some other type of 
conflict. Consequently, mterparty competition may not have been a 
very Important frame of reference for legislators' behaviOr for many 
sessions during the 1925-1967 period Although Figure 1 does rruse cer-
tain questions about effective mterparty competitiOn m the Iowa legtsla-
ture, It would be premature to state that a member's party affiliatiOn is 
of no consequence In affecting hiS behaviOr as a legtslator. The maJority-
minority status of a legislative party IS only one indicator of a party's 
ability to affect mdiv1dual behavior In adrubon, there are such factors 
as the extent to which a maJOrity of one party votes against a maJority 
of the other, and the degree of unity within each party (party coheswn). 
These factors are elusive concepts, as most party activists will readily 
ad.mlt Rough indiCators of each factor are available through an examina-
18 On party competition in the 1967 session, see Charles W. W1ggins, "Party 
Voting m the Sixty-second Iowa General Assembly," m Iowa BuStness Digest~ 
39 (December 1967), 3-11. 
[27] 
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Partisan Affiliation in the Iowa Legislature 1925-1967 (per cent Republican) 
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tion of the sigruhcant roll call votes m the legiSlative body 19 This has 
been done for the lO\\a legiSlatures meehng dunng the 1955 65 period, 
and the results are shown m Table 8. 
Of the 2,553 significant roll call \Otes rec.:orded between 1955 clnd 1965 
49.6 per cent can be termed part) \Otcs i.e., a majont; of members 
of one party \Oted against the majority of members in the other. Party 
votmg for all se.s5Ions \'v.l.S shghtly more frequent in the Senate (51.1 
per cent) than m the House ( 48.4 per cent). 
~ otable vanatlons beh\ cen sessiOns existed during the ten-year period 
Party votmg \\as especiclll) lugh dunng the 1957 and 1965 sessions, 
moderate during the 1959 and 1963 sessions and somewhat lov .. er durmg 
the 1955 and 1961 penod One factor which may account for some of 
the vanahon IS the mterpa.rty balance dunng the session. The theory 
states that legiSlatures which are about evenly diVIded between Demo-
crats and Republicans are likely to have a htgher degree of part) votmg 
than are legtslatures \VJ.th lopstded majorities from one party Companng 
the mcidence of party voting with the mterparty competition (see Figure 
1) mdicates that only a w·eak relauonshtp extsts. The absence of a par-
ticularly strong relationship supports the observation that p.utv balance 
IS only of marginal importance in determining the frequen c.;y of pclrty 
'oti.ng in the Iowa legiSlature. 
Smcc party ralance is of little importance , .. hat other factors might af-
fect the mcidence of party voting? Dunng three of the SIX sec;s10ns In thiS 
penod the Republicans controlled both houses of the legtslahire \\hue the 
Democrats held the governorship ( 1957, 1959 1963) Thic; position of 
party control probabl) affected the outlook of legiSlators with regard to 
legislation ongmc~tmg \\ Ith the governor sohdth mg them in opposition 
to Democratic proposals This contention 1s supported bv nohng the 
h1gher mctdence of party "oting when there was divided part.} control 
The one excepbon, \\hen the same part\ controlled the legtslature and 
the governorship ( 1965), can be explained b\ the party disctphne Im-
posed by the Democrats and the controverstal nature of the legislation 
considered. ThiS legislat10n \\as so offensive to Republicans that they 
achieved a unity rarely expenenced before. 
Another important dimension of the leg1slati\e party IS the cohes10n or 
unity of the polibcal parties Table 8 mcludes data on the mcidence of 
a high party cohesion in the Iowa legislature 20 The data mdicate that 
Senate Democrats were more unified than Senate Republicans for each 
of the s1x sess10ns as vvell as for all sess10ns combmed. However, m the 
House the Republicans were slightly more cohesive for all sess10ns than 
I9 A sigmftcant roll call IS defmed as a nonunanunous vote m which 10 or more 
per cent of the legtslators vobng on the question were in the minority. 
20 A htgh level of cohes10n occurs when 90 to 100 per cent of the legtslators 
vote with theU" party 
[29] 
Table 8 
Party Votmg and Cohesion in the Iowa Legislature 1955-1965 
Party Cohesion° 
Party Votingt House Senate 
Both Both 
Session Year H01Jse Senate Democrat Republican Parties Democrat Republican Parties 
56th 1955 40.2 42.3 23.0 6.6 0.0 54.5 9.1 0.0 ~ ~ 57th 1957 48.9 56.4 42.3 28.2 16.4 43.5 36.6 21.8 ~ 
58th 1959 44.9 48.0 29.6 35.7 18.1 56.8 33.7 22.1 ~ 
c:;' 59th 45.3 31.5 
s 1961 38.3 18.2 11.7 5.2 49.3 21.9 
i 
0 
t......J 
60th 1963 44.4 46.5 20.7 20.7 9.0 34.8 21.5 8.7 
61st 1965 661 56.9 25.4 42.4 6.8 49.3 46.0 29.4 ~ 
0 
0 Per cent of party votes with a cohesion index of 80 or more. § 
(') t Per cent of significant nonunanimous votes with majority of one party voting against majority of other party. en 
• 
"~ 
LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN IOWA 
were the Democrats, while the Democrats were more cohesive in three 
sessions {1955, 1957, and 1961) and equaled the Repubhcans once 
( 1963) One possible explanation for the generally greater chsuruty 
among Repubhcans IS that thel.f party traditionally has been the dommant 
one m Iowa politics As IS often the case in other states dommated by 
one party a comparabvely lugh degree of facbonahsm develops \.Vltlun 
the ma1onty party 
In addition to these differences within each house there are important 
differences between the House and the Senate branches of each party. 
Senate Democrats were more cohesive than House Democrats for every 
legislative sessiOn smce 1955 Senate Republicans were more cohesive 
than House Republicans for ftve of the six sess10ns. These differences 
possibly result from the greater amount of latitude allowed senators be-
cause of therr longer terms and more heterogeneous diStricts ThiS should 
theoretically permit the senator a greater degree of freedom to support 
his party when so desrred 
Previous Legislative Expenence A second factor affecting the behav1.or 
of the legt.slators lS the amount of prev10us expenence they have had as 
lawmakers State legislatures, unhke Congress, expenence a rather ex-
tensive turnover m membership from sess10n to sesswn This trend 1S con-
gruent with the reputation of state legiSlatures as bodies of amateur poli-
ticians who are actmg as part-time legiSlators Data to support thiS con-
tention show that dunng recent sessions of several state legislatures an 
average of 25 per cent of the entire membership was servmg thelf frrst 
term. Turnover ranged from a low of 11 per cent m M mnesota ( 1961) 
to a lugh of 44 per cent m Kentucky ( 1964). Iowa also has expenenced 
comparabvely htgh rates of turnover durmg the last twenty years An 
average of 39 per cent of the House membership and 19 per cent of the 
senators served their flfst term durmg tlus penod. A portion of the dif-
ference m these averages can be traced, of course, to the fact of over-
lappmg terms for senators 
The presence of a larger portion of new members m the legiSlative cham-
ber may or may not affect the behav1or of mdividtMl members They are 
a potential source of change for the legtslative body and thus may be 
viewed as a threat to established procedures and pohctes If thel.f numbers 
are large enough they may actually seize power m that chamber. A good 
example of this was m 1953 when a group of "young Turks," most of whom 
were servmg the1r second terms, were instrumental in oustmg the Incum-
bent speaker. 
In addition to these overall aspects of previous experience, numerous legis-
lators have reported that only after several sesswns as legiSlators can they 
consider themselves effective law makers. Legt.slators argue that s1nce 
there IS so much to learn about the legislabve process as well as about 
the substance of policy, a legislator must take time to become familiar 
[31] 
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NUMBER OF 
PRE\~IOUS 
SESSIONS 
None 
One 
Two 
Three 
~Four 
'--' Five 
SIX 
Seven or more 
Nono 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Ftve 
Stx 
Seven or more 
Table 9 
Previous Legislative Servtce for tv1embers of the Iowa Legislature and Sess!On-1945-1967 
( m percentages) 
51st 
1945 
40 
22 
19 
12 
4 
2 
-
1 
14 
14 
16 
28 
18 
8 
2 
2 
52nd 
1941 
41 
25 
12 
10 
8 
1 
2 
1 
16 
12 
14 
14 
20 
16 
4 
4 
53rd 
1949 
46 
24 
14 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
20 
14 
10 
6 
10 
18 
14 
8 
54th 
1951 
32 
31 
15 
12 
5 
1 
-
4 
12 
22 
10 
12 
6 
10 
6 
22 
55th 
1953 
29 
30 
18 
12 
5 
4 
1 
3 
24 
10 
16 
10 
8 
6 
10 
16 
• 
56th 
1955 
51th 
1957 
HOUSE 
41 40 
25 29 
14 13 
9 6 
5 5 
1 5 
1 1 
4 2 
SENATE 
16 18 
24 20 
8 14 
18 12 
8 12 
8 6 
4 4 
16 14 
58th 
1959 
35 
32 
17 
5 
4 
6 
l 
1 
18 
22 
12 
18 
4 
10 
4 
12 
59th 
1961 
35 
23 
19 
10 
4 
3 
4 
3 
18 
20 
12 
10 
14 
2 
10 
14 
60th 
1963 
21 
31 
16 
15 
7 
3 
3 
5 
16 
24 
12 
12 
4 
10 
2 
20 
61st 
1965 
65 
15 
6 
6 
6 
-
1 
4 
33 
8 
15 
12 
8 
8 
3 
10 
62nd 
1967 
50 
18 
14 
6 
4 
4 
-
4 
16 
38 
7 
8 
7 
10 
3 
11 
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\VIth the many complexities of the legislative S) stem. In many ways J. 
freshman member of the legislature IS not likel} to behave in the same 
manner as one \VIth more expenence. Thus, previous legislative expcnence 
is an additional frame of reference for the mdividual legtsla tor. 
LegtSlatwe Norms for Behavzor. The formal rules of procedure governing 
the operations of both hou~es of the General Assembly have been previ-
ously dtscussed. Political anal sts m other st.ttes have noted that there 
appeared to be other more subtle ruks or norms \\ hich guide the conduct 
of legislators \ Vhile these norms .tre not \'<ntten or st.1ted speeifically, 
most members are aware of these informal nlles of the game.' 
A recent studv of four state legtsl.ltures (California "\ew Jersev, Oh10, 
and Tennessee) explored the nahn e of these unofficial rules and con-
cluded that "legislative rules of the game constlh.Ite a body of specific 
rules of behavior generally accepted and understood by all members ,'21 
These rules are frequently the result of customs and are intended "as .1 
de" Ice to secure ... a \vorkincr consensus' . 22 They cover a wide \ anety 
of legiSlative behavior including a member's performance of obhg.1bons, 
re~pect for the rights of other memLers, and interaction between mem-
bers and nonlegislative participants in the legislative system It Is evi-
dent that a norm for behJ.vior does not necess.trily mean the same thmg m 
every state legislature. Thus the norm enforced in Cahfornia may or 
may not apph to Iowa and vice versa 
During a recent se~s10n of the General Assemblv it was possible to gather 
data about the mformal rules of the game operating m the House of 
Representatives However, due to the large number of freshman members 
in thiS session ( 80 out of 124) and the overwhelming preponderance of 
D emocrats ( 101 out of 124 ) there are some questions about the repre-
sentativeness of this sessiOn and consequently about the legislative norms 
operating at that time. The information was gathered through a "forced-
response" questionnaire The drrectwns asked the legtslative respondent 
to mdicate for each of twen t\ -one norms of beha \ 10r \\ he ther the per-
formance of this type of behavtor was expected from members, 1f It was 
generally accepted. if It was not generall) accepted, or tf 1t \\ as taboo 
to act in th1s manner Responses to th1s questionnaire vvere rece1ved from 
105 of the 124 members rep1esentmg a good cross section of the entire 
House. The results are contamed m Table 10. They mdteate that there IS 
a general consensus among meml-ers of the House about norms govern-
ing md1VIdual behaviOr The ltst IS ordered , ~ tth Lhe greatest amount of 
consensus existmg for those pluced first 1 e "bemg enter tmned b) lobb)'-
Isls," and the least <:lmount f01 those placed near the end, i.e., ucarnpaign-
21 John W ahlke H einz Eulau Wtlham Buchanan and LeRoy C Ferguson 
The Leg~latwe System (New York John W1ley & Sons, Inc. 1962) p. 143 
22Jbtd, p. 145 
[33] 
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Table 10 
Legislative Rules of the Game in the Iowa House of Representatives 
(1965) 
( in percentages ) 
NORM FOR LEVEL OF ACCEPTABILITY 
LEGISLATIVE Not 
BEHAVIOR Expected Accepted A ccepted Taboo N A. Total 
Bemg Entertamed by 
Lobbytsts 12 83 2 1 2 100 
Keepmg Your Word 72 20 2 2 4 100 
~1amtaining Your 
Integrity 72 20 2 3 3 100 
Forming Voting Blocs 13 69 9 3 6 100 
Being Willing to 
Compromise 11 69 16 1 3 100 
Bemg a "Loner" 
- 9 67 20 5 101 
Reframing from Personal 
Attacks on Members 64 18 9 6 3 100 
Speaking When Not 
Informed 3 6 64 24 4 101 
«Going Along., with 
Party Leaders 10 63 17 2 8 100 
Spending Spare Time 
with Lobbyists 2 22 62 8 6 100 
Bemg Familiar with 
All Legislation 54 33 7 1 5 100 
Engaging in "Behind the 
Scenes" Activity 28 57 12 3 100 
Being Known as a Repre-
sentative of any 
Interest 2 21 58 16 3 100 
Voting with Opposition 
Party 2 28 49 14 7 100 
Becommg Expert in 
One Area 11 51 30 3 5 100 
Being Known as a 
Legislator with an 
Open Mind 49 43 5 4 101 
Respectmg Member·s Rights 
over His Le{T}slation 48 42 5 1 5 101 
Givin g Top Priority 
to Re-election 14 47 28 7 5 101 
Respecting Older 
Members 6 47 41 1 6 101 
Getting Publicity 8 47 39 3 4 101 
Campru cming Against 
Incumbenlc; 15 34 29 16 6 100 
[34] 
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mg against incumbents."23 Looking at the distribution of the responses 
for all norms leads one to conclude that a great deal of consensus does 
exiSt among members of the Iowa House about these informal rules As 
a matter of fact, all of these dtstnbutiOns except one, ··maintaining vour 
integrity," are unimodel m nature further supporting the obsenation 
that a good deal of agreement does exist about the operation of these 
norms among House members 
Evaluating the amount of consensus 1n terms of the substantive nature of 
these norms leads to the concluswn that the greatest amount of consensus 
eXISts on matters \.\there personal demeanor is involved, such as keepmg 
one's word and maintaining one's mtegrity. The least consensus exiSts 
concerning those actions dealing \.\ ith re-election, camp~ugnmg aga1nst 
mcumbents, and glVmg top pnority to re-election. It 1s mteresting to note 
that the norms of behavior dealing Y."ith a political party and with a 
legtslator's atb.tudes toward lobbying are scattered throughout the rank-
mgs Thus, most agreement among members of the Iowa House concerns 
norms of general personal beha\ 10r and the least with electioneering. The 
consensus about other legislative behavior depends on that specific act. 
A question frequently asked about data such as that presented above 1S 
'Do \anous groups of legtslators such as Republicans or Democrats, fresh-
men or experienced members, differ m their responses to thiS c1uestwn?'' 
Because of the representativeness of the returns it ts posstble to dtvide 
the responses on the basts of political party affiliation and the amount of 
preVIous legtslative expenence of the respondent. 
\Vhen the responses are dtvtded on the basiS of part} , Republicans are 
generally more reluctant to rate any actton at both of the extremes-ex-
pected to perform and taboo to perform-than are the Democrats This 
results in part from the gre,1ter amount of agreement about the degree of 
acceptabthty for any action exhibited by the Republicans. ThlS greater 
agreement is in turn due m part to the smaller number of Repubhcans 
in the 1965 House and the greater suntlarihes among the pE-rsonal and 
soctal backgrounds, however, these differences between the parties are 
not statz.stically s1gnificant. 2A 
23 The rationale for ranking these norms was based on the principle that the 
greatest amount of consensus eXJ.Sted for that norm which has the largest propor-
tion of respondents falling m any smgle category. Thus since the largest propor-
tion of respondents fell into the accepted category for the norm "Being Entertamed 
by Lobbytsts" this norm was considered to have the greatest degree of con-
sensus This procedure was replicated for each of the twenty-one nonns In 
instances where ties occurred such as with the second and thtrd norm and with 
the fourth and ftfth, the proportions m adJacent categones were added together 
untu uch a diShnc.tiOn could be made. 
24 The term statistically significant should not be confused with terms such 
as significant, interesting, Important, etc Statistically signtftc.ant means that 
when a statistical test in this case a cht square test was applied to the data the 
dtfferences between the observed results and the expected results could not have 
been due to chance 
[35] 
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A second factor \vhich rmght account for some of the dtfferences IS the 
amount of preVIous expenence the respondent has as a member of the 
House. These differences are not as great as one might expect and agam 
are not statistically signuiCant Overall, freshman members appear to per-
ceive legislative norms much the same as do the more expenenced legis-
lators. ThiS similanty m percepbon probably stems from their ability to 
sense cc cues" which are given regardmg proper behavior in the Iowa legis-
lature. Thus, in tenns of legislative rules of the game, Republicans and 
Democrats and experienced and freshman members all seem to perceive 
these norms m about the same manner 
CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made In thts chapter to provide the reader with a 
thumbnail sketch of the Iowa legislature and how it operates. We have 
noted that post-World War II legiSlatures have been functioning within 
an envrronment characteriZed by an accelerated rate of social, economic, 
and political change. The dynamic character of post-war Iowa has pro-
duced novel and exceedingly complex problems, many of which have 
been regarded as requiring effective decision making in the legislative 
arena for their solutions. 
The major question which remains to be answered in the future is will 
the Iowa legislature, as an institution of representative government, be 
able to meet thts challenge. Proposals related to streamlining the legisla-
ture-higher salaries, annual sessiOns, rmproved facilities and staff as-
sistance, updating rules of procedure, reapportionment-seem to us as 
steps m the light direcbon. Yet, other conditions, many beyond the drrect 
control of the legislature, appear to be necessary if the legislature IS to 
meet the demands of modem society. For example, "vill the politiCal 
parties of Iowa recruit well-quahfied candidates to run for the legisla-
ture, and '~rill they attempt to Impose discipline upon elected representa-
tives in order to offer the state's electorate viable alternatives to the solu-
tion of social and economic problems? Generally, then, it would appear 
that reforms both inside and outside the Iowa legislature are needed if 
it IS going to make a significant contribution to solving contemporary and 
future public problems. 
[36] 
, 
CHAPTER 
3 
The Kansas Legislature: 
Republican Coalition 
JOHN G CRUMM 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
The Kansas legtslature, which fust met in Topeka m March, 1861, started 
Its lustory under the most tumultuous conditions. Kansas had been a 
battleground, both pohtically and physically, for the pro- and anti-slavery 
forces Only after four attempts at wntmg a constitution that would be 
acceptable to the people of Kansas and the Uruted States Congress was 
success achieved. The anti-slavery forces had been victonous, and the 
Republican party took command of a state government that would be 
under its conbnuous dommance for more than a century Still, the flow 
of blood had not been checked in "Bleedmg Kansas··, there were still 
large sections m the eastern end of the state where southern sympathy 
and pro-slavery sentiment were lugh. Before tlus first session of the Kansas 
legtslature was over, Fort Sumter had been fued upon Kansas had played 
a considerable role m the origms of the Civil War, and now it would 
be deeply embroiled In that war But despite the magnitude of the prob-
lems facmg the new. Inexpenenced, and untned legiSlature, it did manage 
to get the state government established on a frrm basiS and to start it 
out with Its fust year's appropnahons 
ORGANlZA TION AND STRUCTURE 
Problems of organiZation and structure caused relatively little controversy 
in the Wyandotte Convention that drew the permanent constitution of 
Kansas, except on the question of legislative apportionment. The seven-
teen convention delegates who were Democrats did not care for the way 
the thuty-five Republican delegates apportioned the legislative districts 
in the constitutwn, and ultlmately they refused to affix their names to 
the document as a protest agamst this and the fact that certrun parts of 
what IS now Nebraska and Colorado were not included within the boun-
danes of the new state. The bulk of the constitution was hurriedly drawn 
and was largely copied from the contemporary Ohio constitution. 
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There was also a little trouble, as a re!>ult of the apportionment battle, 
over the siZe of the legiSiab" e bodtes This was finally set at twenty-five 
members for the Senate, whiCh could be mcreased to a maxunum of 
thirty-three, and at sevent) -five for the House, which could be raiSed to 
a maxunum of 100 Senate terms "vere set at two years and House terms 
at one year. Sessions were to be held annually. Table 1 shows the changes 
that have been made in the siZe of each house and in the number of 
legislative chstricts since 1859. 
As a result of an 1873 amendment the maximum SlZe of the House of 
Representatives \\as set at 125 and of the Senate at 40. Smce 1876 the 
terms of senators have been four years and those of the House members 
two years There are no staggered terms. 
rear 
1859a 
1862 
1866 
1871 
1876 
1881 
1886b 
Table 1 
Changes in the umber of Kansas State Legislabve Distncts 
and Members m Apportionments, 1859 to 1966 
Senate House 
Districts Members Districts Members 
14 25 14 75 
20 25 75 • 75 
20 25 80 80 
29 33 90 90 
38 40 123 123 
38 40 125 125 
40 40 125 125 
aProVIded by Art. 10 of Wyandotte Constitution. 
bNo change in this number of districts and members through 1966 
Representational Syste'm From the beginrung representation in the Kansas 
legtslature has been based on a system of districts largely following county 
lines. In the original Wyandotte Constitution each organized county was 
guaranteed one representative There were only forty such counties 
mentioned in the original document, but as the western end of the state 
began to develop, more counties were organlZed and the size of the house 
had to be increased to sabsfy thts guarantee The constitution has always 
reouired a reapportionment every five years based on the preVIous year's 
state census. By 1894 all of the present 105 counties had been organized, 
and since then it has become more and more difficult to proVIde one 
representative per county, stay within the lunit of 125 members, and ap-
portion on the basts of population. As early as 1920, for instance, the 
twenty most populous counties contained almost 50 per cent of the popu-
lation Since the other eighty-ftve could cla1m eighty-five representatives 
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in the House, no matter how the remaining forty seats were rustributed, 
half of the population residmg in the smaller counties could control a 
minimum of m·~thirds of the seats By 1960, these eighty-five smaller 
counties, still able to control h"~th1rds of the seats, contamed only 35 
per cent of the state's populatiOn No basic reapporbonment of the Kansas 
House occurred between 1909 and 1959. But due to the fact that the 
constitution gave very httle latitude m the adjustment of rustrictc;, the 
1959 apportionment only slightly rmproved a very bad condition Based 
on 1960 US. Census figures, the population range between the smallest 
and largest d.tstnct before the reapportionment was 2,100 to 114 000 
( 1·54 ) After the 1959 shift of some of the ((extra" seatc; to the more 
populous counbes, the range v. as narrowed to 2 100-69 000 ( 1:33) After 
some prodding by the courts, another reapportionment of the House was 
accomplished in 1964, but thiS was shll w1thm the framework of the eXJst-
mg state constitutional restrictions, and so the range 'A as only reduced 
to 2,100-55,000 ( 1.26) 
In the Senate there has been no restriction on the number of counties that 
may be mcluded m a smgle senatonal dtstnct. Thus there has been no 
constitutional barrier to reasonably equitable apportionment of that body. 
evertheless the Kansas Senate has not exhibited any great dedication to 
reapporb.onmg Itself e\ ery five years on the basis of equal population 
dlstncts In fact there had been onl) hvo comprehensive reapportion-
ments of this body during the frrst sixty years of this century, m 1933 
and 1947, and neither of these could be considered truly equitable The 
1950 US. Census revealed hoVv poorly the senators had done therr JOb 
m 1947, it showed that the range m population of the Senate districts 
\vent from 20,000 to 220,000._or one to eleven By the time of the 1960 
Census t:lus ratio had reached the even more alanntng proportion of one 
to twenty, as the largest diStrict's population swelled to 343,000 and the 
smallest's shrank to 16,000 At this time Glendon Schubert and Charles 
Press, m a study of malapportionment in the f1fty state legislatures, ranked 
the Kansas legislature forty-eighth m the equttabutty of Its apportionment.1 
Finally, under a court order to reapportion on a "one-man-one-vote" basis, 
the Kansas Senate adjusted Its districtfi toward population equality in 
1963. This had to be repassed because of an error m drav. mg dtstrict hnes 
that left several hundred citizens of Kansas outstde any senatonal distriCt, 
but the result was a considerable Improvement over an\ thing that had 
gone before The population of the average distnct was 54,300 according 
to the state's 1965 agricultural census, wtth the largest 61,900 and the 
smallest 47 100 (deVIations of + 14 0 per cent and - 13 6 per cent) This 
still did not please the federal JUdiciary, however; and in December, 1965, 
a three-Judge federal distnct court ruled that the Senate reapportionment 
1 Glendon Schubert and Charles Press "Measuring Malapportionment," Ameri-
can Polittcal Sctence Revtew, LVIII (June 1964), pp. 302-327. 
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VIolated the "equal protection" clause of the U.S. Constitution. Smce the 
apportionment of 1964 did not follow county lines, the court noted that 
the deviations in the rustncts could not be justified on the basiS of the 
use of existing political subruVlSions Its rmplied suggestion was that the 
Senate should either produce an apportionment that is nearly perfect m 
its numerical equality between districts or give some regard to "com-
munities of interest" or boundanes of political subdivisions in its reap-
portionment scheme. The court stayed the execution of this order until 
the election of the next Senate, which Will be in 1968. Presumably the 
Senate will take up this problem again m the 1968 session of the legiSla-
ture. 
On the House side an equitable reapportionment has finally been accom-
plished. Under court chrection a special session in 1966 tossed as1de the 
((one-county-one-vote" rule for the "one-man-one-vote" doctrine. Counties 
\Vere combined and subd1vided, and the result was a devtabon of only 
+ 11.0 per cent and -8 9 per cent from the size of the mean district The 
range, based on the 1965 state agncultural census, was from about 16,000 
to 19,500. It appears as if the House has now achieved an acceptable re-
apponaonmentofitsdistncts. 
Sessions. The Kansas legislature decided in 1875 that it was not necessary 
to meet every year and initiated a constitutional amendment permitting 
only biennial sessions. It was back to annual sessions in 1954 with another 
amendment that established a budget session, limited to thirty calendar 
days in even-numbered years and a regular session in the odd-numbered 
ones. Another change came about due to an amendment adopted in 
November, 1966, which provided for annual regular sessions, but limited 
the even-numbered year sessions to sixty days. 'While there continues to 
be no limit on the length of the odd-numbered year sessions, the legisla-
tor's pay and expense allowance stop after ninety calendar days, and this 
has become quite an effective lrmitmg deVIce The new amendment also 
provides that unfinished busmess during the regular session in an odd-
numbered year may be carried over to the next session without starting 
at the beginning. 
Procedures. The rules of procedure in the Kansas legislature are rather 
typical of other legislative bodies in this country. Some of the maJOr things 
to note about these are as follows:2 
Three readings are requrred of every bill, and they must be 
made on three separate days, except when two-thirds of the 
legislative body decides othenvise. The bill must be read in 
full on the thrrd readmg 
2 A detailed account of rules and procedures of the Kansas legislature is con-
tained in Frederic H. Guild, LegJSlative Procedure in Kansas (Lawrence Gov-
ernmental Research Center University of Kansas, 1956). 
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Bills are referred to the cornmittees by the speaker in the 
House and by the president pro tern in the Senate at the 
second reading 
After a fa\ orable report of the standmg or select committee, 
or the proposal of a committee b11l, or h) the membership 
oveniding an unfa, orable report, a bill goes before the com-
mittee of the whole, which is the entire membership of the 
house acting as ,1 general committee. 
After a favorable report by the committee of the '"hole and 
acceptance of the report bv the house the bill 1s sent to the 
secretary of state for engrossment pnor to the thtrd reading. 
A roll call vote is requrred for final passage (and for all 
jomt resolutions ) . The bill must be read in full at the third 
readmg prior to the final vote. An absolute majont}' of all 
the elected members of the house lS necessa1 y for approvaL 
If the bill IS amended bv the second house, concurrence m 
" these amendments bv the house of origin IS required F.1llmg 
concurrence, it IS sent to a conference committee appomted 
from members of both houses to reconc1le the differences For 
final passage both houses must accept the conference committee 
report 
After transmittal to the governor, he may sign it into law, 
mav hold It for three legislatiYe days wtthout actwn and let 
it become law '" 1thout h1s signature, or he may veto it within 
the three-day penod Overndmg a veto requires a two-thrrds 
ma1onty of the elected members of each house 
As in every legislature, provisions such as these are not preciSely adhered 
to In practice For mstance, even though the rules of both houses reqillfe 
committees to report on each btll, many bills are ne\ er reported back It 
appears to be impossible to find any \vay of enforcing this rule. The re-
qillfement of a full third readmg also IS often overlooked As long as no 
one objects, btlls may be burned through by merely reading the first lme 
of each secbon, or several bills may be read aloud Simultaneously And, 
although a roll call 1s required on each measure, several billc; may be 
grouped together for "bulk votmg," lettmg one roll call applv to the bills 
in the package Each member IS requrred to vote on each bill, but this IS 
seldom enforced Occas1onally, hov. ever, if a bill seems to be fmling for 
lack of suffiCient members present, a "caB of the house" mav be held. 
The chamber doors are locked and the sergeant-at-arms and h1s assistants 
go through the buildmg m search of absentees The leg1slature also has 
found a way of gethng around the "pocket \ eto" by postponmg sine die 
adjournment until three days after passage of Its last btU. This also makes 
it possible to bnng the members back for an ovemdmg vote m case of 
a direct veto In practice, Kansas governors have used the veto very spar-
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mgly, in 1965 the governor vetoed only 3 of the 531 bills that came across 
lus desk. 
The committee of the whole house IS probably the most mtereshng msti-
tutlon of the Kansas legiSlature. The speaker will yteld hiS charr dunng 
these meetmgs to one of the other members and a general arr of in-
formality prevails. The bills are read, debated, and amended section by 
sechon, but votes are not recorded m the journal and most of the formal 
rules of the house are in abeyance. The committee may recommend that 
the bill be passed as IS, passed with amendments, rejected, or set aside 
for more deliberation Qwte naturally, smce the committee consists of all 
the members of the house, the fate of a bill on fmal passage can be pre-
meted quite accurately from the report of thiS committee. In large measure 
the Republican leadership uses this committee as a "gatekeeper," gen-
erally permitting only those measures It has sanctioned to get through 
the gate It also IS used as a de\ Ice for reconciling opposition, should it 
appear, and for bnngmg about a concensus 
A look at the roll calls on bills dunng any sessiOn of the Kansas legiSlature 
would suggest that it IS one of the most harmonious legislative bodies m 
the world. In the 1965 sessiOn about 2 per cent of the measures that 
came to a third reading in both the House and Senate failed to pass in the 
roll call of that house. And of those that passed, 91 per cent in the House 
and 92 per cent in the Senate received majorities that were unanimous 
or nearly unanimous (less than 15 per cent of the members in opposition). 
Obviously, a look at the roll calls alone does not reveal the conflict in the 
legislature, which is more apparent at the committee stage and particu-
larly In the committee of the whole Thus, to a large degree, conflict IS 
resolved at this stage or there is no roll call vote. 
The Kansas legislature, like most others, has too many committees. Pres-
ently there are forty-five m the House, and they account for a total of 
506 committee posts. Hence, the average committee has a little over 
eleven members and the average member serves on about four committees 
In the Senate the committees number thirtv-one 'vith 264 committee posts 
The Senate committees average about eight and one-half mem hers per com-
mittee, and the senators serve on the average with about six and one-half 
committees. Some senators, if they were able to attend all meetings of all 
committees to which they are named, would consider as committee mem-
bers over 300 bills in a regular session. With a total of seventy-seven com-
mittees (including one jomt committee), Kansas IS exceeded by only five 
other states in total number of legislahve committees 
Committee chairmen ha\ e a rather powerful poSition in the Kansas sys-
tem. They schedule and call the meetings, set the agenda, preside, and 
can influence in various v\ ays the fate of bills coming before therr com-
mittees As m many legiSlatures, the leadership uses the key committee 
chairmanslup posts as a means of control. Customarily, all committee 
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chairmen, and even all VIce-chairmen, are Republicans, although the 
Democrats generallv recehe an equitable share of the membershtp on 
committees. Seniority lS a consideration in appomtment of chairmen, but 
no strict rule 1s apphed. Usuall) it IS necessary to have sen.ed at least 
one term before being considered for a chairmanslup. 
On the House s1de committee appointments are made by the speaker 
who generally consults rather closely with other members of his party 
Probably the most tmportant committees m the lower house are \\lays 
and means (appropriations), assec;sment and taxation , education, judicia.IJ 
roads and highways state affairs, revision of calendar, and (during the 
1965 and 1966 sessiOns) legislative apportionment. A survey of House 
members in 1965 showed that they rated the ways and means committee 
as by far the most important ( 82 per cent ranked it first), the state affairs 
committee second ( 12 per cent), and the education committee third ( 6 
per cent).3 Other kno\-..ledgeable observers might have placed the un-
obtrust\le commtttee on rc\ ision of calendar near the top Its power LS 
particularly significant toward the end of the session because of its con-
trol of the calendar. It c.1n ultimately detemune which bills \\'ill be per-
mitted to come up for a vote and v.•hich will dte on the calendar. The 
Repubhcan leaders generally keep rather tight control O\ er thiS five-man 
committee. usualh, they let only one Democrat, usually the minority 
floor leader Sit on thlS committee. Apparently the behmd-the-scenes opera-
nons of thiS committee escape the cognizance of the rank-and-hie members 
of both parties. 
On the Senate side the crucial committees almost exactly parallel those 
of the House. In the Senate the ways and means committee was also 
ranked frrst by the senators (61 per cent ), the federal and state affarrs 
comrruttee was ranked second ( 14 per cent), and the assessment and 
taxation committee was thtrd ( 11 per cent). As with the calendar com-
mittee tn the House, the Senate commtttee on reviSion of calendar and 
rules can also be a significant factor influencmg the fate of legislation, but 
only three of the thuty-four senators mterviewed ranked 1t m first place 
An additional important committee, which has no counterpart m the 
House, IS the Senate committee on committees. As the name tmplies, It 
selects the committee members and chairmen. Ag.un, on the Senate side 
the Repubhcan leadership IS m complete controL In the 1965-1966 ses-
SIOns the prestdent pro tern "as chamnan of the committee on com-
mittees and dee-chairman of the judiciary committee and the rev1ston of 
calendar and rules committee. The majonty floor leader v-as chairman of 
3 I am indebted to Professor Earl Nehring of the Pohtical Sc1encc Department 
of the Umvers1ty of Kansas who made available all of the data and coded re-
sponses to a survey of 143 Kansas legiSlators conducted under h1s supervision 
during the 1965 sess10n of the legtslature Findmgs from thiS survey are used 
extensively throughout this paper. 
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the calendar revision committee and of the assessment and taxation com-
mittee and a member of the committee on committees. 
Legzslative Services. The legislative council was a Kansas mvenhon The 
necesstt\ that ,,·as the mother of thts in\ en bon \Vas the combination of 
" 
very short sessions and ver) long mtenm penods. The Idea seems to 
have germmated after an extensive stud\ of the Kansas tax system by a 
group of experts ''ho \\ ere sponsored by the state chamber of commerce 
111 the early 1930s The proposals that resulted from the one-and-one-half 
year stud\ fruled to gmn acceptance m the legtslature, but the manager 
of the chamber of commerce became convmced that if the legislators 
themseh es ''ere personal!) mvolved In the supen iswn of technical studies, 
the legislahire ' ' ould be more receptive to the policy conclusiOns reached 
through the research process The chamber and se, ·eral promment Republi-
cans and Democrats took the idea to Professor Frederic H. Guild who im-
medtately saw the potential value of such an agency and set to work to 
get the plan adopted The first formal meetmg of the council \Vas on 
May 15, 1933. 
An essential feature of the legislative council plan is the permanent staff 
of quahf1ed researchers The Kansas council's research staff, known as 
the research department, consiSts of a director and twelve full-time staff 
members. In recent years the staff has been supplemented by the em-
ployment of graduate student interns supported by the Ford F oundation 
State Legislative Internship program. The research departrne.Qt provides 
the necessary research assistance for the council committees and carries 
on cononumg research studies into legislative problems as instructed by 
the legislature, the council, or council committees. It also provides con-
siderable spot research for standing committees and individual legislators. 
During the sessions virtually all of the staff's time is spent in providing 
legislative reference-type services; in other words, answering specific 
questions such as what the effects of a new la\\ will be, what other states 
are doing in a particular held of legislatiOn, or merelv venf)in~ the pas-
sage or status of a bill The research department itself is not to make 
recommendations on pohcy, but only to report the data and findings on 
the problems it has been mstructed to study. 
There is no separate legislative fiscal agency in Kansas. Consequently, 
the research department of the legislative council performs the function 
of f1scal analvsis. One member of the staff, designated the fiscal analyst, 
has the pnmarv responsib1litv m this area and works closelv \vtth the 
council's assessment and taxation and its budget committees The legisla-
ture also gets fiscal assistance from the st aff of the department of finance. 
The membership of the council is spearheaded by the lieutenant governor 
and the speaker of the House, who are ex off1cio and who choose the re-
maining twenty-fh e members Their choice is rather circumscribed, how-
ever. It IS subject to the approval of the members of the respective houses 
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from \\ hiCh the} are appomted, and there are four qatutory restrictions 
on the selection process ( 1 ) The major political parties must be repre-
sented on the council m proportion to their relative strength m each house 
( 2) There must be at least one representative from each congre.ss10nal 
district on the council. ( 3) There must be representation from each of the 
more unportant committees of both houses ( 4) Fifteen of the appointed 
members must be selected from the House of Representati\ es and ten 
from the Senate. 
An anal' SIS of council appointments benveen 1942 and 1962 reveals that 
the reqmrement of proportional representation among the major parties 
has been foJlo,ved conststently.4 Although the requirement that all con-
gressiOnal districts be represented has alwa\ s been met in council ap-
pointments, there has been considerable divergence from equal represen-
tation in council appomtments Of the 250 council appointments during 
this nventt-y~r penod, one of the western d1stncts accounted for ftfty-
rune \vhile one of the eastern dtstncts accounted for only twentv-six. The 
western half of the state consisted geographically dunng tlus penod of 
h\~o congressiOnal districts and the eastern half of four The population 
in the eastern section v.;as four times that of the western Still, 116, or 46 
per cent, of the council appomtments v,;ere gl\.en to the western section. 
To some extent this can be accounted for by the fact that representation 
in the House was largely based on counties, and shghtly over half (59 
out of 105) of the state's counties are m the western sectiOn But another 
factor IS that the leadership of the Republican party has come primanlv 
from the ,..,estern part of the state, and most of the Republican influen-
tials in the legislature manage to get appointed to the council. Related to 
thiS is the fact that turnover of legislative seats IS less m the \.Vest than in 
the east It has been unusual to have a legislator appomted to the council 
unless he has served more than one term in the legislature The average 
council memberc; between 1933 and 1962 had a httle less than five years 
of legislative expenence 
The legislative leadership IS always \Yell represented on the council Of 
the fifteen councils between 1933 and 1962, the president pro tern of the 
Senate has been appomted to twelve, the speaker pro tern of the House 
to ten, and the maJority floor leader of the House to etght. Also, during 
this period about 60 per cent of the council members have been either 
chairmen or VIce-chairmen of on~ of the ten most tmportant committees in 
each house m terms of leg:tslative workload 
4 \..fuch of the analysiS m thiS section 1s based on Wilham H Cape and John 
Paul Bay An Analyszs of the Kansas Legzslative Counctl and its Research De-
partment (Lawrence Governmental Research Center University of Kansas, 
1963). Addtnonal data were obtamed from a survey of all legislative counctls 
and servtce agenc1es conducted by the Citizens Conference on State Legtslatures 
See CalVIn W Clark A Survey of Legislative Services m the Fifty States ( Kan-
sas City Cttizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1967), pp. 99-101 
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In a recent study of the Kansas Legislative Council, William Cape and 
John Bay concluded that the selection of council members can be an 
issue which results in an intraparty factional struggle. Withm the legis-
lature, committeemen are often chosen for therr allegiance to a dominant 
party faction Thus, there IS a tendency for council memberslup to reflect 
the representabon of the dominant faction through the appomtment of 
key committee chairmen and vice-chamnen. The end result is that the 
council can become an agent of the dominant Republican facbon which 
further mcreases its mfluence and control. s 
The average legtslator seems to regard the legislative council quite highly; 
there 1s rather broad general support for It m both houses, and there is 
rather httle opposition to it, even among the Democrats Allegations of 
bias are rare and are never expressed publicly Interviews with 143 of the 
165 legislators in 1965 suggest that the council's relationships with the 
legislators are good. The quesbon was asked: "How important do you 
feel the legtslative council 1s?" The results are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Legislators' Evaluations of the Importance of the Legislative Council 
( m percentages) 
Not very important 
Farrly unportant 
Very important 
Don't know, or others 
House 
4 
42 
43 
11 
100 
Senate Republicans Democrats 
12 
41 
44 
3 
100 
4 
40 
49 
7 
100 
8 
45 
33 
14 
100 
Total 
6 
42 
43 
9 
100 
It appears that the Democrats were able to restrain their enthusiasm for 
the council a httle more than the Repu bhcans, but it is certamly not 
likely that they would lead a revolt agatnst It or even try to do away 
with It should they gain control of the legislature. In fact, it appears as 
if the Democrats have found the council's research department as 
useful as have the Republicans. Thus, they apparently do not regard it as 
generally unreliable or as biased m a partisan direction. In the 1965 sur-
vey the question was asked of the legiSlators, "About how many times 
have you, personally or through a secretary, made use of the research 
dPpartment of the legislanve council?, The results are displayed in 
Table 3 
5 Cape and Bay, op. cit, p. 66. 
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Table 3 
Legtslators' Use of the Legtslative Council 
(In percentages) 
House Senate Republicans Democrats 
. ever used it 6 
A few bmes 38 
Once or twice a week 22 
Often, many times, da.Uy 23 
Continuous use 10 
24 
24 
32 
21 
0 Do not add to 100 per cent due to roundmg. 
3 
40 
19 
26 
11 
100° 
8 
24 
29 
24 
16 
Total 
5 
34 
23 
25 
13 
100 
The maJOr function of the legislative council IS to "prepare a legislative 
program m the form of bills or otherwiSe . . to be presented at the 
next sessiOn of the legtslature." Hence, some twenty to forty bills are 
placed m the hopper dunng the regular sessiOn by the council. In view 
of the fact that there IS considerable legislall\ e power and mfluence rep-
resented on the council , one might expect that Its bills would fare much 
better than the indt\.Idual mcmbei s' bills Such IS not the case to any 
significant degree. Between 1935 and 1961 council btlls and bills embody-
ing council recommendations rated 52 per cent acceptance b\ the legisla-
ture, compared to 47 per cent acceptance for the a\erage bill proposed In 
the legtslature This does not appear to be an outstandmg record on the face 
of it, but it should be \ICY\. ed in light of the fact that many of the most 
controversta.l ISsues are passed to the council Often the legtslature "passes 
the buck'' to the council In order to avOid or delay making a decision that 
they would rather avoid In some states, sendmg a bill or Issue to mtenm 
study or to the legtslative council IS merely a humane way of ktlhng It. 
This is undoubtedly pracbced tn some degree in the Kansas legtslature 
Or It may be sent to council with the hope that It can reconcile confhcts 
and achieve a compromise where the legislature Itself cannot Conse-
quently, the 52 per cent success rating 1s reasonably good considering 
the issues With wluch the council has to deal. 
The other maJOr legislatl\.·e services In Kansas are proVIded by the state 
library and the revisor of statutes The hbrary employs a Iegtslattve refer-
ence libranan and makes other hbrary employees available to the legisla . 
ture as needed. It IS quite extensheh used while the legislature is m ses-
sion, primarily perfonn1ng a sort of bibliographiCal function in whiCh the 
staff locates Citations or actual arttcles and other matenal on a subJect 
requested by a legislator. 
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During the session the reVISor's rna JOT function is bill dra.ftmg. ThiS serv-
ICe IS proVJded for any legislator who requests it, but it IS not mandatory 
that all bills are drafted by the reviSor's office. Virtually without exception, 
all bills that are not money bills are reviewed by the reVISor at some 
stage m the legislative process In the mterim the reVISor, as lus title 
Imphes, is involved in a continuous statutory or code revision. 
Secretanal and clencal serviCes are proVIded to the legislators through a 
stenograpluc pool m the House, but each of the senators has a personal 
secretary. Only the legislative leaders have their own offices. 
Total expenditures on legislative sefVlces, operation of the legislative 
branch, and compensation of legislators amounted to $1,935,000 during 
the 1963-64 biennium. In this respect the state ranked twenty-ninth among 
the hfty states, wluch, comcidentally, is where it ranked in respect to 
total population in 1960. It costs each citizen of Kansas, on the average, 
a httle less than 25 cents to keep hiS state legislature going The nearly 
one-million-dollar-per-year expenditure on the legislative branch amounted 
to about $6,000 per legislator. 
Relatively speaking, the Kansas 1egislature does not seem to be lacking 
in legislative services, although a better coordination of services might be 
in order. Cape and Bay suggest that the council's research department, the 
office of revisor of statutes, and the legislative reference service may be 
Involved in performing duphcate services for the legislature.6 All three 
services seem to be involved in some way in legislative reference, and it 
might at least be practical to consohdate this function in a smgle agency. 
The legislative council has an expert staff, and because of tlus 1t re-
ceives many requests for assistance, and many of these are of a legiS-
lative reference nature The energies of the council staff should probably 
not be dissipated in tlus way. Strengthening of a consolidated reference 
service would be the solution to tlus. 
Years 
1901-1945 
1947-1963 
1963 
1965 
6Jbid., p. 115. 
Table 4 
Length of Legislative Sessions Since 1901 
Calendar Days 
70 
86 
99 
102 
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Legislative Days 
Senate 
50 
60 
67 
65 
House 
52 
62 
70 
68 
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The LegtSlature s Workload and Output.7 The recent regular sessiOns of 
the Kansas legiSlature ha\e been exceptionally long, even though sessiOns 
have been mcreasing in length for some time The 1963 sessiOn consumed 
99 calendar days and the 196-5 sessiOn 102 da"s Table 4 below sho,-...s 
the increasmg length of the legiSlatn,e sess10ns dunng the last two regular 
meetings and dunng a recent penod as compared to an earher one. 
The legiSlators, therefore, have been in these recent sessions bumping 
up agamst the hmit of ninety calendar days, which lS the maximum num-
ber of days for which they can be prud The increasmg length of the 
sessions has been due, qwte obviously, to the greater work load placed 
on the legiSlature m terms of number of bills introduced and number of 
enactrnents 
Actually, the upsurge in mtroducnons has occurred only recently Dunng 
most of thiS centurv there was a steady declme The average fell from 
a httle over 1,300 bills m the 1901-1947 penod to an average of 880 in 
1947 to 1963 But 1965 brought an mcrease all the way up to 1,019. 
Nevertheless, since the early 1940s, the number of enacbnents has steadily 
nsen. This means that a larger percentage of the bills are becommg law. 
During 1901 to 1945, 27 per cent were enacted, but smce 1947 the figure 
has risen to almost 55 per cent. In 1965, there were 529 enactments, which 
represented 52 per cent of the introduct10ns ThlS lS a rather lugh enact-
ment rate, constderably above that of other states in the region, Wlth the 
excepbon of Nebraska In Iowa, for example, durmg the 1965 sessiOn it 
was 34 per cent, in Missouri It was 31 per cent; and in Oklahoma, 47 per 
cent One can only speculate as to the reasons for thiS high percentage 
in Kansas, although a few observations m1ght shed some hght on the 
reasons 
The number of mtroducbons may be held down somewhat by the fact that 
there IS some consolidation by the device of "committee bills" and because 
a broad area of IegJSlaoon IS covered by the relatively small uumber of 
legiSlative council bills mtroduced durmg each regular sessiOn Also, 
because the mmority party is so weak, very little legislation is mtroduced 
by Its members Bills that are introduced have a relatively good chance 
of passage, probably because of the deVIces for achieving concensus such 
as the committee of the whole. There are also ample opportunihes for 
considering amendments to legislation in this system, and an analysis of 
bills would probably show that many come through considerably altered. 
Where are the real hurdles in this legislative process? As previously Indi-
cated, most of the bills that are lolled d1e in committee or on thP calendar 
If a bill actually gets to the floor for a vote m 1ts house of ongm, tt has 
slightly better than a three-to-one chance of being signed mto law During 
7 Except for some updatmg of the data, the analysis m thlS section is largely 
based on Earl Nehring, "The Workload of the Kansas Legislature," XIX, Your 
Government (October 1963). 
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the post-World \Var II penod, for every one hundred bills mtroduced in 
either house, about seventy would get to the floor, but only an average 
of two or three \vould be elrmmated at that point. Generally, about siXty-
seven would go on to the next house which would pass an average of 
83 per cent of these, or roughly hfty-siX out of the siXty-seven. Typically, 
one of these would die m conference committee, and there was about a 
ftfty-ftfty chance of one being vetoed by the governor. So fLfty-four or 
fifty-five of every one hundred bills dropped m the hopper will eventually 
go onto the statute books. There has been httle change in thiS pattern 
Since 1947, and there is httle difference between the nvo houses m the 
percentage of bills killed 
The Kansas legislature, much hke other legislabve bodies, has had a de-
Clded tendency to leave most of the formalities of bill consideration and 
passage until very late in the sess10n. Tlus undoubtedly stems from the 
realities of the pohtical process and 1s not b.kely to be radically altered, 
but It IS a matter of grave concern to those interested in well-considered 
and carefully drawn legtslation In the regular sessions between 1951 and 
1963, an average of 59 per cent of the b1lls that became law were passed 
In the legislature during the last three days of the session ( excludmg the 
three days at the end of the session, dunng which no bills are considered) . 
Th1s meant that an average of 285 laws were approved by each sessiOn 
durmg these three days, while the other 200 completed thel.l' legislative 
journey sometime during the precedmg three months. Of courS'\ considera-
tion of these measures that pas'>ed 1n the last few days mav have started 
\ ery early m the session; ne\ ertheless, the floor debate and fmal passage 
of these 285 bills had to be squeezed into a very short penod of tune 
The recently approved conshtutional amendment pennitting bills mtro-
duced in the fll'st sessiOn of a b1ennium to retrun their status m the legis-
lative process at the bPginning of the second session should help reheve 
the '1og Jam" in the first sesswn at least 
TilE NATURE OF THE KA."1SAS LEGISLATOR 
Election, Recruitment, Induction. Politically, Kansas is generally classified 
as a ((modified one-party" state or, at best, a semi-competitive state. In 
terms of the party divi'>ion in the legislature and of the activitv of the 
m1noritv partv in recruiting for and contesting legislative elections, it comes 
closer to a straight one-party state. 
Interparty rivalry in legtslatne electiOns 1s comparatively low in Kansas. 
In the average general election between 1940 and 1962, fort\ -three of the 
125 House seats went uncontested An average of eleven of the fortv S""nate 
seats had no general election contests In the primanes of the two parties 
durmg this penod, Republicans competed for nomination to seats m the 
House 22 per cent of the time, and Democrats fought each other only 6 
per cent of the time In the Senate primanes, competition among the 
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Republicans eXIsted in 45 per cent of the mstances, and Democrats had 
contests m only five per cent of the possible opportunities for a contest. 
V. 0 Key has hypothestzed that in the modified one-party states such 
as Kansas the electoral conflict becomes concentrated in the pnmary of 
the dorrunant pa.rl).8 ThiS IS borne out m Kans1s to some extent but 
there IS not e\len very much hfe in the Republican primanes for legtsla-
tive nommabons There IS considerably more primal) activity in other 
states of low party competition than there is in Kansas 9 Th1s should not 
suggest, however, that the Kansas Republican party IS a unifted, mono-
lithic organization th~t IS able to stifle or control 1ntraparty conflict 
Rather, there are two other explanations that seem to account for thiS 
phenomenon FirSt, the factions that do eXISt m the Republican party are 
sectionallv onentcd Generally, in any given legtslative district, factional 
conflict tends to be nil Secondly, the mducements to run for legislabve 
offiCe m Kansas are not \; ery great e1ther part} has been pa.rticularly 
well orgaruzcd for recru1ting purposes, and neither can offer legislabve 
candidates much help m their camprugns fmancially or otherwise Legis-
lanve compensation IS still below par desptte a recent increase Cam-
paigning and even servmg in the legiSlature mvolve financial sacrlftces 
for most canchdates 
In the matter of support from the pohtical parties, neither party has ever 
provided Its candidates for any office with very much help Pnnc1pally 
because of the relanvely rural nature of the state, Kansas parties have 
never developed the highly articulated precmct organlZahons that are 
more characteristic of urban polihcs Another factor has been the electoral 
wealmess of the minonty party Its strength always seems to have been 
below that threshold point beyond which one success can lead to another. 
That is, It seems to have been trapped in a defeatmg sprral where 1t 
cannot attract good candidates because It cannot hope to win most d.Is-
tncts; it cannot wm In most diStricts because of Its weak party organiza-
tion, it cannot seem to build up Its organizabon because 1t cannot attract 
good candidates; and so on 
Organizationally, the Republicans are not much better off. They are in 
the comfortable posibon, however, of not haVIng to support therr candidate 
very heavily, nor do they find It necessary to build a strong party machine 
at the grass-roots level. The Republican politicians are fond of saying 
that they can win with merely the "walk-m vote," which means that they 
feel little need for organizational efforts toward activating and mobilizing 
the voters. 
That legislanve candidates are pretty much on their own in running for 
off1ce is indicated by the fact that only 5 per cent of the respondents 
8 V. 0 Key, American State Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), 
pp. 172-173. 
9 Ibid. , pp. 106-109, 172-173. 
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in the 1965 survey of Kansas legiSlators mentioned that they received 
financial help from therr party. About 60 per cent said that the party 
helped them by providing speakers, settmg up rallies and meetings, and 
m other small \vays, but 30 per cent srud they had no real help from therr 
party Interestingly, more Repubhcans ( 33 per cent) said therr party 
proVIded no help than did Democrats (21 per cent). When asked what 
percentage of the cost of campaigrung came from their O\Vll funds, 49 
per cent of the respondents said, "100 per cent!" Only 15 per cent main-
tained that they received one-half or more of their camprugn money from 
other than personal funds Apparently even the pressure groups are not 
very heaVIly involved m financmg legislahve campaigns. Fortunately for 
the candidates, they do not fmd It necessary to spend much money m a 
legtslative campaign Accordmg to the 1965 survey, the median expendi-
ture was shghtly over $200. But man; a prospecbve candidate must won-
der If it IS really \\·orth\vh:ile to spend even this much of his O\vn money 
for a chance at gettmg a low-paymg JOb that will probably mvolve ad-
ditional financial sacnfices. 
In all but a handful of states the compensabon that legislators receive 
constitutes no inducement to seek legtslahve office. This certainly has 
been the case in Kansas. Until 1962, legislative compensation was set by 
the state constitution and could be changed only by amendment. Smce 
statehood, it had been changed only once-from a basic pay of $3 per 
day to $5 per day in 1949. The latter amendment also provided for $7 
a day m expenses while the legislature was in session. Limits were im-
posed, however, on the num her of days one could be paid in a regular 
sess10n (sixty days) and a special or a budget session (thirty days ) So, 
in the average biennium the Kansas legislator received a compensation, 
including an ex-pense allowance, of around $1,000 for the two years A 
survey of 146 of the 165 legiSlators conducted in 1959 revealed widespread 
dissatisfaction with the eXIsting pav levels. Eighty-eight per cent felt that 
there was a genuine need for a substanbal raise in compensation, and 83 
per cent said that therr service m the legislature resulted in a loss of in-
come for them. When asked what they thought would be a reasonable 
compensahon, the greatest number of answers fell within the range of 
$20 to $25 per day. 
In 1960 a constitutional amendment was submitted that would have 
rrused legislative pay to $15 per day and the daily expense allowance to 
$15, with a maXImum for a total compensation placed at $1,350 for the 
biennium. The voters would have none of this, and it was soundly de-
feated Two years later the legtslature struck back with a proposed amend-
ment to remo\ie all pay provisions from the constitution and permit the 
establishment by statute of the levels of pay and other compensation. 
Rather surprisingly, thlS was approved, and the next sessiOn of the legiS-
lature set about immediately to rruse legislative pay to $10 per day and 
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the expense allowance to $15 per day Pay and expense allowances were 
}united, of course, to cover runety calendar days dunng the regular ses-
SIOns and th.uty calendar days for the budget or special session. In ad-
dition, an expense allowance of $50 per month was granted for the 
months when the legiSlature "vas not m session. Expense allowances \\ere 
raised agam in 1967 to $25 per day \\hile in session and to $100 a 
month during the interim. It is now posstble for the legiSlator to rece1ve 
a total of $4,150 during the odd-numbered years ~1nd ~3,100 dunng 
the even-numbered years, or $7 150 for the biennntm in pay and expense 
allowances 
Soil, Kansas does not pay 1ts legiSlators a living wage. According to pay 
scales pre\ athng 1n 1964-65, Kansas ranked thirtieth in legtslative com-
pensation Among the eighteen states \\ tth annual sessions at that t::Ime, 
It ranked fifteenth in compensation, and the recent mcrease has only 
shghtly Improved this situation Calculations based on other responses by 
the legislators m 1965 reveals the financtal phght of the Kansas legislator. 
The median total income for these lawmakers came to a httle over $12,000 
per year in 1964 Thev estimated that the} spent about three and one-
half days a month (the median figure) on legislative busmess when the 
legiSlature was not in session. In a hvo-year penod the average leg1slator 
\vlll now spend five months in legislatJ.ve sess10ns and about hvo months 
1 not countmg weekends ) In legtslah\e business durmg the mterim Add 
to this a month for campatgning In the pnmary and general elecbons, and 
the result IS a conservative estimate of eight months for the b1enruum or 
an average of approXImate!} four months a year Assummg that the in-
and out-of-sessiOn expense and mileage allowances cover actual out-of-
pocket costs the legiSlator's income from the state IS only $1,200 ($10 
per day for 120 days ) for this e1ght months of \VOrk Since the average 
Kansas legiSlator earned $12,000 a year m his regular occupation, he 
would normally receive $8,000 for that amount of workmg time Thus, 1t 
could be argued that pay should be mcreased about six and one-half trmes 
in order that running for and servmg in the legislature would not const::I-
tute a finanCial sacrifiCe 
Compositzon and Turnover Despite the lack of Inducements to run for 
office, the background of the average Kansas legislator reveals him to be 
considerably better educated than the average c1hzen of the state and 
probably better quahfted for his legislative task than one \Vould have a 
nght to expect. The following compares the medtan school years com-
pleted by the cibzens of Kansas ( 1960 census) and the Kansas legislators 
( 1965 survey) . 
State population twenty-five years and older 
Kansas House members 
Kansas Senators . . 
11.7 years 
14 8 years 
16.4 years 
From this, it can be seen that moot of the House members had completed 
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two or more years of college and most of the senators were college gradu-
ates, wlule slightly Jess than half of the citizens of Kansas had finished 
high school. 
The Kansas legislature has been dominated by farmers to a larger extent 
than most other legislatures in this country, but to no greater degree than 
would be expected considering the agncultural onentab.on of the state's 
population and economy. In Kansas, the farmers are the most numerous 
group in the lower House, while lawyers are the most numerous group 
in the Senate. As one can see from Table 5, lawyers have been represented 
in the Kansas legislatures in about the same proportions as in other legis-
latures throughout the country. There was a slight decrease in the number 
of lawyers in the Kansas House of Representatives m 1965 as compared 
Table 5 
Occupational Classification of Kansas and Other States 
(in percentages) 
Occupational 
Class 
48 States-1949 Kansas-1949-59 Kansas-1965 
Hoose Sen. Tot. House Sen. Tat. Hoose Sen. Tot. 
Agriculture 20 21 20 41 22 37 40 25 36 
Law 19 34 22 24 44 28 1t3 45 24 
Merchant 14 16 14 10 9 10 8 5 7 
Banking and Trusts 
Real 
2 2 2 3 5 3 5 0 4 
Estate/ Insurance 7 7 7 5 7 5 6 13 8 
Medical 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 1 
Others 37 19 33 16 12 16 22 22 22 
Sources: 
Bernard L. Barnard, t<The Legislature of Kansas: An Appraisal" (Unpublished 
Ph D. dissertation, American University, 1949 ); Kansas Legislature, House and 
Senate Journals for 1949 through 1959 and 1005. 
to the earlier period, and this appears to have been counteracted by a 
small increase m the number of bankers and persons of miscellaneous 
occupations. Whether or not this 1s a trend could not be ascertained as 
yet. In general terms, however, the occupational structure of the legislative 
borues of Kansas is not dissimilar from that of other such bodies in the 
country. 
On the average, the Kansas legislators have had a considerable amount of 
political and government experience before going to the legislature. In 
1965, 71 per cent of the members of the House and 63 per cent of the 
members of the Senate had held a government position at some time 
prior to coming to the legislature. In that year 77 per cent of the senators 
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and 53 per cent of the House members held an appombve or elective 
position w1th therr party before commg to the legiSlature. Furthermore, 
m the 1965 session about 45 per cent of the House members and about 
one-fourth to one-tlurd of the senators had served m therr respective 
howes for at least one term preVIously. 
Comparatively speaking, the Kansas legislature has not been noteworthy 
m keepmg the services of those \VIth previous expenence m legislature 
Until recently, m fact, the turnover rate m the Kansas legiSlature has 
been extremely high. Between 1901 and 1931 there was an average of 
seventy-nine new members m each term m the House-wluch meant a 
turnover rate of 63 per cent-and of tlurty-three new faces m the Senate 
-an 82 per cent ratel Table 6 present<; the turnover rates, or percentage 
of new members, from 1933 (when only three senators returned) to the 
most recent sessiOn. 
The table indicates that there has been a decrease since 1933, but that 
turnover IS still quite lugh It has been considerably above the national 
average, whiCh was 34 per cent in both houses m 1963 The reasons be-
hmd Kansas' lugh rate are not altogether clear, nor are the reasons for 
the recent reduction One obvious hypothesis is that the low legislative 
pay m Kansas is responsible. Lockard, m correlatmg pay rates Wlth turn-
Table 6 
Turnover in the Kansas Legislature-1933-1965 
( m percentages) 
First Year New Members 
of Term Senate House 
1933 
1935 
1937 
1939 
1941 
1943 
1945 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1955 
1957 
1959 
1961 
1963 
1965 
Average 
93 
80 
70 
80 
63 
65 
73 
45 
58 
69.7 
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63 
47 
53 
55 
44 
43 
34 
42 
50 
37 
37 
34 
53 
31 
51 
26 
35 
43.2 
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over rates m the fifty states m 1963, found no relation, so tlus does not 
appear to be a factor Io Sbll, the rate of pay might in\ olve different fi-
nanctal sacrifices ill chfferent states as a result of the varymg length of 
sessiOns and other factors. If one could devise an "index of financial 
depnvahon" for legtslators, It 1S possible that this might be correlated 
with turnover. It 1S somewhat early to determine whether the pay raise 
in Kansas m 1963 ·will have an} effect on this state's turnover rate. 
Some light can be shed on the matter of the turnover rate in Kansas If 
we examine \vhat happened to those individuals who did not return to 
their seats ill the legislature from one term to the next Of the forty-
four House members 'vho had been in the 1963-64 legiSlature but had 
not been elected to the 1965-66 term, thirteen ran in the general election 
of 1964 but were defeated, and five ran m their party's pnmary and were 
defeated at that stage. These eighteen incumbents \vho failed at the 
polls could be considered "involuntary retirements." Nine of the forty-
four sought other posts seven runrung for the state senate, one for at-
torney general, and one for U.S House of Representatives. One repre-
sentative died before the 1964 elections, and ten apparently rebred 
voluntarily from elective state pos1tion. The story is about the same in 
the Senate. Twenty-three of the Senate incumbents failed to return in 
1965-eight through defeat at the polls (four in the primanes and four 
in the general election) , three by 1unning for higher office; two because 
of death; and ten by voluntary retirement. 
The illCumbents who falied to gam renonnnation or re-election in 1964 
represented a signifiCant contribution to the high turnover rate In the 
House 18 per cent of the Incumbents \vho filed for re-election failed to 
return, and in the Senate 32 per cent \vho ran were defeated It is chf-
ftcult to compare these figures \Vlth other state legislatures, since the 
data are not readily available, but they can be compared with Congress, 
where in the four electiOns between 1954 and 1960, an average of only 
6 per cent of the incumbents running for r~election lost in either the 
primary or the general election. The relatively high rate of incumbent 
failure in Kansas electwns may, agam, be related to the wealmess of the 
party organizations in the state. Particularly, the lack of any open endorse-
ment of candidates by the party organization before the primary could 
have contributed to the rather large number of incumbents who were 
denied renomination. 
One of the significant pohtical effects of the high turnover is the great 
degree of influence wielded by the uveteran" legislators. A uveterann 
rmght be defined as anyone who is not in his first term Those who have 
to Duane Lockard, "The State Legtslator," in Alexander Heard ( ed.). State 
Legislatures in American Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.· Prentice-Hall, Inc, 
1966), pp. 98-125. 
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had hvo or three preVIous terms become extremely pO\\ crful One Re-
publican senator, who had sen ed in the Senate for almost thrrty years 
before runnmg for governor m 1964 and \\ho had seen eight different 
go\'emors come and go, \\as reputed to hc1ve virtually dictatorial powers 
over the Senate Although the seniority rule lS not stnctly followed in the 
appomtment of committee chamnen the import!l.nt charrrnansh1ps always 
go to the veterans, as do the part}' leadership positions in both houses 
Few will be surpnsed to learn that the Kansas legislature has been tradi-
tionally Republican. The extent of the Repubhcan domination 1s, howe\er, 
Table 7 
Political Affiliations of Kansas LegiSlators 1901-1965 
( m percentages) 
First House Senate 
Year of Term Republu:an Republican 
1901 66 83 
1903 78 82 
1905 86 92 
1907 77 92 
1909 69 88 
1911 56 88 
1913 41 48 
1915 53 48 
1917 69 78 
1919 88 75 
1921 90 95 
1923 76 95 
1925 72 80 
1927 73 80 
1929 81 93 
1931 60 93 
1933 52 58 
1935 60 65 
1937 60 63 
1939 86 62 
1941 78 88 
1943 90 90 
1945 96 97 
1947 86 98 
1949 76 85 
1951 84 85 
1953 84 88 
1955 71 88 
1957 66 80 
1959 55 80 
1961 66 80 
1963 71 80 
1965 65 68 
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qwte extraordinary. Only once have the Democrats had a majority in 
either house, this was m the House of Representatives elected in 1912. 
For this century, the average Republican percentage in the House has 
been 72 per cent and m the Senate, 80.5 per cent. As can be seen from 
Table 7, the Republican percentage in the Senate has ranged from as 
lugh as 98 per cent (all but one senator) down to 48 per cent after the 
three-way split in the 1912 election. The peak for the House was in 
1945 when there were only hve Democrats in the 125-member body, 
and the low was 41 per cent Repubhcans in 1913. 
It should be noted that the voting for other offices in Kansas has not ex-
hibited such consistent, unfhnchmg Republicanism. Kansas has gone Demo-
cratic for President four bmes smce the turn of the century and has elected 
five Democratic governors, one for two terms. Apparently, the ((electoral 
lag" which V. 0 . Key noted m voting for the legislature m other states IS 
in operation in Kansas as well. 11 He noted that when there are shifts in 
the balance of party strength nationally, these are reflected m most states 
almost immediately m the voting for the higher offices; but the national 
ebb and flow of party strength does not readily trickle down to the level 
of the state legislative elections. Only if the traditional minority party is 
able to take advantage of its peaks of power to consolidate its position 
and build its organization will it be able to translate victories for the 
higher offices into gains in the legislature. It appears that the Democratic 
leaders in Kansas have generally failed to make the most of their oppor-
tunities 
LEGISLATIVE VOTING BEHAVIOR 
Studies of roll call votes m legislative bodies have generally identified 
ftve types of influences on the legislator. ( 1) his political party affilia-
tion, ( 2) constituency pressures, ( 3) organized interest groups lobbymg 
the legiSlature, ( 4) pressure from the chief executive, and ( 5) the legis-
lator's philosophical onentation resultmg from his own political socializa-
tion. Roll call studies of the Kansas legislature have shed some hght on 
how the first two of these Influences operated in this legislative mstitu-
tlon. Some conclusiOns can also be made regarding the other factors but 
these will have to be more speculative and tentative. 
Party and Constituency The most thorough roll call analyses of the Kan-
sas legislature were made for the 1957 and 1959 sessions,12 although 
u Key op cit., pp. 106-109. 
I2 See the following papers by John S Crumm: ((The Systematic Anal}s1s of 
Blocs m the Study of Legislative BehaVIor," Western Polttical Quarterly X VIII 
(June 1965 ), pp 350-362, "The Means of ~1easunng Conflict and Cohes10n in 
the LegiSlature," The Southwestern Social Sctence Quarterly (March 1964), pp. 
336-356, "A Factor Analysis of Legtslabve Behavior," Midwest Journal of Po-
litical Science~ VII (November 1963 ), pp. 336-356. 
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some of the findings have been updated for the 1965 sessiOn. These 
showed, as we have already noted, a striking degree of unanunity in the 
votmg of both houses There were 1,089 roll calls on final passage m the 
1957 and 1959 sessiOns of the Senate, and all but 57 of these were 
passed or ( m a few mstances) defeated by a unarumous or near unaru-
mous vote IJ In the 1959 sessiOn of the House, 533 measures came to a 
roll call vote, and forty-one of these produced a diVIsion of the House 
that was not unarurnous or near unanunous About the same proportions 
held for 1965 when the respective figures for the House were fifty-two 
bills out of 607 voted upon in that body during the sessiOn, and for the 
Senate, forty-siX bills out of 606 
IndiCes of confbct and coheswn were computed for the nmety-eight roll 
ca11s during the 1957 and the 1959 Senate and the 1959 House sessiOns 
in order to determme wluch groupmgs were related signtficantly to the 
voting patterns on these controversial bills It had often been hyPothe-
sized that an urhan-rural cleavage, or an East-versus-\\1est spht produced 
strongly opposed cohesive groupmgs m the legtslative howes and that 
this division would be reflected m the roll call votes 14 Such ~as not the 
case, however. The index of conflict, or "unlikeness" as It is somebroes 
called, for the urban-rural voting patterns averaged only fifteen In the Sen-
ate and eighteen m the House. This index ranges from zero to 100, so 
these figures are qu1te low What they essentially mean is that there 
was a 15 percentage-point difference, on the average, bePNeen the urban 
members and the rural members in the way they distnbuted therr votes 
in the Senate and an 18 percentage-pomt difference between them, on the 
average, m the House Out of all the buls considered, there were only 
two measures m the Senate and hvo m the House that could be regarded 
as causmg an urban-rural dt'r ISIOn of a sigrufiCant proportion. 
Even less conflict was recorded for the East-\Vest groupmg In both 
houses, the mdices of conflict were less than ten, and none of the bills 
could be said to have caused a really strong d1vision on thiS basiS. 
What, then, was the basis for the controversy on these ninety-eight votes? 
By and large, 1t v. as pohhcal party affthabon The mdex of confhct m 
the Senate on a party basts was thuty-ftve and in the House was thtrty-
six These are not extremely lugh, but they exceeded the m ban-rural 
md1ces by a factor of nvo. In order to be satisfied that some other way 
13 "Near unanrmous" lS defined as a vote in which the minority side consbtutes 
less than 15 per cent of the total membership of the house. 
14 "Urban" legislators are defmed as those from distncts in which the population 
in 1960 was 50 per cent or more urban (as defined by the US. Census) The 
remamder are "rural" legislators U S. Highway 81 is generall) cons1dered as the 
dividing line between eastern and western Kansas Legislative districts to the 
east of this highway were designated as ~·eastern" and those to the west of it as 
'' ,, western. 
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of groupmg than these three would not produce higher indices of con-
flict, a "cluster analysiSH \\as performed on this set of roll calls ThiS 
\Vas accomplished by programming a computer to assign legiSlators to 
one of hvo clusters m a manner that would produce the most cohesive 
voting pattern \Vlthin each cluster and the greatest chfference behveen 
clusters \Vhen these clusters were examined for the House, It sho\ved 
that one consisted almost entrrely of Republicans and the other almost 
entuely of Democrats. On the Senate side, there were two Democrats m 
the Republican cluster, but no Republicans in the other. This vvould 
appear to provide ample evidence of the pnmacy of party as a deVIsive 
factor in legislative voting. 
If this seems somewhat surpriSing in VIew of the apparent wealmess of 
the organiZations of extra-legislab.\e parhes, It should be recalled that 
the parties do have some organiZation in the legiSlature, they both hold 
regular caucuses, and there are some sancbons the leaders can employ 
to promote party regulanty On the other hand, there is no formal or 
mformal orgaruzation of urban and rural or eastern and "vestern legisla-
tors For the new member-and thiS may be more than half of the legiS-
lative body-the clues that he gets from the party leaders may be the 
only inchcations from anyone on how he should vote on controverSial 
measures or, at least, the only ones that he can regard as reliable. 
Dunng the period under examination, the governor of Kansas was a 
Democrat and the Indices of cohesiOn for the Democrats "vere found to be 
higher In both houses than they were for the Republicans The governor 
appears to have exerted lus mfluence to keep the Democrats m line on 
some of the important and controversial ISsues As a partial check on thiS 
theol), roll calls \\·ere a gam exammed for the 1965 sessiOn "vhen a Re-
publican governor was m office. Tills sho\.ved that the cohesion \vas no-
ticeably lower for the Democrats m both houses but about the same, if 
not slightly higher than preVIous!), for the Republicans Thus, the evi-
dence IS a bit scanty, but It does suggest that the cruef executive can 
enhance the voting cohesiOn of h1s parhsan colleagues in the legislature 
The question of the absence of marked conflict bet\veen the urban and 
rural legislators and between the eastern and western legislators remains 
unanswered. It appears that the agencies promoting concensus in the 
legislature-the caucuses, the standing comrmttees, the legislative council, 
the committees of the whole-proVIde ample opportunities for the recon-
ciliation of differences between these groups concerning legiSlation But 
these are somewhat more effective at reconciling intraparty chfferences 
than interparty differences. The Republican party is so pervasive as to 
be both an urban and a rural party, both an eastem and a western party. 
Still, it must, through amendments, tradmg, or log-rolling, unify these 
relatively diverse groups if It IS gomg to enact its legislative program. 
Makmg concessions to the Democrats IS next in priority after the intra-
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party divisions have been smoothed O'-er. One must assume that such 
concessions are often made as double protection· othenvise, the high de-
gree of unanimity in the total voting patterns is difficult to explain. 
A close analysis of the clusters, or blocs, in the legislah1re suggests that 
the moderately high degrees of party cohesion were achieved because 
the ne'\\< members followed the lead of the veterans very closely. The 
cluster analysis of the 1959 House of Representatives showed that the 
"sub-cluster· '\\'"Ithin each party that exhibited the highest degree of party 
voting \Vas composed of two types cl small number of legislative veterans 
who were also party leaders, and a large number of first-termers It ap-
peared obVIous that the veterans were setting the party line, and the 
new members, feeling somewhat unsure of themseh es were following it 
rather closely. Those who had been in the legislature a little longer, but 
not long enough to become leaders acted more independently, going 
along with the party when it swted them and feeling, probably, less m 
need of the party's help and support. The delineation of these relabon-
ships was somewhat less clear in the 1965 analysis probably because of 
the stronger role played h) the governor who submerged, to some de-
gree, the influence of the legislative veterans e" ertheless there '\\'as a 
percepbble pattern which showed the go\-emor, the Repubhcan legislative 
leaders, and the first-term Republican members acting '\vith a high degree 
of regularity. 
One additional use of these roll call data was made b) subjecting them 
to a ('factor anal} si.S." By this process, four factors m the Senate and 
five in the House were identified as being related to or "causmg" the 
observed voting patterns in those bodies The party factors \\ere, of 
course, the most important ones m both houses Less "strong, urban-rural 
factors were also singled out. But m the Senate 1n particular, and in the 
House to a lesser degree. a rather well defined third factor was identi-
fied that \Vas unrelated to anything 1n the previous anal)SIS This was 
labeled a (~growth-declme factor., because il was associated with such 
consbtuency variables as population mcrease or decrease and economic 
expansion or dechne Thts meant that, regardless of other factors, legis-
lators tended to \ ote on many Issues accord1ng to whether they were 
from a district wtth a growing population and expanding economy or 
from a static or declinmg one There was not a very close relationship 
between these distnct characterishcs and the party membership of the 
legi.Slators, although more Democrats than Republicans came from the 
declining districts But this factor did explain some of the intraparty 
chfferences m vohng behavior m the legislature The Democratic legts-
lators from declmmg chstncts appeared to be shghtly more consistent 
party voters than other Democrabc members Although the terms are 
somewhat ambiguous in this context, it could be concluded that the legts-
lators from the declimng distncts were also some\vhat more ~liberal" m 
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their legiSlative voting behavior, while those from the growth districts 
were shghtly more ''conservative." 
The perceptions of the legiSlators regardmg conflicts in the legislature 
are a good deal different from that revealed by the roll call analysis. 
They generally rate the urban-rural conflict as more important than the 
party conflict. It may well be that it lS in the context of the total legis-
lative process, although it is one that is generally not allowed to be vented 
on the floor of the legislature. The following table shows how the legis-
lators in the 1965 survey ranked the various opposing groupings m terms 
of the importance of the conflict to the legislative process. 
Table 8 
Ranking of Groups in Relation to Importance in Legislative Conflict 
Percentage Ranking in First Place 
Groups House Senate Democrats Republicans 
Urban vs. Rural 37 
Democrats vs. Republicans 21 
Liberals vs. Conservatives 23 
Governor vs. Opponents 8 
41 
18 
17 
2 
59 
24 
6 
3 
26 
18 
32 
8 
It is interesting that the Democrats saw the urban-rural and party con-
fhcts as more important than the Republicans did, while the Republicans 
saw the Ideological struggle as more rmportant. This might be explained 
by the fact that the majority party generally fmds It useful to perpetuate 
the myth that there are few partisan or interest confhcts in the legisla-
ture that cannot be eventually reconciled. To a great degree, it IS a 
credible myth, although the minonty party has not entirely been con-
vinced. 
Lobbying It is difficult to determine anything about the influence of 
lobbies from the analysis of roll call votes, since most of their effective-
ness is achieved in workmg with committees before the bills reach a 
vote Over the years, however, It lS possible to observe the success with 
wluch the individual lobbies have been able to get the legislation they 
want and to block legislatiOn \\ hich they oppose. 
From these observations, one has to rank the Kansas Independent Oil 
and Gas Association near the top of the hst of successful lobbies Kansas 
is the only major oil and natural gas producing state that does not have 
a Se\ erance tax on these resources, a fact that can be traced drrectly to 
the effectiveness of the KIOGA lobby. Also near the top is the Kansas 
Farm Bureau \vhich has hardly ever failed to achieve the major goals 
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of its legtslative program, much of whiCh has been concerned with tax 
legtslabon The KFB, along \vith the state chamber of commerce, man-
aged to get right-to-work legtslation past the legislature on two occas10ns, 
after the fust bill was \~etoed by the governor, 1t was repassed as a con-
stitutional amendment. 
In recent yean>, the Kansas State Teachers Association and various educa-
tional pressure groups, such as the PTA and the Kansas School Boards 
Association have become rather influential I he) \\ere qwte effective 
in the 1965 sessiOn in gettmg through a state school foundation program,. 
and in working with the governor to get the necessary tax increases to 
support it. 
The Kansas Bankers Association has managed over the years to keep 
branch bankmg out of Kansas and has been able to keep the amount of 
mterest prud by Its member banks on the deposit of state funds at a 
nominal level. 
The railioad lobby was probably the most important lobby until the 
1920s, but 1ts influence has dunmished wh1le that of the motor carriers 
has increased. 
The Uruted Drys, the main temperance lobby, has also been extremely 
influential in the past, but with the repeal of state prohibition in 1948 
Its power declined, although It has been successful In keeping alcohohc 
beverages under very stnct control 1n this state. Other rmportant groups 
are labor, the pubhc utilities, and the sav1ngs and loan assoc1ahons. 
In the 1965 survey the legiSlators were asked what lobbymg groups they 
thought were the most powerful. In revieWlng the answers, 1t IS not 
Table 9 
Rankings by LegiSlators of Most Powerful Interest Groups 
Ranks 
Groups Total Republicans Democrats 
Teachers (KSTA) 1 1 4 
Motor Carriers 2 3 2 
Labor 3 2 3 
Railroads 4 6 1 
Gas and Oil 5 5 5 
Kansas Farm Bureau 6 4 7 
Bankers 7 7 6 
Schools ( PTA, KSBA ) 8 8 10 
Misc. Farm Groups 9 9 8 
State Chamber of Commerce 10 11 9 
Public Utilities 11 10 11 
S. W . Bell Telephone 12 12 12 
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clear whether most were responding by hsbng the most active or the most 
po\verful In this sun e}, the teachers' lobby came out on top, but tlus 
probably reflects a pecuhanty of that session, wruch saw a tremendous 
amount of pressure applied for the school foundation program Labor, m 
particular, seemed to be ranked some\vhat lugher than its legiSlative 
successes would have warranted. The labor lobbyists are always much 
m evidence, but they are not ahvays very effective. The mean rankmgs 
gl\·<m to each of the lobbying groups by the legiSlators are shown 1n 
Table 9. 
The Democratic leg1slators apparently thought that the transportation 
lobb} 1sts ( rrulroad and motor earners) were a good deal more effective 
than did the Republicans, whtle the Republicans tended to attribute 
more power to the teachers and the Farm Bureau than d1d the Democrats 
These different responses may have been a result of <(selective perception" 
due to political biases, but more probably they reflect some differences 
in the \\'a)' lobbymg organizations treat the two partiSan groups Each 
lobby \vill tend to deal with the part} \VIth wluch it feels it has the 
better access and relations 
One further interesting compariSon can be made \vith responses to an-
other survey question vvluch asked. ((Are any interest groups or lobbies 
particularly strong m your o\vn district?" Half of the respondents answered 
"no" to this, but of those \\ ho answered "yes," the ranking as to which 
was the strongest was as follows. 
1 Kansas Farm Bureau 
2. Educational groups ( KST A, PTA, KSBA) 
3 Labor 
4 Chamber of Commerce 
5 Oil and Gas Industry 
Mention of other groups \\as quite scattered. But tlus does suggest that 
the Farm Bureau, the educational groups and, to some degree, labor de-
n\ e much of therr legislative strength through active Involvement at the 
district level in terms of assisbng candidates and building citizen support 
for therr programs. For these Jobbymg groups much of thetr work has 
already been accomplished by the time the legislature con\enes 
Other Influences on Legislative Voting 1\o studies have been made in 
Kansas regarding the mfluence of the go\ em or over legislation. Most 
knov.ledgeable obseners \\Ould probably conclude that, on the average, 
it IS not very great. OccasiOnally governors \vho ha\e Y-IShed to exert 
such influences have been moderate!} successful Go\ emor Wi1liam 
A' ery \\as extremel) effective dunng the 1965 sessiOn in getting his 
leg1slati\ e program adopted As m most states and at the federal level, the 
chief executive who \VIshes to wield some mfluence over legislation \vill 
have a much happier time In the first } car of lus first term-the so-called 
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"honeymoon" period-than later on \vhen opposition to him builds up 
through resentment and jealousy and factional squabbles withm the 
party Kansas seems to conform to tlus pattern as a rule, although most 
Kansas governOis have not been ven aggressive in attempting to "run'' 
the legtslature. A few have attempted to do so, but \Vithout success, as 
in the case of Governor Fred Hall, whose lt.giSlative program became 
hopelessly mired in a factional struggle within the party. Governor Avery's 
success has been largely due to his ability to forge a coahnon of interest 
groups behmd hiS program and lus use of these groups to lobby through 
his program. Aside from the veto and appointment power, the governor 
mhents few tools with his office that would make him an effective legis-
lative leader, so he must build support for lus program largely by per-
suaslOn, compromise, trading, and bargaining. 
It is almost impossible from the analysis of roll call votes to separate the 
influences of a person's own political philosophy from the influences of 
social political, and economic interests that condition his reactions to 
legiSlative proposals In the factor analysis of the 1957-59 roll call votes 
a so-called "liberal-conservative factor"' ''as Identified, but this '"as a 
rather "weak" one and d1d not account for 'cry much of the variatiOn m 
voting behavior in the legislature. One can only generalize, and even this 
IS rather nsky. about the philosophiCal orientation of the average legiSla. 
ture In a 1959 questiormai.re sun ey the legislatOis in both houses ''ere 
asked to locate themselves on a line, broken into seven intervals and 
labeled at one end '" Ith the word "liberal" and at the other with the 
word "conservative" The vast ma1onty placed themselves in the middle 
or on the conservatl\ e s1de. Less than one-fourth put themselves on the 
hberal s1de This would conform with the expectations of most observers; 
the a\erage Kansas legislator is a conservatn e and rightly regards hun-
self as such. There is very little extreme, right-wmg conservatism m the 
leg.slature, however, and most could be termed 'moderate" consen atives. 
AnalyslS of the legtslative output over the ye<u-s indicates that this self-
styled conservative legislature has often been quite progressive Kansas 
has piOneered in such areas of legislation as anti-bust, "blue sky laws,' 
non-chscrirnmation in pubhc accommodatiOns, outlawmg 'yellow-dog, con-
tracts bank deposit msurance, and was the first state to establish a "court 
of mdustnal relations." It was one of the first states to mst1tute a state 
mcoxne tax Kansas' mental health program has ranked in frrst place for 
many years, 1ts per capita expenditures for higher education rank well 
above the median, It has a reasonably liberal program of public \\elfare 
and unemployment compcnsatwn; and its tax structure, though not very 
progressive, is rather broad and dl\, ersif1ed 
CO'\CLUSIONS 
It can generally be concluded that the function of the legislature 1n the 
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Kansas pohtical system has been to reflect and enact the demands and 
desrres of the dominant pohbcal elements of the state. These elements 
are coalesced by the Repubhcan party, \vhich serves as the vehicle for 
tmnslatmg these demands and destres mto legislative programs. The ele-
ments forming the coalition are the wheat farmer, the small-town mer-
chant and businessman, and the mtddle-class suburbanite. The urban 
worker, racial and rehgwus minorittes, and the marginal fanner are 
poorly represented in this system, although they are not altogether ig-
nored. Reapportionment may change these conditions somewhat, but not 
greatly Probably the influence of the urban workers \Vill be increased, 
but the Increased representation of the suburban dwellers should substan-
tially counteract this. The Republican coahtion should remam m fum 
control of all aspects of state government and all three branches, and also 
conhnue to dormnate most local units as well. 
Etther through a sense of secunty nurtured by over 100 years of pohbcal 
domination or from a feeling of nobless oblige, this majority coahb.on has 
not ndden roughshod over the mterests of the minority. Even though 
notlung will happen that is not willed by the majority coalition, it does 
exlub1t a disposition toward accommodation and compromise with the 
minority. There is also manifest m the legislature a tendency toward 
some degree of "nonpartisanship," a willingness of the majority party to 
take the minority into its confidence on occasion and to play down par-
bsan differences. 
The Kansas legislature is a reasonably smooth-running institution, pri-
manly because there is little confusiOn as to who is in control. Its efficiency 
could probably be improved through certain adjuslinents in its structure 
and procedures, by providmg better facilities, services, and office space 
for the legislators, by removmg linutations on the length of sessions, by 
increasing legislators' pay, and by reducing the number of committees 
Furthennore, the recent amendment establishing annual regular sessions 
should help to improve the scheduling and processing of legislation. But 
none of these improvements would drastically change what the legislature 
does or the direction that public policy will take. Some changes in this 
respect may come about through the recent reapportionments, but these 
will not transform the legislature or its output. History, tradition, the 
social-economic structure of the population, and the political party 
system determine the functionmg of the Kansas legislature as they do 
the other elements of the state's pohhcal system. The Kansas legislature, 
m fact, seems reasonably responsive to 1ts environment. We can predict 
that, as this environment changes, so \VIll thlS institution. 
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The Legislature in 
Missouri's Political System 1 
D A V I D A. L E U T H 0 L D 
U 'N I V E R S I T Y 0 F M I S S 0 U R I, C 0 L U M B I A 
The MISsouri legislature is an important part of the ~1Issouri political 
system, but It IS only a part Too often the legtslature recet\es the credit 
or blame for the whole system. One example is home nile for the city 
of St LouiS-the legislature IS often credited w1th or blamed for the re-
stricbons placed on the city's "nght" to home rule. In achtahty the legis-
lature was only one of the pobtLCal mstihlttons which restricted the city 
The Consbhlt10nal ( onvenbon of 1875 did proVIde for home rule for St 
LouiS, but 1t hedged that pro\ lSI On \vith restrictions. The conflict behveen 
the home rule proVIsiOn and the restncbons was taken to the state Su-
preme Court which, composed of outstate Democrats \'- ho were suspiciOus 
of the city's then-Republican administration consistently ruled in favor 
of the restrictions. Subsequently Cibzens of St. Louis \\ ho opposed the 
city government asked the legiSlature to expand the court ruJ;ngs by 
addmg more restnctwns, and the legislarure did so. Finally even the city 
government itself concluded that it was easier to ask thP legislature 
to pass laws applicable only to St Louis than to ask the city electorate 
to approve amendments in the city charter 2 The restrictions placed on 
St. Louis' home rule should be credited not only to the legtslature, but 
also to the Conshhltional Convention the Supreme Court, the political 
parties, Citizens of St. LouiS, and the St Louts city government itself This 
example illustrates why those who would understand the legislature must 
consider not JUst the legislature Itself, but the entire political system. 
1 I wish to express my appreciation to Ronald Claunch, Wtlliam M. Reid, and 
Ann Thompson for their help in gathenng and analyzmg some of the data in-
cluded m this paper, and to a number of my colleagues, especially Randal Down-
ing, for their comments and criticisms of an earher draft. 
2 Henry Schmandt. uA History of Mumctpal Home Rule in St. Louis" (Un-
published Master,s theslS) St. Louis University, 1948). 
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A conceptual framework for studying pohtical systems has been presented 
by David Easton and adapted for states by Herbert Jacob.3 Tlus paper 
will utilize that frame\vork to focus on particular aspects of the MISSouri 
political system, mclud.mg Its environment, its output, the demands made 
upon it, and the support gtven it. Special emphasis will be placed on 
the role of the legislature in the system. 
'!'BE POLITICAL SYSTEM'S ENVIRONMENT 
Physical Environment Those states which border an ocean or a great lake 
have had low-cost shipping, ease of access which stimulated early de-
velopment, and, in many cases, a rruld chmate which still attracts ne\v 
residents and industry. Such advantages are denied Missouri and Its land-
locked neighbors. MISsoun does have 1,000 miles of navigable ·waterways, 
including long frontages on the nation's largest rivers, the Mississippi and 
the Missouri. The mineral and soil wealth of the state are average, Judg-
ing by Missouri's rank near the median of the states in the value of 
minerals produced, and by the similanty in value per acre of farm land 
in Missouri and in the nation.4 
Overall the state is not so well-endowed as, for example, California, 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Louisiana, each of which borders an ocean 
or great lake and has good agricultural land and extensive mineral re-
sources. On the other hand, Missouri has had a clear advruuage in phys-
ical environment over such states as Vermont, Nevada, and South Dakota, 
which have poorer land, less mineral production, more severe climates, 
and more limited access to water. If there existed a scale sumrnanzmg 
the relevant aspects of physical environments, :tv1issouri would probably 
rank near the median of the states. 
Within the state there lS substantial variation in the physical envrronment. 
This is most noticeable in the quality of the soil, which is lugh near the 
Iowa border and low in the Ozarks. Conversely, the state's mineral wealth 
is concentrated more heav1ly m the southern part of the state 
Economic System. Missourians have developed and exploited the envi-
ronment so that the state's economic system ranks at least at the meruan, 
if not above it. Such a ranking is indicated especially by Missoun's rank 
among the states m 19655-twenty-second in per capita personal Income, 
3 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York. John Wtley 
& Sons, Inc., 1965), Herbert Jacob, "Drmensions of State Politics," in Alexander 
Heard ( ed.), State Legtslatures in American Politics (Englewood Chffs I\ J : 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 5-36. 
4 US Bureau of the Census Statz.stical Abstract of the US.: 1966 ( Washing-
ton D C 1966 ), p 704 ( Hereafter c1ted as Statistical Abstract ) , U S Bureau 
of the Census, US. Census of Agriculture 1959, Volume II, General Report, 
Statistics by Sub7ect-Chapter 1 (Washington, DC., 1962), p. 35. 
5 Statistical Abstract, 1966, pp. 330, 621, 774. 
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fourteenth m value added by manufacturmg, and seventh in value of all 
farm products sold. 
The state's top income producers are manufacturing, agnculture, and 
tounsm. The prinCipal manufacturing industnes are ( 1) transportation 
and eqwpment, includmg aircraft and auto assembhes (McDonnell Air-
craft, Chevrolet, Chrysler, and Ford, as examples), (2) food products 
(Anheuser-Busch brewery, and meat packmg plants), and (3) chemicals 
(Monsanto and Cook Pamt and Varrush) 6 
Once again there IS great variation \Vlthm the state The most consiStent 
vanation is between the urban and rural areas, with the rural areas, es-
pecially m the Ozarks, bemg centers of poverty. In many of these areas, 
in fact m one-tlurd of the counties m the state, half or more of the families 
had annual mcomes below $3 000 in 1959 In contrast more than one-
fourth of the fam1hes m St. Lows county (the St. Lows suburban area) 
had annual mcomes above $10,000. (Tlus combmation of frurly high pro-
porbons of both the affluent and the poverty-stricken IS also found m 
Vrrgmia, Flonda, and Texas ) 7 
Socuzl System. The sOCial system in MISSouri is highly diversi.&ed, due in 
part to the Civil War Ten per cent of the battles of the C1vil War were 
fought m MISSouri, but most of these were skirmishes between MISSourians, 
who constituted approxrmately 10 per cent of both the Union and Con-
federate arrrues. These skirmishes were of mmor Importance to the war, 
but they were important m the development of the MISsouri soc1al and 
pohtical system. 
The war and rmrnigratwn mto vanous parts of the state divided Missouri 
mto numerous soCial and pohtical areas. A sunple urban-rural classifica-
tion lS often inadequate because the rural areas alone contam counties 
dommated by such diverse groups as descendants of German unm1grants, 
Iowa and IllmolS immigrants, MlSslSSlppi delta plantation people, Kentucky 
slave holders, and Tennessee hill people. Sun:Uarly the two large cities, 
St. LoUIS and Kansas City, have a dtversity of racial and ethruc groups 
much like that m other northern mdustnalized c1ties. 
Summary measures of soc1al systems can be based on such indicators of 
modemtty as urbaruzation, education, and use of mass medta or com-
murucations devices. By these measures, MISsouri's soCial system would 
rank near the meruan, for her rank among the states on ind1vidual meas-
ures 1s as follows. 8 
Twentieth m per cent who hve m urban areas, 
Twenty-siXth m per cent of housmg units with television sets, 
6 The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1965, Harry Hansen ( ed.) (New 
York 1965 ), p. 228, Missouri Directory of Manufacturers (Jefferson City, 1966 ). 
7 U S Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1962 ( Washmgton, 
DC, 1962) Table 2. 
8 Ibtd., Table 1. 
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T\venty-sixth in per cent of housing units with telephones; and 
Thuty-ninth in med1an school years completed by population age twenty-
five and over. 
One other important Indicator of Missouri's social system is its rank of 
second among the states in the percentage of people sixty-five years of 
age and over.9 
Missouri is a state with an environment and physical resources which are 
about average for the nab on. U smg the crude indicators that are readily 
available, the economic system and the social system appear to be near 
the median for the fifty states. The state is characterized especially by 
diversity, with many small but distmctly different areas. Trenton Kost-
bade, a geographer who stuched Missouri's political patterns, identified 
fourteen distinct political regions 1n the state.10 As an example of the dis-
tinctness, some counb.es elect Republicans at least 95 per cent of the 
time while the adjoining counties elect Democrats at least 95 per cent of 
the time. 
OUTPUT OF THE POLmCAL SYSTEM 
The output or production of a political system can be readily divided into 
four categories-taxatiOn, expenditures, regulation, and employment. 
Taxation. Missouri is a low-tax state. Probably the best of the numerous 
devices to measure the scope of taxation is one which (a) excludes fed-
eral government money but Includes all other revenues of state and 
local governments, and (b ) IS stated as a proportion of total personal 
Income within the state. Local government revenues should be mcluded 
because the amount wluch local governments can collect is often closely 
regulated by the state, and madequacies in local funds are often met by 
state equalization programs. Stating taxes as a proportion of total personal 
mcome provides a control for the number of people in a state and for J 
their wealth. 
Using then the measure of all state and local general revenue sources per 
$1,000 of personal income in 1965, Missouri ranked forty-eighth among 
the fifty states. Missouri has ranked near the bottom for some time-forty-
sixth in 1932, thirty-eighth in 1942, forty-fifth in 1953, and forty-eighth 
in 1962.11 
Another measure of the tax output of a state is the type of taxes ·which 
are collected. Missouri collects a \.vide variety of taxes from 1ts citizens 
but has low rates in almost every case The principal tax sources in Mis-
9 Ibid. 
10 J. Trenton Kostbade. uGeography and Politics in Missouri" (Unpublished 
Ph D. dissertation, Uruversity of Michigan, 1957). 
11 Statistical Abstract, 1966, p. 425; Clara Penniman, ~The Politics of Taxa-
tion," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines ( eds.) , Politics m the American 
States (Boston: Littl~ Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 308-309. 
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souri, measured as a proportion of total state and local government 
revenue, are. 12 
property taxes 43 per cent 
general sales taxes 16 per cent 
individual mcome taxes 11 per cent 
motor fuel taxes 9 per cent 
These proportions, and the proportions for other taxes, are quite Similar 
to those for the fifty states as a whole. 
Expendrtures. Important and easily comparable indicators of the outputs 
of state political systems are therr expenditures G1ven MISsoun's low tax 
rates, we \vould expect her expenditures to be low. The comparable 
Table 1 
Rank of MISsouri Among 50 States Per Capita Expenditures for Selected 
State and Local Government Programs, 1962, and Proportion of 
Funds Contributed by State Government 
Note: 
Per cent of funds from 
Rank Program State Government 
8 Public welfare 31 
12 Local parks and recreation 0 
17 Pollee protection 12 
17 Ltbraries 5 
21 Local fire protectiOn 0 
23 Houswg and urban renewal 0 
25 Corrections 7 4 
27 Health and hosp1tals 42 
35 Highways 41 
39 Se\\erage and sanitation 0 
39 Education 41 
42 Natural resources 68 
41 All general expenditures of 
state and local government 
The Census Bureau has provided rankings of some selected programs of state 
and local governments expenditures as a proport10n of personal income On 
such rankings Mtssouri ranks three to seven places lower than the rankmgs shown 
here. 
Source: 
Comp1led from US Bureau of the Census Census of Governments, 1962, Vol 
IV, No 4, Compendwm of Government Finances, tables 37 and 44, V ol. VII, 
No 25, Government in Missouri, tables 16, 35. 
12 U.S Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. IV, No. 4, 
Compendium of Government Finances (Washmgton, D.C., 1963), pp. 48-49. 
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measures of expenditures which the Census Bureau has made readily 
available-per capita expenditures for selected programs~e unfortu-
nately not as valid as the measures of taxation because they do not ex-
clude funds that the federal government transfers to the states, nor do 
they control for the level of wealth in the state Nevertheless they can 
serve as indicators Missoun' s rank among the fifty states for selected 
programs, using these measures, is shown in Table 1. 
A comparison of the rankmgs and the proportion of funds for each pro-
gram contributed from the state government provides a fascinating pat-
tern. Of the six programs m which Missoun ranks above the median, the 
state contributes substantially only to public welfare. (The rank of public 
welfare is due to the large number of recipients, not to the state's largesse, 
because Missouri ranks only thirty-third in average payment per re-
cipient.) 13 Of the six programs in which Missouri ranks at or below the 
median, the state government contributes substantially to all but sewerage 
and sanitation. Though the correlation is by no means perfect, it does 
indicate that the greater the state's share of financing for a program, 
the lower Missouri ranks among the states. The greater the share of local 
or federal government financing, the higher Missouri ranks. Apparently 
the state government either receives different demands than are received 
by the local governments or reacts differently to those demands. 
Regulatory Policies. The regulatory policies adopted by a political system 
are an important output. Unfortunately, they cannot be as easily measured 
and compared as taxation and expenditure policies. Scales can be con-
structed, nevertheless, by giving weights to various components of the 
policies and by summing these weights. The states can be compared on 
these scales. Using this procedure a civil rights scale was constructed, 
based on state laws regarding public accommodations, fair employment 
practices, and open occupancy. States were given weights based on such 
factors as the presence or absence of the la'-'vs, their strength, the inclusion 
of specific provisions, and the bme of passage. Based on these ran.kings, 
the states fell into one of seven groups, and Missouri was one of nine states 
tied for twenty-seventh, ranking just above the bottom group of fifteen 
states, mostly southern states which had no laws in these three areas. A 
similar scale was constructed for laboring conditions, including provisions 
relating to workman's compensation, minimum wages, and women's labor-
ing conditions. On this scale Missouri ranked twenty-fifth among the 
fifty states.14 These scales cover only two of the many areas of regulatory 
policies adopted by political systems, and they do not include any measure-
13 Richard E . Dawson and Tames A. Robinson, "The Politics of WeUare," in 
Jacob and Vines, op. cit., p . 395. 
14 See the ed1tion of Midwest Legislative Politics prepared for participants 
in the Mid-America Assembly on State Legislatures in American Politics, pp. 
91-95, for the complete scales. 
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ment of enforcement polictes, so e\aluabons must be made \\tth care 
They do indtcate, however, that the ~1tssowt state go\ ernment may rank 
nearer the mechan m at least some regulatOT) polic1es than in taxation 
and expenditure polictes 
Employment The demands that some people make upon pohtical systems 
are for personal employment or personal mcome, often referred to as 
patronage Patronage IS fairl} important in tv1ISsouri's pohocal system; 
in the mid-1950s a member of the governor's staff estimated that there 
were about 2,500 patronage appomtments m Mtssoun state government 15 
Howe" er, ~hssoun ranks forty-third among the states m the number of 
full-tune eqwvalent employees of state and local governments per 10,000 
population Not surpriSmgh , m VIe\'-' of the previous findmgs, MISsoun 
ranks thirtv-third m the proporbon of employees per 10,000 population at 
the local government level, and forty-fifth at the state government level. 16 
Outputs on Federal Level Not only does the output of MISSouri local 
government rank comparatlvel} htgher than the output of MISsouri state 
government, but the output of MISsoun's federal government representa-
tives, Its oongressrnen, also ranks near or above the median of the states 
Congressional Quarterly has, smce 1959, presented scales of congress10nal 
support for a larger role for the federal government, based on roll call 
Table 2 
Comparison of Votes of Missouri Congressmen and All Congressmen 
on Support for Increased Role for Federal Government, 1959-66 
Year 
1959 and 1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Source: 
Percentage of votes cast which were in favor 
of increasing role of federal gooemment 
AU CongresS'T7Um 
56% 
51 
63 
73 
56 
68 
63 
Missouri Congressmen 
77% 
67 
76 
73 
59 
64 
58 
Congressiorull Quarterly Almanacs. 1960, pp. 134-137, 1961, pp. 634-637, 1962, 
pp. 719-721, 1963, pp. 726-729, 1964, pp. 763-765, 1965, pp. 1114-1117. Con-
gressional Quarterly W eekly Report, Feb. 19, 1967, pp. 214-217. 
15 George D. Young, .. The Role of Political Parties in the Missouri House of 
Representatives" (Unpublished Ph.D diSsertation, Uruvers1ty of Mtssoun, 1958 ), 
p. 63. 
16 US. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments· 1962, Vol. III, Com-
pendtum of Publtc Employment ( Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 30. 
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votes. The summing of the ayes and nays on the roll call provides a 
measure of the percentage of votes by all congressmen in support of a 
larger federal role, and tlus measure can be compared with the percentage 
by Missouri congressmen. The results are presented in Table 2. They in-
dicate that Missoun congressmen are usually as much in favor of expand-
ing the role of the federal government as is Congress as a whole. 
The measures of output were not always precise or complete but they were 
fairly consiStent, with the possible exception of regulatory policies. They 
indicated that though Missoun·s physiCal resources, social system, and 
economic system rank near the median for the fifty states, the output 
of the state government usually ranks belo\v the median. In contrast the 
output of local governments m Missouri often ranks near or above the 
median, and ~hssoun·s congressmen favor expansion of the role of the 
federal government as much or more than congressmen from other states. 
A similarity of levels of output might be expected on all three levels; 
why lS It apparently lower on the state government level? Our use of 
the conceptual framework of political systems focuses our attention on 
the demands that are made on the pohtical system and the process of 
converting those demands mto output. 
DEMANDS AND THEIR CONVERSION 
Demands are not easily d.Istingwshed from the conversion process. A 
letter from a constituent to a legislator urging a policy clearly represents 
a demand, but the classification IS not so clear when the legislator pre-
pares and introduces a bill \vhich he thinks essential, but for \vhich no 
other citizen has asked. Sunilarly, a comparative measurement of the re-
quests of interest groups, such as labor unions in two states, mcludes 
both the demands that the uruons are making, and the mochflcat10n or 
conversion that leaders have already made on the demands of the uniOn 
members. In a federal system the level of demands may well be related 
to the rate of conversion of the demands, because citizens \VIll probably 
make therr demands on the particular level which is most likely to re-
spond. Thus demands and conversion may be closely related, and an 
exammation of the process of making and converting demands in Mis-
souri may provide explanations of the comparatively low level of output 
of the state government. 
Public Deszres. Attitudes of the public can serve as an indicator of the 
demands that might be made. The only comparable measures of the 
attitudes of MISsoun Citizens With citizens of other states are with regard 
to federal government policies Such measures were made in a nation-
\"vide survey conducted by Herbert McClosky in 1957 and a state-wide 
survey conducted by the Public Opm10n Survey Unit (POSU) of the 
Uruversity of MISsouri in 1965 Compansons must be made cautiously 
because the wordmgs vaned on most of the issues and because of the 
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lapse of etght }ears betvt.een the suneys. In the t\vo output ISsues m 
which the wording was exactly the same, foreign rud and federal rud 
to education, the responses were almost exactly the same In the remain-
mg ISsue areas, the results are mixed enough and close enough so that 
there lS not a diSproof of the assumpbon, based on the frrst two ISsues 
that ~1tssounans hold pubhc attitudes toward federal government policies 
essentially srmuar to those of all Amencans.17 
Interest Groups. In man} states, interest (or pressure) groups are important 
channels in the making of demands One attempt has been made to rate 
the comparatl\ e importance of pressure groups 111 American states; the 
Committee on Amenc.an Legislatures, American Political Science Associ-
ation, rated Missouri as one of the seven states in whicl1 pressure groups 
were weakest.18 The ratings were based upon questionnaires sent to no 
more than four people in each state and Rre consequent!} not regarded 
as particularly reliable. In contrast, Ro} lv1cClintoc.k has provided, in his 
dissertation on pressure groups m MISsoun,I9 a number of examples which 
indicate high levels of actiVIt} and Influence For example, .tvtcClintock 
reports that lobb} Ists have solicited legislators \ otes for candidates for 
legiSlative leadership positions, and they ha\·e beseiged the speaker to 
appoint their legislator-friends to conference committees, apparent!) with 
the assumphon that such requests might well be granted. Pressure groups 
ha"e prepared bills and amendments \\hich the legislature has adopted 
after being assured by a legislator that the interest group had prepared 
the bill or amendment. At least one pressure group offered retamers to 
all lawyers who \\ere interested, and offered to purchase msurance from 
legislators \\ho "vere msurance salesmen One lobby was reported to regu-
larly provide legiSlators with all the free hquor that they destred One 
legiSlator charged on the floor of the House that an oil compan} had taken 
a distributorship away from him after he had failed to support their 
program. Similarly, McClintock reports a case in which a governor in-
structed an agenc\ of lus to re\\ nte Its proposed legislative program in 
order to make it acceptable to an mterest group. He reports another 
instance in which an interest group, after havmg been beaten In the 
17 Data drawn from codehooks for each survey. A sim1lar1ty m attitudes does 
not mean a sumlarity m demands, people may d1ffer greatly m the rate at wluch 
they are w1lling to a~k the government fm particular polic1es they favor. The 
?\.1cClos1.')' data were utiliZed in Herbert McClosJ<r.. et al, "Issue Conflict and 
Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers,' American Polittcal Sctence 
Review, LIV (June 1960 ); 406-427 The POSU data were ut1hzed m Eleanora 
Easterh ~1argaret Gadd, and Ja> Kiesewetter "Missoun Congressmen and 
Their Const1tuenc1es.. Unwerstty of AftSSOitri Busmess and Government Re-
view VIII ( March-April1967) 26-33 
18 Belle Zeller ( ed ) Amerrcan State Legislatures (New York Thomas Y 
Crowell Company 1954 ), pp 190-191. 
19 Roy M McChntock Jr., .. Pressure Groups m the Mtssouri Legislative 
Process" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of MiSsouri, 1961 ) 
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legislature by the governor, took the governor's law to the people in a 
referendum, and there defeated hun Such activities ( wluch are common 
m many states ) certainly do not seem to represent weak pressure politics. 
If \Ve accept McClmtod .. 's evidence as indicating that pressure groups 
are active and influential m Missouri state government, an important 
question 1s, "Which groups are the strongest?" Perhaps Missouri is domi-
nated by groups which favor low levels of governmental activity, while 
other states are dominated by other groups In the 1966 survey, legiSlators 
were asked which interest groups and lobbies they considered most power-
ful The results were fairly similar to the fmdings in a number of other 
states,20 with the Missoun State Teachers Association, the AFL-CIO, the 
Missoun Farmers Assoc1ahon, truckers, the chamber of commerce, liquor, 
ou, the Farm Bureau, and the Steamfitters Union being mentioned by 
many legiSlators. A less extensi\e stuvey m the 1950s by McClintock pro-
duced a some\vhat similar list, wtth the most important difference being 
the mclusion of the small loan lobby m the earlier list.21 
~ 
Srm1larity among the strong pressure groups does not, however, mean 
similarity of demands; Robert Salisbury has argued that pressure groups 
in Missouri make comparatively few demands.22 
Each group tends to seek a narrowly defined program caBing 
for marginal adjustments in pohcy with as little fuss as possible. 
• • • • 
... the focus is on specific and incremental adjustments ac-
companied by a rationale which emphasizes job or investment 
protection against the impersonal forces of the larger world 
No one seeks to depart from eXISting conditions in any dramatic, 
drastic, or rapid way, but rather to preserve things as they are, 
as far as possible. In this sense, labor groups are as conservative 
as business groups in the state, differing only in the specific 
objects of their conservative desrre. 
With regard to demands made by the Missouri State Teachers Associa-
tion, the state's most powerful interest group, Salisbury commented: 23 
20 For listings in other states, see John Wablke, Heinz Eulau, William Bu-
chanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 318-319; Kenneth Janda, Henry Teune, Melvin Kahn, and 
Wayne Francis, LegtSlative Politics in Indiana ( Bloomington: Bureau of Gov-
ernmen~ Research, lnd~ana Uni:ersttx, 1961); and John G. Crumm, "The Kan-
sas Legtslature : Republican Coalition, supra. 
21 McChntock, op. cit., pp. 389-390 
22 Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H Salisbury, and Thomas H. Ehot. State 
Politics and the Public Schools: An Exploratory Analysis ( New York. Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1964), pp. 37-38. 
23 Ibid , pp. 13, 21. 
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... the proposals ~1ST A makes to the leg1slature are adjusted 
to the state's political traditions 
• • • • 
Fust, ~1ST A scales dovm its demands for support to 'reason-
able levels, hoping to minimize confhct O\ler school Issues 
[MST A leaders] are fully conscious of the gap behveen the 
MISsoun school aid level and that of, sa\, neighbonng Illinois . 
:"Jevertheless rather than press for state aid at an abstractly 
desrrable level, MST A has sought to pttch the formula for rud 
at the h1ghest level that present or immediately prospech\e 
state revenues ""ill support, assuming no TTUI/Or shift m eXlsbng 
patterns of allocation of state monev M1ssoun's political cul-
ture mcludes a powerful tradition agamst aslang for more money 
than the revenue picture comfortablv allows 
SaliSbury notes that :tv1STA might fight the fiScal conservat::lSm of the 
system by mobilizmg extensive popular support for increased aid for edu-
cation, but has done so only once. Such campaigns, he notes, would re-
quire MSTA to hire new personnel, because the present personnel are 
part of MISSouri's pohtical culture and abide by It.24 
Political Parties Political parties are a second important channel in the 
makmg and oonverting of demands An assumption of the "responsible 
party" theory of democracy is that the people, as a unit, can effectively 
express their views only if the pohbcal parhes present different programs 
and are competitive 25 If the parties are in agreement in their vie\VS, the 
voters have difficulty replacmg an unresponsive group of officials With 
a respoi1Slve group The amount of disagreement between parties has 
been measured in two ways-one being the per cent of nonunanrmous 
legtslabve roll calls m which a ma1onty of one party is opposed by a 
maJOrity of the other party, and the other bemg the proportion of legis-
lators who, when interviewed, list party conflict as one of the rmportant 
conflicts in the legislature Roll call measures have been oompiled for 
fifteen non-southern states, based on various legtslative sessions in the 
1940s and I950s.26 Interview results are avrulable for five states. Both 
sets of data indicate that the level of party conflict in the Missouri Senate 
is comparatively low, but that the level in thP Missouri House is at about 
the median for northern states.27 
24 Ibid , p. 25 
25 See for example, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System (Supple-
ment to September 1950 American Political Science Reotew). 
26 Malcolm E Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the 
United States (New York. Random House 1966 ), pp. 420-421 
Z1 The low level of party confhct for the Senate IS indicated by the data col-
lected by Jewell (footnote 26) for the 1945-46 sess1on, m which a majonty of 
the Democrats were opposed by a maJority of the Republicans on only 23 per 
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A measure of party competition is the amount of competition for public 
office Missouri is often classified as a two-party or weak-two-party state,28 
but an examinabon of county election patterns indicates that most coun-
ties are dominated by one party, being e1ther solidly Democratic or solidly 
Republican In more than half of the outstate counties, 90 per cent or more 
of the county off1emls elected between 1944 and 1962 belonged to the 
dommant party.29 In state legislative races 25 to 30 per cent of the seats 
in each house ·were uncontested m the elections between 1956 and 1962, 
a rate of compebtwn above most southern states but below most northern 
states.30 
Competition IS discouraged by restrictive la\\S and by public attitudes. 
State law prohibits persons who have not lived in the state for ten years 
from running for governor. Competition from mdependents IS discouraged 
by a law \.\' hich makes their candidacy difficult. The extent to which this 
cent of the nonunanunous votes, by data for the 1953 sessiOn, in which the 
figure was only 8 per cent, and by data for the 1955 session, m which the figure 
was onlj 29 per cent Further support is proVlded by the mtervtew data, with 
only 32 per cent of the MISsoun senators ranking party confuct as important, 
a figure far below New Jersey ( 85 per cent) and 0 hio ( 59 per cent) and only 
slightly above Cahfomta ( 26 per cent), a state noted for Its nonpartisanshtp, 
and Tennessee ( 17 per cent), a southern state. (The Missoun figures are from 
the mtervtews with legtslators. The figures for other states are from Wahlke, 
et al. , op. cit., p. 423.) 
Jewell also reported a comparabvely low level of party confuct for the Mis-
soun House, w1th only 36 per cent of the nonunanimous votes involving party 
majonties m confhct. These data are contradtcted, however, by other data. 
George Young found that two-thirds of one party was opposed to two-thirds of 
the other party on 41 per cent of the nonunanunous votes m 1955 and 35 per 
cent m 1957. He dtd not provide hgures for a ma)onty agalilSt a maJority, but 
a proJection of his ftgures would indicate that the figures for a majority agaUlSt 
a ma1onty would be near the medtan that Jewell reports for the fifteen non-
southern states. George D. Young, "The Role of Pohtlcal Parties in the Mtssouri 
House of Representatives," ( unpubushed Ph.D. dissertation, Umversity of Mis-
soun, 1958) pp. 100, 176. In addition, the percentages of House members who 
hsted party confuct as Important m their House were as follows . 
New Jersey 96 per cent 
Nlissouri 69 
Oh10 49 
Cahforma 26 
Tennessee 23 
Since these data conflict with that for the 1945-46 session, the question anses as 
to why My colleague Martin Faust has told me that the 1945-46 session of the 
legtslature was unusual m that legtslators were rmplementmg the state's new 
constitution, consequently partiSan conflict was mlentionally reduced. Thus it 
appears that the 1955 and 1957 data and the mterVlew data may be more typtcal. 
28 See for example, Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Pohtics " in Jacob and 
Vines op cit., p. 65. 
29 Robert F Karsch The Government of l.fissouri (8th ed . Columbia, Lucas 
Brothers Pubhshers, 1963 ), p. 21. 
30 Companson of data comp1led from Official Manuals of the State of Missouri 
and statements in Jewell and Patterson, op. ctt., p. 80. 
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law JS reinforced by public attitudes was Indicated by an October, 1964, 
suney of Boone County (in Central l\hssouri), conducted b}' the Public 
Opmion Survey Unit, University of ~1JSsouri. Respondents were asked 
for their vte\\S about the local sheriffs race in '' luch a defeated pnmary 
nominee had ftled as an independent :\umerous respondents expressed 
admiration for the personal qualities of the independent, but said that 
since it was not proper for a man to run as an independent, they would 
not vote for him. In campaign appearances in this county, candidates com-
peting for office rarely attack each other, contenting themselves \Vlth 
descripbons of their personal qualificabons for office. Emphasis on such 
personal attnbutes as anc stral family relationships and long-term local 
residence reduces compebhon by reinforcing pubbc diScrimination agamst 
those born elsewhere. 
Competition in the primary of the majority party JS often limited, es-
pecially by informal decisions w·hich result in only one major candidate 
for important offices Salisbury has described the process of selecting 
gubematonal candidates as follows 31 
. . through an informal process of quiet negotiation among 
persons of political influence in \ arious parts of the st!lte, a 
'successwn' of Democratic hopefuls IS often arranged, and, 
'"hen necessai), rearranged . . . Potential candtdates are 
~assigned' places on the waiting lists and gtven appropnate 
rewards for waiting therr tum patienth . The successiOn is 
backed up by few sanctions but m the absence of counter-
pressures from groups not represented in the negotiations, it 
is generally adhered to. 
In 1964 \Narren Reames then a candtdate for governor, labeled the 
group involved in this process the "EstabliShment," charging that it was 
centered around the Central ~hssoun Trust Company a J efferc;;on Cttv 
bank, in which was depos1ted many of the state's funds Reportedly 
Reames had decided not to \vail in line, and he successfully defeated 
Lieutenant Governor Hila.IJ Bush the 1964 .. Establtshment" candidate. 
The measures of party competition and conflict mchcate that most Mls-
soun voters do not have a meanmgful chOice behveen two parties be-
cause competition is discouraged and one party dommates in their area. 
The bmited amount of conflict between the parties indicates that it 
does not particularly matter '"·hich partv 1s dommant This low level of 
party compebbon and conflict 1s probably related, accordmg to the 
•cresponsible-party" theory of government , to limited conversiOn of de-
mands. 
31 Masters et al. op cit , p. 46. See also the discussion of the oligarchy 
runmng the Democratic party m John Fenton, Politics m the Border States (New 
Orleans: Hauser Press, 1957 ), p . 142. 
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Formal Governmental Institutions. Formal governmental structures, such 
as the legiSlature, make demands and convert them, though their em-
phasiS is probably on the latter process. Their structural arrangements 
are s1gruf1Cant if they restrict the presentation or conversion of demands. 
For example the powers of state officials may be so restricted that they 
are unable to convert demands into output. The evidence tends to con-
tradict this assumption, for MISsouri state officials have substantial legal 
power. The governor of MISsouri IS potentially one of the most powerful 
governors m the nation. Joseph Schlesmger has constructed a scale 
measurmg the formal (or potential) powers of governors, uh1izmg therr 
legiSlative powers, therr appomtive powers, their tenure potential, and 
therr veto power. The scale scores divided the states into twelve groups 
rangmg from the potentially most powerful governor (New York) to the 
potentially least powerful governors (MISSISSippi, South Carolina, Texas, 
and orth Dakota). Missoun was ranked in the fourth group, but the 
recent adoption of a constitutional amendment allowing the governor of 
MISsouri to serve two consecutive terms would place Missouri in the 
tlurd group, topped only by New York in the first group and by Illinois 
and New Jersey in the second group.32 Such measures as we have of 
actual power, rather than potential power, also indicate that the governor 
is quite strong. For example, no veto of the governor has been overridden 
by the legislature since 1838.33 . 
The Missouri legislature is orgalllZed so that substantial powers are held 
by the leadership. The speaker of the house appoints all committees and 
therr chamnen, Wlfestncted by seruority rules or by any limitation on the 
number, siZe, or subject matter of the committees. He also appomts all 
intenm committees. These latter appointments, made after the session IS 
completed, can be used as rewards for those legislators \vho have "gone 
along" with the speaker dunng the session. The interim committees som&-
times mspect facilities in such states as Florida and California, making 
their investigations during the winter time. The speaker of the house also 
assigns all bills to committees, a process which allows him to kill or delay 
almost any bill. In the Senate these powers are split between the maJority 
floor leader and the president pro tern. 
Measures of actual power substantiate these statements about potential 
power. In a 1966 survey, members of the legislature were asked who 
were the most powerful members of their house and why.34 Almost all 
House members nominated the speaker as one of the most powerful, and 
32 Joseph A Schlesinger "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob and Vmes 
op ctt , p. 229. 
33 Karsch, op. cit., p. 21. 
34 The survey of legiSlators was conducted by the Public Opinion Survey Unit 
of the University o£ Missoun and financed by a grant from the National ~1unicipal 
League. 
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almost all Senators nominated the majority floor leader. In the House the 
reasons for nominations for the speaker and others were often based on 
the power of the positions they held, while in the Senate reasons were 
often related to the personal qualities of the individuals The difference 
between the houses IS probably due to the smaller size of the Senate ( 34 
members compared to 163) and to the much longer time members have 
served together 35 
The committee structure of the legtslature has been cumbersome, but ap-
parently reasonabl)' responSI\ e to demands The cumbersomeness was 
related to the large number of committees (more than fifty H ouse com-
mittees and thirty-five Senate committees in some sessiOns), and the 
large SIZe of some of the committtees (more than fifty members for one 
House comnnttee) Such committees were unwieldy, not only because of 
therr siZe but also because legtslators had numerous committee appomt-
ments, so that the conflicts of meeting times and the lack of diligence of 
some members resulted m high absenteeism at comrruttee meetmgs. Many 
of the committees were established especially for the purpose of allowmg 
a legiSlator to tell constituents that he was a comrruttee chairman In 
fact, between 1937 and 1959 the pracbce in the House of Representatives 
was to create a chairmanship for every member of the maJority party who 
had more than one term of service. Thus, the number of committees es-
tablished depended on the number of sen1or majonty party members. If 
they WIShed, legislators could have become experts In various substantive 
areas, smce most legislators were allowed to serve on the committees they 
desrred, but m practice most legtslators preferred to SWitch committee as-
signments from session to sessiOn Tlus, combined v11th legtslabve turnover, 
often meant that almost half of the maJOr committees of the legislature 
were chaired by members servmg on that committee for the fust time.36 
The salanes and facilities for legiSlators are good, though not exceptional 
The salary and per diem of $11,550 per biennmm makes MISsoun legis-
lators the eleventh best paid state legiSlators m the nation.37 Each Senator 
has an off1ce and secretary of hiS own, wlu.1e m the H ouse members of 
the ma1onty party have offices and secretaries whiCh they share with one, 
35 One possible explanation of low output would be that the governor and 
legiSlative leaders are each sufficiently powerful, and sufficiently opposed to each 
other to veto the policies of each other, resulting m a restricted conversiOn of 
demands. If so the 1967 legiSlature should be diStinctly different, because the 
Democratic House caucus selected the governor's candidate as speaker, and the 
relationslup between the governor and the Senate leadershtp appeared to be good. 
36 The discussiOn is based especially on Robert F Karsch, The Standmg Com-
mittees of the Mt..ssouri General Assembly (Columbia Bureau of Government 
Research, Umverstty of MISsouri, 1959) See also Young op cit, pp. 21-24 and 
Masters, et al op cit, pp 57-68 In 1967 Speaker James Godfrey reduced the 
number of standmg committees in the House from forty-seven to thirty-seven 
37 John G Crumm and Calvm W Clarl-.. Compensatwn for Legislators in the 
Fifty States (Kansas Ctty: Citizens Conference on ~tate LegiSlatures, 1966 ), p 7. 
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two, or three colleagues. Minority party House members are not given 
indiVIdual offices but do have one large room in which they have desks. 
The LegiSlabve Reference Servtce was orgaruzed in the 1940s and pro-
VIdes extensive research and bill draftmg services for members and com-
nuttees, mcluding Intenm committees 38 The length and frequency of ses-
sions poses no senous problem because regular sessions, every other year, 
last for six months, and the present governor, \Varren Hearnes, has called 
a siXty-day budget sessiOn during each of the even-numbered years. 
One frequently alleged inadequacy of MISsouri government has been the 
malapportionment of the House of Representatives. The Senate has been 
some\.vhat equitably apporboned since 1945, but small counties were 
overrepresented in the House until 1967. (Before Baker vs. Carr and the 
subsequent court decisiOns which required wide-scale reapportionment, 
only one state Senate \vas more eqwtably apportioned than the Missouri 
Senate and only five houses \.vere more malapportioned than the Missouri 
House ) 39 However, David Derge analyzed roll call votes in the Missouri 
House In the mid-1950s and concluded that the malapportionment had 
had httle effect. He found that there v.rere few rural-urban divisions, and 
practically no oases in \.VhiCh united urban groups lost to rural groups. 
Frequently, urban groups were split, especially between core-city Demo-
crats and suburban Republicans.40 On the other hand, a comparison of 
responses of metropolitan and outstate legislators on the 1966 survey 
indicates that there is some division behveen the hvo groups, at least in 
their attitudes, and that this division IS usually stronger m the Senate 
than 1n the House ( Derge analyzed votes only in the House.) Another 
indicator of some effect of malapporbonment is that the metropolitan 
areas have contributed only one-sixth of the House speakers In this cen-
tury, compared to almost one-third of the presidents pro tern of the 
Senate, and of the govemors.41 Similarly, outstate men dominate the 
lobbymg staff of the MST A 42 and probably other powerful pressure 
groups. 
Formal structure is only one factor, however, and many studies have 
found that organizations \.vtth similar formal sbuctures operate differently 
38 For a discussion of the formation and early years of the Committee, see 
Arthur C Marlow, "The Committee on Legislative Research of the General As-
sembly of the State of ~hssoun" (unpublished Master's thesiS, St LouiS Univer-
Slt) 1950) 
39 National l\1umctpal League, Compendwm on Legislatwe Apportionment ( 2d 
ed , New York, 1962). The measure of apportionment used is the per cent of the 
populatwn which can theoretically control a majority of the body. 
4o David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Out-State Alignments in Illinois and 
Missoun Legislative Delegations," American Political Science Review, 41 (De-
cember 1958 ), 1051-1065. 
41 Compiled from Karsch Government of ~1issouri, p. 80, and State of Missouri, 
Offzczal ~fanual, 1963-64 (Jefferson City, n.d. ) , pp. 23-32. 
42 Masters, et al., op. cit., p. 18. 
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because of the varying charactenstics of the individuals '"I thin the or-
garuzabons and the informal arrangements that they ha\ e made. 
For example the men within a state government might possess sufficient 
powers and facilities but use them to restnct the demands of ctbzens, 
believing those demands to be mappropnate The best avatlable measures 
of the amount of agreement between ~1issouri legislators and thctr con-
sbtuents are, unfortunately, concerned with federal goven1ment programs. 
Etght attitude questions were asked 1n the POSU state-wide opinion sur-
vey in 196.5 and m the legtslator sun ev in 1966. LegiSlators held more 
conservative attitudes on ftve of these federal issues, more hberal atti-
tudes on one 1ssue. and attitudes simtlar to the pubhc on one 1ssue One 
companson lS available on a state tssue-fund.s for higher educatiOn-though 
the questions asked of the legislators and the public \vere \vorded chl-
ferently In th1s case legiSlators \\ere more strongly in favor of an increase 
in funds than the pubhc \vhich also favored expans10n These measures 
md.icate that r..1ISsonn legislators are more conscn ati\e than the public 
m their attitudes toward many federal government programs, but that 
legislators are more strongly in favor of expansion of at least one state 
government program. 
The level of output might be related to some measures of the abihty of 
the people m the pohtiCal S}Stem. Unfortunately \\ e have no comparable 
measures of the abilities of public employees \\rho are \Cry Important m 
the making and converting of demands Some evaluations of elected of-
ficials are available In the early 1960s SaliSbury charactenzed the formal 
leaders of the Mtssoun legiSlature as relatively young, mexpe.rienced, and 
weak, and Missouri governors as "relatively passive, acceptmg or reJecting 
most legislative actions Without attempting to gtude them."43 One com-
parable measure of the ability of legiSlators is their educational level 
Figures have been comp1led for legtslatures of vanous states during the 
1950s and early 1960s, showing the percentage of legtslators w1th some 
college education. M1ssonn, judged by 1ts 1957 leg~slature, ranked eleventh 
among the hvelve states for which data were compiled, indicating a 
oomparatively low propo.rbon of legtslators \\ 1th college educations The 
percentage In the Missouri Senate IS regularly much lugher than the per-
centage In the House. In the House the proportion of members w1th some 
college education (not mc1uding busmess or trade schools) has varied 
over the years, bemg farrly high for example between the mid-1930s and 
the early 1950s, then slippmg after 1953 to percentages lower than those 
at the tum of the century 44 After the 1961 salary mcrease from $1,500 
to $4,800 per year, the proportion of newly elected legislators with some 
43 Ibtd , pp. 45, 52. 
44 Howard B Lang, Jr., "They Legtslate for Missouri," Annals, 195 (January 
1938) 41; and Karsch, The Government of MtSsouri, p 76. 
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college education jumped immecbately from about 50 per cent to more 
than 70 per cent.45 
Another indicator of the abi.hty of legislators is the percentage with previ-
ous legislative expen ence, based on the assumption that experienced men 
are more capable than inexpenenced men. Data are available for about a 
dozen states, and Missoun ranks slightly above the median of these states, 
w1th about one-third of the districts in each house selecting newcomers 
at each election. 46 
PUBLIC APPROVAL AND SUPPORT 
M~ou.rians apparently are satisfied \VIth therr state government, including 
their legislature. In June, 1966, the Pubhc Opinion Survey Unit of the 
University of MISsouri asked respondents m a state-wide sample· 
Do you know if the Mtssoun state legiSlature did or cbd not 
hold a sesswn tlus year? (IF YES, I K1 0\V, THEY HELD A 
SESSION) How would you evaluate what the legislature did? 
\Vould you say that you are very sabsfied, moderately satis-
fied, moderately dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the work 
of the legiSlature this year? 
The most significant ftnding was the low level of knowledge about the 
legislature. Only 46 per cent of the respondents said that they knew that 
the legislature had held a sesswn. Comments by those people indicated 
that some of those who '1cnew" that the legislature had met were actually 
Table 3 
Attitudes of ~fissourians Toward Governor R eames, President 
Johnson, and the Legtslature, June 1966 
Attitudes Toward 
Governor Hearnes L egi$lature President Johnson 
Very satisfied 
Moderately satisfied 
Moderately dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
37.2% 
54.9 
6.0 
1.9 
100.0 ( N=266) 
13.4% 
69.1 
14.4 
3.0 
99.9 ( N= 298) 
11.8% 
39.4 
27.7 
21.1 
100.0 (N=289) 
Note. 
Table includes only those people in the state-wide sample of 951 who had an 
opinion about the legislature 
45 Based on compilations from bwgraplucal data in Official Manuals, State of 
Missouri ( Missouri Blue Book) 
46 Comparison of figures in Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., p. 120, and Karsch, 
The Government of Missouri, p. 76. 
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thinking of the regular 1965 sessiOn rather than the 1966 sesSion, which 
~vas a budget session \Vlth a restncted agenda. 
Sunilar questions were asked about Governor Warren Hearnes and Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson The responses can be compared by loolang only 
at those who had an opm10n about the legtslature thus controlling for 
the effect of cogruhon, because many more people had opm1ons about 
Hearnes and Johnson than about the legtslature The results are presented 
m Table 3 Apparently public evaluabon of the leg:tslature IS somewhere 
between that given to R eames and to Johnson Johnson's popularity m 
Missoun was far rugher in 1965 than in 1966, and in both years was 
somewhat suntlar to his popularity in the nation. 
The only comparison with legiSlatures across the nabon is a chfferently 
worded question by George Gallup, "\Vhat land of JOb do you thmk our 
state leg:tslature does An excellent job ( 12 per cent), a fair JOb ( 61 per 
cent), or a poor JOb (9 per cent)?" o response was obtamed from 18 per 
cent.47 If we assume that "excellent" is surular to "very satisfied," that 
"fair" ts similar to "moderately satisfted," that "poor" IS Slmtlar to "dtssabs-
fied," and that Gallup's total sample can be compared to the more restricted 
lmowledgeable group m MISSouri, then it appears that the evaluation by 
Missourians of their legiSlature IS f,urly Sirrular to that for the nation as 
a whole 
Political Culture The concept of pohttcal culture-the patterns of onenta-
bon to political action-may help to pull together some of these p01nts, and 
indicate the extent to \\hich they form a pattern Dante! Elazar has iden-
tified and named three dtfferent pohtical cultures m the United States-
the moralistic, of which the best examples are the old Progresstve states 
such as WISconsin, Mmnesota and Oregon, the mdiVIduahstic, of ~vhich 
the best examples are the pohtwa] machmes of btg cities, and the tradi-
tionalistic, of which the best examples are southern state governments. To 
summarize, but oversimplif} drastica1Iy, the moralistic pohbcal culture 
is based on assumptions that political battles should be about policies, that 
government should be run bv citizens rather than professwnal politicians, 
and that each citizen has an obligation to participate by voting or even 
running for office. The individuahstic political culture is based on the 
assumption that poht1cs IS, hke busme~s, an appropriate means of making 
a livmg. A successful pohbcal career will be based on such business prin-
Ciples as loyalty to associates and providmg the services demanded by 
the market Pohcies become secondary to patronage The tradibonalisbc 
culture IS based on an assumption that the role of government is limited, 
that government should be controlled by a small group at the top of the 
47 "Polls Show Voter Ignorance of Law Makers," State Legislatures Progress 
Reporter, 2 (January 1967) , 2. 
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social structure, and that one responsibility of government is to maintam 
the eXISting social structure Parbc1pation is limited to the few.48 
Elazar has provided prelunmary classifications of some geograph1c areas 
in each state: He classified St LouiS and Kansas City as individualistic and 
parts of outstate Missouri as trad1tionalistic He classified the state political 
culture as individualistic-traditionalistic. Elazar commented on the rele-
vance of a particular culture to the outputs of governments as follows:49 
[In the individualistic culture] Publia officials, committed to 
(giving the public what It wants,, are normally not willing to 
initiate ne\\' programs or open up new areas of government 
activity on theu O\a.:n recogruzance They ·will do so when they 
perceive an overwhelming pubhc demand for them to act, but 
only then In a sense, their "vlilingness to expand the funcbons 
of government is based on an extension of the quid pro quo 
lavor' system which serves as the central core of their po-
litical relationsh1ps, With new sel"Vlces the re\vard they give 
the public for placing them in office. 
By virtue of its fundamental outlook, the [moralistic] political 
culture creates a greater commitment to active government 
intervention into the economic and social life of the com-
munity . . . Not infrequently, public officials will themselves 
seek to initiate new government activities in an effort to come 
to grips with problems as yet unperceived by a majority of 
the citizenry. 
; 
\Vhere the traditionalistic political culture is dominant in the 
United States today, political leaders play conservative and 
custodial rather than initiaton roles unless pressed strongly 
from the outside. 
In !\1issouri the patterns of individualistic and traditionalistic cultures pro-
vide a rubric under which mav be fitted a number of the points noted-
the assumption of a custodial role for state government, the fiscal con-
servatism, concern with patronage, limited competition for office, and 
the limitations of puhlic participation. At first glance, the concept of po-
litical culture does not seem to explain, however, why the output of local 
governments and of federal government representatives should be com-
paratively higher than the output of state government. Nevertheless, an 
examination of the levels of output for those states which are most purely 
individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic in Elazar,s classification in-
dicates that the normal patten1 for individualistic states is a high ranking 
on local government programs and a low ranking on state government 
48 Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism· A View From the States (New 
York. Thomas Y. Crowell and Company, 1966), pp. 86-97. 
49 Ibid., pp. 89, 92, 93-94. 
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programs Moralistic states rank fairly high on both levels and tradition-
alistic states rank fairly lo'v on both le"V els so 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The data indicate that though ~1ISsouri has substantial physical, economic, 
and social resources, the output of her state political system ranks fairly 
low among the states In contrast, the outputs of Missouri local govern-
ments and of MISsoun's congressmen are at a higher level. The attempt 
to explain the low state output led to a consideration of demands and 
their conversion. The only available measure of public desues tnrucated 
that MISsourians had public attitudes toward federal government policies 
surular to those held by all Americans. The rmportant pressure groups m 
Missoun are similar to the important ones in other states, but one study 
indicated that MISsoun groups may not make as many demands as their 
counterparts m other states The two parties m MISsouri conflict relati\ ely 
infrequently In addition, political competition, even in primaries, IS sub-
dued m Missoun, so that voters rarely have a meaningful choice between 
conflicting policies. The formal structures and facilities of Mtssoun state 
government seem adequate, with the possible exception of the malappor-
tionment of the House in earlier years. Nevertheless, the one available 
measure of a state program showed that members of the malapportioned 
legislature favored Increases m funds for higher education more strongly 
than the public. Fmally, the men servmg in the legtslature in earher years 
apparently were not as able and educated as the legislators of some other 
states. Nevertheless, MISsourians are sallsfied with their government These 
pOints, seemmgly diVerse and diSparate, fit \Vithm the patterns of the 
mdividual1stic and traditionaliStic political cultures, the cultures of MIS-
souri. M1ssoun's output patten1 in fact is very Similar to that of the indi-
VIdualistic states This mdicates that further understandmg of Missoun's 
output pattern might be gained by looking at the pohtical systems of 
several mclividualistic states ( IllmoiS lnchana, Pennsylvania, and New 
Jersey, for example) and companng them with Missoun. 
Such an investigation should examine, among other things, the extent of 
fragmentation and diversity. In .N1ISsouri the diversity of political areas 
seems related to the low output of state government. Within the legislature 
50 Compiled from tbul , p. 110 and US Bureau of the Census US Census of 
Governments Vol IV No 4 Compendmrn of Government Finances, p. 72. In-
dividualishc states are Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania 
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey OhiO, Indiana, Illm01s, and Nevada Morahstic 
states are Vermont \taine, Miclugan, Wisconsin, Minnesota 1"--orth Dakota, Colo-
rado, Utah and Oregon. Traditionahsnc states are Virginia, North Carolina, Ten-
nessee. ~outh Carolma, Mississtppi Alabama Georgta, Arkansas and Louisiana 
The measure of output uses rankings of states accordmg to per capita expenditures 
for the predommately state programs of institutions of f1igher education, highways, 
and public welfare, and the predominately local programs of police protection, 
local fire protection, and sewerage. 
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there is a norm of ''local uruty", legiSlators tend to introduce bills applying 
only to their particular areas of the state, and their fellow legislators ap-
prove the bills only if most or all of those affected are in favor of them. 
Perhaps fragmentation is more characteristic of individualistic states than 
of moralistic or traditionalistic states. Certainly many of the individualistic 
states border on the Mason-Dixon line and contained both Northern and 
Southern elements during the Civil War. In addition many of them were 
settled by a wide variety of ethn1c groups in the post-Civil War era. The 
hypothesis would be that diversity required an individualistic culture, while 
solidarity allowed the establishment of a communitarian culture either 
moralistic or individualistic. 
CHAPTER 
5 
The Nonpartisan 
Nebraska Unicameral 
RI C HARD D MARVEL 
STATE SENATOR A ND u "fiVER S ITY OF OMAHA 
One of the baste functions of a legislabve body is to make deciSions for 
the society wluch it represents "The task of government IS not to express 
an rmagmary popular world, but to effect adjustments among the varwus 
special worlds and purposes whtch at any gtven time are pressing for 
realization "1 How are deciSions made in Nebraska, unique among the 
nabon's state legislative bodies, where smce 1934 the legiSlature has per-
formed 1ts dutles witlun the one-house, nonpartisan frame\-vork? 
The Nebraska uniCameral legiSlature rna\ provide clues regardmg legiS-
lative decision making with somewhat less reluctance than some partisan 
bodtes with a more complex orgamzatlon There are fewer personalities 
to study, procedure provides for pubhc hearings on all legtslation, for roll 
call votes should any member so request, and for a substantial reporting 
system of both floor debates and committee sessiOns In sum, the Nebraska 
field is a fertile one for research on decision makmg 
Wtlson and Alexis discuss s1x elements common to all decisions. ( 1) state 
of na ture or envrronment, ( 2) dectston makers, ( 3 ) goals or ends to be 
served , ( 4 ) relevant alternatives and a set of actions from which a cho1ce 
JS to be made, (5) a relationship whiCh produces an order of alternatives 
1n some arrangement, ( 6) the choice 1 tself - the selechon of one or more 
alternabves.2 ThiS paper \vill focus on these vartous elements in attempt-
1 V 0 Key, Jr., Polttws, Part~&, and Pressure Groups ( 3rd ed. , New York 
Thomas Y Crowell Company, 1952 ), p 10 quotmg John D1ckinson, .. Democratic 
Dogma," Amerwan Polttical Sctence Review, XXV ( 1930 ) 291-292. 
2 Charles Z. WJ.lson and Marcus Alexis, .. Bas1c Framework for Decision," jour-
nal of Admintstratwe Management ( August, 1962 ), 151, from Paul F. Lazars-
feld ( ed ), Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences ( New York: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1954). 
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mg to shed some light on the question of how decisions are made in the 
Nebraska legislative process. 
There are basically two ways of analyzmg the decision-malang process. 
One IS the "mathernancal approach" which puts an emphasiS on proba-
bility and game theory.3 Although the present study uses mathematics to 
sort and catalogue data, the framework is basically "social-psychological.'' 
The "actor decision-maker participates in a particular kind of social sys-
tem . . . built into this actor are certam properties which . . will partly 
account for his behavior "4 Thus, mstitutional factors cannot be disre-
garded, and it is a prerruse of tlus research that one cannot adequately 
understand pressure politics m 1 ebraska and the decisions that result 
without an analysis of the people of the state as '\veil as the legislative 
insbtubon which the} have de\ eloped. The history of Nebraska, the 
structural processes of the legiSlature, and the personal, informal influ-
ences wluch affect each senator must be described in trymg to pomt out 
possible influences on the fmal product-legislative decisions. 
THE NEBRASKA POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The Physical Fact01's. Nebraska is geographically classified as being part 
of the Great Plains area, w1th three distinguishing characteristics: "a 
comparatively level surface of great extent; a treeless land and unforested 
area; and a region where the rainfall lS insufficient for the ordinary in-
tensive agriculture common to the lands of the humid climate."5 Eastern 
Nebraska, ho\vever, does not fall 1nto the Great Plains area and contams 
not only entirely different topograplucal characteristics than the land 
west, but also is in an entirely separate ramfall area. "The state is mdeed 
1n the transitional area and for that reason, perhaps, its problems are more 
complicated. "6 
Geographical differences betv.een the east and the west have caused sub-
stantial variation in the types of crops grown and the entire base of the 
economy It seems probable that geographical variance has also affected 
the personalities of the people. Thus, the geography of the state may be 
responsible for many of the differences in attitude between the eastern 
and the western senators. 
Major rivers also play a role in both urufying and diVIding Nebraskans 
3 Irwin D J. Bross, Design for Deczsion (New York. The lvfacmillan Company, 
1953 ). 
4 Richard C Snyder, et al., Foreign Policy Decision-!fakmg ( ~ew York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 172 
s \Valter Prescott \Vebb, The Great Plains ( ~ew York Crossett and Dunlap, 
1931 ), p 3 
6 James C Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1955), p. 6. 
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Every mile of the Platte fuver "IS bound to hiStory and politics."7 It pro-
VIded a pathway for settlers, defmed the maJor route for the railroads, 
became a political IDVldmg hne, and in the 1940s and 1950s the Center 
of bitter water di\!ers10n battles in the state legiSlature. 
The settlers who came to Nebraska were faced \vith a Situation unknown 
in the humid east. \Vith ramfall of less than menty mches annually west 
of the hundredth men dian, Nebraska lS near the margin as far as stable 
farmmg lS concerned Drought combmed \vilh a grasshopper mvas1on or 
an economic do\vnturn turns prospenty mto disaster In such an environ-
ment, adaptation and expenmentation were necessary, resulting in a 
ccba1ling-wire approach to any problem, and the emergence of a cult 
of the practical. "8 
Demographtc Factors Nebraska has a built-in urban-rural population 
schism, for Douglas (Omaha ) and Lancaster ( Lmcoln ) counties-both 
located m the eastern one-third of the state, only sixty rrules apart-con-
tain over 35 per cent of the state~s population and have enjoyed the major 
population mcrease in recent years 
Communities 
Over 10,000 
5,000-10,000 
2,500-5,000 
1,000-2,500 
Under 1,000 
Table 1 
DLSt:ribution of Nebraska Population 1960 
Number 
Unincorporated and on farms 
611,919 
86,897 
67,237 
102,169 
136,943 
406,185 
Source. 
Per Cent of 
Total Population 
434 
62 
48 
72 
97 
287 
N D. Searcy and A R Longwell, Nebraska Atlas ( Kearney, Nebraska Nebraska 
Atlas Publishmg Co 1964), p 24 
Observers predict that within a few years Omaha and Lincoln will have 
over 50 per cent of the population and will, thus, be entitled to a ma-
JOrity of the representation in the state's unicameral legiSlature. Probably 
of more significance for the future is the ratio of school age residents to 
total population. In 1964, !\eb1aska ranked thirty-eighth in tlus category, 
7 Wendy Rogers, "Water Treasure" Depth Report No 3 (Lincoln School of 
Journalism, Umvcrsit)' of Nebraska March 15 1964) p. 9 
8 Lewis Atherton, lYf atrutreet on the Afiddle Border ( Bloommgton: lndtana 
University Press, 1964 ), Chapter 4. 
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With school age population as 25.6 per cent of the total. In the same year, 
Nebraska ranked fourth in the nabon m 1ts population of those over sixty-
five years of age-a percentage of 11 6. 9 
Table 2 
Family Income in Nebraska 1960 
Per Cent of Families 
Famaly Income State Urban Rural 
Under $1,000 5.5 2.8 8.7 
$1,000-$1,999 9.2 5.3 13.8 
$2,000-$2,999 11.4 7.4 16.0 
$3,000-$3,999 12.8 10.0 16.0 
$4,000-$4,999 13.0 12.7 13.3 
$5,000-$5,999 12.6 14.4 10.4 
$6,000-$6,999 9.7 12.3 6.7 
$7,000-$9,999 15.8 14.1 5.5 
$10,000 and over 10.2 14.1 5.5 
Source. 
N. D Searcy and A. R. Longwell, Nebraska Atlas (Kearney, Nebraska: Nebraska 
Atlas Publishing Co., 1964), p. 33. 
• 
Imrrugrants have played an important part in the development of the 
state. The typical unm1grants were poor people, materiahsbc, thrifty, con-
servabve, religious, and pragmatic.10 The Germans led the influx \vith more 
than 200,000 of the 538,218 foreign population in 1910.11 Large numbers 
of Scandinavians and Czechs populated the state, as well as lesser num-
bers of Central and Southern Europeans, Dutch, French, and English.12 
Wlule the Yankee settlers tended to be more progressive and interested 
in innovation than were many other groups, "rmmigrant pwneers influenced 
the state's politics, Its fiscal viewpoint, and its morals."13 Negroes, predomi-
nately located in the metropolitan areas, today number only 2.1 per cent 
of the population, and the other main disadvantaged minority group, the 
Indians, accormt for less than 0.5 per cent of the population.14 
Econcmic Factors. Founded on an agricultural basis, Nebraska today re-
9 Ranking of the States, 1965, Research DIVISion of the National Education 
Association, February, 1965, pp. 11-12. 
10 Jane Tenhulzen, "A Foreign Frontier," Depth Report No. 3 (Lincoln. School 
of Joumahsm, Universtty of Nebraska, March 15, 1964 ), p. 23. 
llJbid. 
12 Ibid., p. 22. 
13Jbid. 
14 U S Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract of the U S., 1966 (Washing-
ton, D C., 1966), pp. 26-27. 
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ma1ns pnmarilv an agncultural state The state's econom} stood siXth in 
agncultural products In 1962 The farming industry 1s a one-bU.hon-dollar 
annual business, and 1ncludes 5 2 milhon head of cattle worth $1 5 bilhon. 
Nebraska has O'-' er hvice as many people employed in agriculture as in 
manufactunng.Is 
Present ebraska industr} IS largely centered in the metropolitan areas of 
Omaha and Lmcoln Douglas County (Omaha) has 38 per cent of the 
manufacturing industries and 45 per cent of those employed in manufao-
twing.Is The agncultural emphasis lS even more apparent in light of the 
fact that over 40 per cent of the manufacturing employees process food 
and other related products.17 
The mterdependence of agnculture and manufacturing lS not a cOinci-
dence, and ebraska farmers have historically had a business-onented '-'lew. 
The latter vie\\ triumphed over the Populist view which refused to accept 
pnce control based on production hm1ts 18 In the end, the farmers had to 
swallow therr moral values and accept governmental support and con-
trolled producbon. This busmess-oriented vie\v of rural Nebraska lS in 
direct opposibon to the practices and pohcies of the laboring people and 
the unions that represent them. 
\Vith recent legtslabve enac.:tments, many of Neb1 aska's ptlla.rs of fiScal 
conservatism have fallen No longer can the state "boast" of no broadened 
t.tx base, no state aid to schools, and the lowest per captta state tax m the 
nation. Frugahtv is understandable cons1denng the enVIronment of the 
Great Plams In ebraska, the enVIronment imposes vanab1hty and stresses 
the Importance of a matenahstlc, conservative onent:ation to hle Unoer-
tatnty encourages the citizen to buy, plan, and operate cautiously with an 
emphasiS on practical hvmg As one western ebraska ma}or commented. 
"The depress10n years are still looking over our shoulders "19 
Historical Politlcal Factors Any descnption of the Nebraska personality 
must emphasize the p10neer spint "In these years [the 1870s] was created 
the Soul of Nebraska-charactensbc rrund, VISion, and form of action Soli 
and sun and wmd, hardship and confhct, spint, Institutions, debates and 
expenences shaped the type of man who still hves upon these prarries ... 
the Nebraska type was created in the '70s ... The soul of Nebraska 
remains in dommant feature the product of the p10neer '70s.·~ 
15 N D Searcy and A R. Longwell, Nebraska Atlas (Kearney, Nebraska Ne-
braska Atlas Publishmg Company 1964), p . 77 
16Jbid 
17 Ibid 
18 James A Stone uAgranan Ideology and the Farm Problem in Nebraska 
State Politics Wlth Special Reference to Northeast Nebraska 1920-1933" ( unpub-
hshed Ph D. d1ssertation, University of Nebraska, 1960), p 172. 
19 Frederick C Wefso, Mayor of Rushville, Nebraska, personal interview, July 
18, 1964. 
20 Olson, op cit., p. 177, c1tmg Addison E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and 
the People ( Crucago. Lewis Publishing Company, 1931 ), p. 579. 
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Polibcal squabbhng dating from the first legislative session between the 
North and South Platters set a pattern for political behavior which remains 
even today Railroads made therr presence felt in the early history of 
Nebraska and have played a significant role m the state's economiC and 
pohtical development. It has been said that the hvo most important fac-
tors m Nebraska's settlement were the construction of the railroads and 
a bberal land policy 21 Towns vied for railroads and the competition en-
couraged feelmgs of localism and community spirit. A pioneer wrote m 
1868 "One part of ebraska belongs to the speculator, one part to the 
state, one part to the schools, and one part to the Union Pacific."22 The 
pohtical Influence of the railroads is still felt in Nebraska, for the railroads 
continue to be important to the state's economy. 
The home of agncultural innovation, the Great Plains region has also been 
"a land of political innovation, expressing Itself in such vagaries as popu-
lism, agranan crusades, and farm relief."23 Nebraska has been an active, 
and at times the dominant, participant in these various movements. Yet, 
the agrarian political behavior was unlike other segments of the popula-
tion "In short, the fanner reacts to economic pressure \vith political pro-
test, yet the response h as an e>.-plosive quality-great force without dura-
tion-which is untque."24 Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to trace the 
individualiSm and the nonpartisanship of early agricultural political revolts 
to the signs of \Veakness in the Nebraska political parties by the mid-
1930s, and ultimately to the establishment of a nonpartisan state legis-
lature. 
It might be expected that a lack of commitment to a p ohtical philosophy 
\Vould lead to s1gnif1cant variation in Nebraska's national political prefer-
ence H owever, this does not seem to have been the case. Dr. Jasper 
Shannon shows that "Nebraskans generally prefer a Republican liberal or 
progressiVe to a Democratic one,"25 selecting Republicans in eighteen of 
twenty-four presidential elections.26 
The envrronment and conditions of settlement contributed to strong feel-
ings of localism and opposition to centralizatiOn The necessity of the 
settler to look within himself m the midst of isolation and desolation 
caused localism to become the only understandable way of life. Localism 
is still strong today and finds expression in strong oppos1t1on to state m-
volvement in educational matters 
21 Ibid., pp. 161-164. 
22 Tenhulzen op cit , p. 23. 
23 \Vebb op ctt, p. 514. 
24 Angus Campbell, et al.> The Amerzcan Voter ( Kew York: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc 1960 ), p 403. 
25 Jasper Shannon, "Conservative Nebraska: Fact or Fiction?" (unpublished, 
undated paper), p. 1. 
26 Ibid. , p. 15. , 
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Concluszon From this brief survey, one might be led to hypothesiZe that 
the ebraska legtslator IS probably a highly individualistic conservative 
Republican, rurall) oriented, with a pro-business and anti-labor outlook, 
cautious with regard to spending, and a staunch advocate of local control. 
Yet, thiS picture would fail to account for the liberal innovations \\-hich 
have been a part of r ebraska history-the Populist-Progressn e reforms, a 
complete public pO\\ er complex, the somewhat radical design of the state 
capitol, and a one-house, nonpartisan legislature. ThiS blend of conserva-
tism and liberalism mav find Its ongin in the envrronment of the Great 
Plams which "challenges human mtelligence in regard to every aspect of 
hfe-technological, economical, political, social, even philosophical."27 Tills 
dichotomy has been evident throughout rebraska history. \\'hatever the 
reason it is evident that ((there seems to be a contradiction in evenrthing 
the ~ebraskan thinks and does. He is secure, yet insecure; he IS conserva-
tive, yet radiCal; he belie\ es m both private O\vnership and pubhc owner-
ship. In his shifting moods and attitudes the ::'\ ebraskan is like most of 
the great hdlands '"28 Thus, a more \ahd hypothesiS \Vould seem to be 
that when an O'.lerall perspective of the legislative voting pattern IS 
aclueved, the Nebraska legislator \Vlll prove to be not of extremes, but 
of moderation, a blend of conservative and progressive strains. 
DEVELOPME!'TT OF THE UNICAMERAL 
The development of 0Iebraska's nonpartisan, uniec-uneral legislature was 
the result of the state's political, soctal, and economic lustory. Even though 
a unique set of crrcumstances led to the brrth at that particular moment 
in 1934, the thmkmg of the people as it e\olved made the enacllnent of 
the system possible. 
A number of events and individuals kept the unicameral idea before the 
people awaiting the nght moment. During the Progressne period of the 
early 1910s J 01 Norton came to the Nebraska House and eventually 
became maJOntv leader and speaker pro tern Norton was mterested m 
the umcameral 1dea and pushed for 1t during rus legtslative career. The 
ISsue lost in the Consbtutional ConventiOn of 1920 by only one vote 
In the same year, a model state constitutiOn recommended by the National 
Munictpal League advocated the adopbon of a unicameral state legisla-
ture. In this same period, Senator Ge01 ge Norns was actively supporting 
the umcameral Idea 1n speeches and artiCles Dr John P Senning, head 
of the Pohhcal Science Department at the Umvers1tv of Nebraska and 
member of the S\liYe\ committee for the constltuhonal drafting comm1ttee 
• 
27 Karl F Kraenzel, Watson Thomson, and Glen H Cra1g, The Northern 
Plams in a World of Change (Toronto Gregory-Cartwnght Ltd , October, 1949), 
p 175. 
28 James Momson, "Nebraska and its People Paradoxes and Truisms of a 
High Plains Society," Studies in Nebraska ]ournalzsm, Pamphlet No. 8 ( Lmcoln. 
School of Joumahsm, Umversity of Nebraska), p. 3. 
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of 1919 to 1921, saw the urucameral ccas the next logical step for the un-
provement of the structure of the legislature.'~ 
The proponents believed the unicameral would be more representative of 
a legislative body, more open to public scrutmy, and more readily account-
able to the electorate. Senator Norris saw parb.sanship and the conference 
committee as the 1:\vo main roadblocks which tended to separate the public 
from Its state representative.30 It is through Norris's efforts that the 
nonpartisan feature was part of the proposal put before the people in the 
elecb.on of 1934. 
The year 1934 was economically poor for ebraska. Agriculturally, the 
state had expenenced hard times as early as the 1920s when the panty 
index began to take an unfavorable turn. Thus, the economic argument 
of the lesser cost of the urucameral no doubt had relevance for many 
people. Also, there \\ere t:\vo other key constitutional amendments slated 
for consideration in 1934-a panmutuel proposition authorizing horse 
racing and repeal of prohibition. Advocates of these amendments, fear-
ful that a "no" vote on one ISsue might Jeopardize all, urged therr su~ 
porters to vote '\ es.. on all three proposihons All three carried-repeal 
of prohibition by 328,074 to 218,107, parimutuel by 251,111 to 187,455, 
and the unicamera1286,086 to 193,152.31 
Many credit one personality or organization for the success of the uni-
cameral campaign. One author perhaps has summed it up best: ((We may 
have to be content with the belief that the combination of forces and 
circumstances of the election produced the unpredicted. Certainly, 1t was 
a deCisiOn that dismayed and perplexed many political experts."32 
Perhaps it is appropnate to say that originally Norton's promotion kept 
the unicameral ideal alive, that Norris' political astuteness Judged the 
((Nebraska mind" ready to accept the proposition in 1934; and that Sen-
nings educational background added the third element-political theory-
to the triumvirate. 
FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE Ul\"'CAMERAL 
The unicameral structure represents the innovative, yet conservative, spirit 
of the Nebraska pioneers. Born in the midst of agricultural depression 
and severe drought, the unicameral, it was hoped, would create an ef-
ficient, economical, and basically democratic state legislative system. The 
basic goals of the unicameral, as propounded by its supporters and trans-
29 John P. Senning, The One House Legislature (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1937 ), p. 3. 
30 George W. ~oms "The Model Leg1slature •• address given m Lincoln, Ne-
braska, February 22, 1934, reprint from Congres.nonal Record, February 27, 1934 
( Washmgton, D.C.. U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 3276-3280. 
31 Sennmg, op. ctt., pp. 60-61. 
32 Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, One House For Two: Nebraska's Umcameral 
Legt.Sltlture ( Washmgton, D.C .. Pubhc Affairs Press, 1957 ), p 5. 
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lated into the orgaruzation and rules of the legtslature, can be summed up 
as follo\vs ( 1 ) direct communication between the public and the legiS-
laove body, (2) \lS1b1hty, i e., playing the legislative game in the open, 
(3) adequate and full deliberation, (4) mobuu;ation of power, (5) mrua-
mlzabon of leaderslup potential, (6) representation of every major seg-
ment of the state•s population, (7) protection of minonty rights, ( 8) the 
sum total of the pre'\'lOUS goals-democratic representaoon 
Access and Vzstbility. The legiSlative operation and structure pro\'ldes an 
excellent opportunity for the mterested cibzen to obtam access to the 
confhct and to observe the de" elopment of the battle plans VISitors are 
separated physically from the senators only by a rope strung across the 
rear of the chamber. Only forty -nme actors are involved and it IS relabvely 
Simple to diSCern the ke) leaders in order to make direct contact \vith 
them. Perhaps the most rmportant access point to both organiZed and 
unorganiZed groups IS the committee he,umg. Almost all bills are given 
a pubhc ruring to \\luch any interested citizen is In\'lted. Pnnted notice 
must be gtven five da) s before a hearing is held. 
The legislative procedure msures "openness at all stages Committees 
must act on each measure, chau"ffien must report committee declSlons to 
the legtslature withm eight da\ s,33 and be accountable for the reasoning 
behmd each deciSIOn. Any committee member who disagrees With the 
deciSion of hiS stanillng committee can rise on the floor to explam lus op-
poSibon 34 
Floor debate and votmg procedure add another dimensiOn to the \'lSibuity 
aspect. An electroniC vobng machme permits an observer to see at a glance 
how any senator has voted The vote on fmal readmg IS recorded m the 
daily Legtslabve J oumal, but at an) time \Vhile the bill IS bemg processed 
a member can request a machine \ ote and can ask that this vote he 
made part of the record 35 
Informed Deliberation. Public hearing IS the frrst step a bill takes after 
mtroduct10n After the open committee sessiOn, where all can testify, the 
committee goec; into secret or executive session to take acoon on the bill. 
The executive sessiOn IS a controversial aspect, and though members of 
the press may be present, they are bound by a "gentleman's agreementn 
to reveal nothmg but the numencal vote on any bill 36 The legislature, by 
a ma1onty vote, may vote to raise a bill killed m committee 37 Ho\vever, 
the committee 1s seldom overndden. 38 
33 Nebraska Rules of the Nebraska Legislature ( 1965) Rule 6, sec. 8 C1ted 
hereafter as Nebraska Rules 
34Jbtd., Rule 6 sec 10 
35 Ibtd , Rule 9 sec 4 
36Jbul, Rule 6 sec 11 
37 lbtd, Rule 6, sec 9. 
38 Dunng the 1959 legislative sessiOn, of the bills killed in committees, only 
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When a billlS released by a committee, it \vill be considered by the entire 
legtslature after bemg placed on general file, the fust of five procedural 
steps, followed by enrollment and re\ 1ew for reVIew, select file, enrollment 
and reVIew for engrossment, and fmal reading. The first full-scale debate 
of any bul occurs , .. hile that bill lS on general fue. At tlus point amend-
ments are offered, the standing committee chairman supports committee 
acbon, and the Introducer defends lus bill. ~1ost bills which survive the 
general file w1ll be passed, though they are yet subJeCt to amendments 
V\'hich may (\Vater do\vn" or slO\\ h strangle them 
The select file prov1des an additional deliberative step largely unknown 
in other leg1slab\ e bodies. It provides an add1honal opportunity for debate 
and exam1nabon of the measure. "Procedure on Select File was reallv 
action m another committee of the whole. "39 
The 1:\.vo enrollment stages provide for technical correction of the bill and 
the add1bon of amendments A full-arne attorney is hired to assure legal 
correctness. 
The last fue is fmal readmg. All senators are required to be on the floor, 
and no VISitors are perrrutted to contact the senators 40 As the entire bill 
1S bemg read, the senators, free from interruptions, have a final opportunity 
to study each bill. 41 
The rules which govern movement of the bill across each of the five files 
provide that: ( 1) five legtslative days must have passed since the bill 
was initially referred to enrollment and reVIew, (2) it must have passed 
two legislative days on the board after its reference to the final reading 
file, and ( 3) a fmal pnnted form of the bill must have been upon the 
desks of the members for at least one legislative day.42 
A ((call of the house" further contnbutes to the deliberative process.43 
When one member requests a call of the house, each member who has 
not been formally excused must retwn to hiS chair and remain there until 
the call IS lifted. Members cannot be forced to vote, but at least they are 
requrred to remam during the penod of votmg. 
The umcameral's founders obviously felt that the deliberative process 
could not be left to chance. The ongmal steps, largely mtact, are still pro-
viding the necessary checks agamst hasty or ill-informed legislabon. 
four were raised and only two ulbmately passed. In 1961, seven bills were raised 
and only four surv1ved. In 1963, eleven bills were raised from committee and 
seven of the eleven became law 
39 Lane W. Lancaster, "Nebraska's New Legislature," XXII Minnesota Law 
Retnew ( December, 1937 ), 69 
40 Nebraska Rules, Rule 4, sec. 7. 
41 Few legislators take advantage of the opportunity, most having made up 
therr mmds as to its merits. These legiSlators are prone to use final reading time 
for relaxation, qmet viStts, and opemng letters. 
42 Nebraska Rules, Rule 12, sec. 11. 
43 Ibid , Rule 9, sec. 8. 
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Afobilizatwn of Power. The unicameral structure provides a flexible frame-
work for the use of pohtical power. Flexibihty 1n thiS Instance refers to 
three major areas-method of selection of legtslative leaders, development 
of leadership by specialization, and the prec;ence of votmg blocs which 
shift \vith specific ISSues ~either senionty, partiSanship, nor gubernatorial 
mfluence are of maJOr s1gntficance in the pO\\ er struggle in ~ebraska's 
unicameral structure. 
The election of legislative leaders-the speaker, chairman of the committee 
on comnuttees and the chairm.m and \1ce chairman of the legislative 
council-IS by secret ballot, not by party alignment.44 The speaker presides 
dunng the absence of the lieutenant governor,45 but his real power lS 
based upon hiS memberslup ill the reference committee46 and the legislative 
councrl execubve board The speakership, often conferred on one of the 
senior members, IS more a position of honor than power in ?\Jebraska. 
The chairman of the committee on committees ts a strategic position. T1us 
comnnttee chooses the chairman and members of each standing committee 
Though geographical chstnbution, nonparb.sanshtp, and a blend of fresh-
man and expenenced senators IS sought, politics is a vital aspect of com-
mittee assignments Both opponents and proponents of a broadened tax 
base in the pa~t have attempted to "stack" the revenue committee in 
their favor Spending agencies of state government, ill hke manner, are 
alwa}s happ} when therr supporters fmd a position on the budget com-
mittee 
A person can rise to committee chairman in as few as two terms. Here 
again, too often geographic or spending philosophies, rather than abihty, 
are the basis for selection. Peculiar to the uniCameral IS the fact that com-
mittee chairmen usually retam their positions for no more than two con-
secutive sessiOns 
The chairman and VICe chairman of the five-member legtslanve council 
executive board can be very influential. ThiS board, whtch also includes 
the speaker and chrurman of the committee on committees, heads the 
mam research unit available to the legiSlature and drrects mtenm studies 
Bills are ass1gned to various standmg committees by the reference com-
mittee-the speaker, chairman of committee on committees, and the lieu-
tenant governor Obv1ously, referral to an unfnendly committee can greatly 
lessen a bill's chances for survival. 
While parbsan machinery might make voting blocs more ng1d, Nebraska's 
nonpartisansh1p finds that opponents on one issue may be proponents on 
another. In other words, issues tend to take the place of party alliances in 
Nebraska's legtslabve voting patterns. 
44 Ibid., Rule 3, sec 1. 
45 Ibid., Rule 2 sec. 1. 
46 Ibid., Rule 14, sec. 1. 
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Leadership. The legtslative climate includes an opportunity for advance-
ment which is not based on seniority. Nonpartisanship permits legislators 
to wield a considerable amount of individual authority and influence 
through Identification With specific subjects. Ideally, the Nebraska uni-
cameral structure provides the laboratory for the individual who desires 
to use his talents to full capacity to experiment with the problems of state 
government. The product of legislation in the American democracy must 
include the ingredien~ from the many elements of the society being served. 
To meet the diverse needs and demands requires the leadership traits 
of courage, patience, and understanding. The author believes these traits 
thrive best under a nonpartisan, one-house legislative structure. 
Majority and Minor-ity Rule. Minority groups in our framework must be 
allowed to speak, but not so loudly or forcefully as to thwart the majority. 
A Nebraska citizen can be heard on any issue through individual effort 
or by unibng with a group which shares his view. 
A potent majonty, properly organized, is provided adequate means of 
expression within the unicameral system. Neither party, seniority customs, 
nor a second house stands in the way of the majority. Lobbying by mi-
nority groups behind closed doors is reduced by a visible, accessible, legis-
lative system operated by a small, easily identifiable membership . 
Democratic Representation. The sum of all the elements discussed previ-
ously should lead to representative government producing moderate de-
cisions. A legislative structure must afford the opportunity for the co-
operative use of all its elements to meet the challenges facmg modem 
representative democracy. The nonpartisan unicameral structure, in the 
opinion of the author, provides the mechanism to meet the demands of 
the first seven poin~. The seven goals, together, can attain maximum co-
ordination through the nonpartisan, unicameral structure and thus pro-
duce the eighth goal-moderation through democratic, representative gov-
ernment. 
INFORMAL INFLUENCES ON DECISION MAKING 
IN THE NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL 
Each inruvidual elected to the unicameral brings with him predetermined 
philosophies and preJudices which collide with the informal rules of the 
group. HIS ccrole ooncept"-how he relates to each individual, to society, 
and to the world-influences his behavior in the role of a legislator. This 
((role concept.. can be said to be composed of three elements· ( 1) the 
personal background and relationships a legislator brings with him to the 
legislature, ( 2 ) the outside pressures of constituents, pressure groups, 
parbes, and agencies of state government, ( 3) the (I rules of the game" gov-
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eming the roles and actions of the members of the legiSlative group 
itsel£.47 
The Legislator in Perspective. As was the pattern in the ma1onty of the 
states, the Nebraska legislature has had to wrestle with the reapportion-
ment problem. Ongmally set up on an eqwtable distnbution of population, 
urban growth in the 1950-60 decade resulted m an rmbalance. The follow-
ing table of the 1962 general election results not only mdicates the popu-
lation chsparity between rural and urban legiSlative chstncts, but also r~ 
veals the apprec1able difference \Vlthin the metropolitan areas of both 
Omaha and Lincoln. 
Legislative District 
6 (Omaha) 
10 (Omaha) 
19 ( Lmcoln ) 
20 ( Lincoln) 
Table 3 
Apportionment in Nebraska, 1962 
30 (Two counties in central Nebraska ) 
39 (Ten counties in western Nebraska) 
40 (Three counties m western Nebraska) 
Source 
Total Votes Cast 
4,845 
31,819 
4,371 
20,500 
13,858 
9,158 
6,123 
Nebraska Legislative Council, Nebraska Blue Book 
hereafter as Blue Book 
( 1962), pp. 653-655. Cited 
Urban-sponsored reapportionment acts were killed in the 1959 and 1961 
sessions. A comprorruse estabhshmg a population-area formula was passed 
by the legislature as a consb.tunonal amendment in 1961 and was ap-
proved by the voters The 1963 legislature implemented the measure, al-
lowmg a 20 per cent weight for area. A three-member federal court, how-
ever, voided the act, but approved a 1965 reapportionment act allowmg 
a population discrepancy of almost 20 per cent.48 Thus, one obstacle to 
possible majority rule in the Nebraska unicameral has been overcome 
As may be expected, farming-ranching has been the dorrunant occupation 
represented in the unicameral Lawyers, traditionally well-represented m 
legiSlative bodies, have steadily declined m the unicameral and busmess-
47 John C Wahlke Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson 
The Legt.Slatwe System (New York John Wuey & Sons, Inc, 1962 ), pp 141-169 
48 League of Nebraska Munictpaltties v. Frank Marsh and others, 232 F. Supp 
411 (U.S. District Court, 1964) and League of Nebraska Municipalities v 
Frank Marsh and others, 252 F Supp. 27 (U.S. Distnct Court, 1966) . 
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oriented occupations seem to have taken their place. Few blue-collar work-
ers have served in the Nehraska legislatw·e 
Table 4 
Occupations of · ebraska Senators 
Real 
Busi- Estate Profes- White- Blue-
Session Rancher Lawyer ness Banking simuzl Collar Collar 
1937 18 10 5 4 2 3 0 
1939 15 10 10 4 1 3 0 
1941 13 14 8 4 0 4 0 
1943 10 16 8 6 2 1 0 
1945 11 10 11 7 1 2 1 
1947 13 7 12 4 4 3 0 
1949 13 9 10 6 3 2 1 
1951 9 8 9 10 3 4 0 
1953 7 5 16 7 4 4 0 
1955 15 8 9 4 3 4 0 
1957 16 5 10 6 2 4 0 
1959 15 5 11 7 2 3 0 
1961 16 4 10 8 0 5 0 
1963 20 1 6 8 1 6 1 
• 
Source: 
Blue Book, 1938 through 1964. 
The average age of N ebraslal legislators has remained fairly constant over 
the years. The early sessiOns had the youngest personnel-47.0 years of 
age in 1941. The average age rose gradually to 54.2 in the 1947 session, 
and has remained around 54 years. 
Session 
1937 
1939 
1941 
1943 
1945 
1947 
1949 
Source: 
Table 5 
Average Age of Senators 
Average 
Age Session 
48.0 1951 
47.1 1953 
47.0 1955 
50.3 1957 
52.4 1959 
54.2 1961 
52.6 1963 
Blue Book, 1936 through 1964. 
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Average 
Age 
54.9 
55.4 
54.3 
53.7 
53.2 
54.9 
54.5 
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Of all the leg:tslator!> serving between 1936 and 1962, more than 67 per 
cent of those elected served more than one term, and more than 37 per 
cent served more than two terms About one-third served but one term 
in the urucameral. 
Table 6 
Terms Served by Legtslators 
Number of Terms Number of Legt.slators PerCent 
1 78 328 
2 70 294 
3 37 15 5 
4 27 113 
5 13 5.5 
6 3 13 
7 5 21 
8 or more 5 2.1 
Total 238 100.0 
Source 
Blue Book, 1938-1964 
Of 125 uncontested races m the elections held between 1936 and 1962 
(20 7 per cent of the total races), 114, or 91 2 per cent, involved in-
cumbents The "staying po\ver" of Nebraska senators seems to be very 
lugh Once elected, if he so desrres an IndiVIdual has greater than an 80 
per cent chance of being re-elected Of 416 incumbents runrung in the 
years 1936-1962, 341, or 81 5 per cent were successful. If one chscards 
those defeated by former leglSlators, the result IS 341 out of 395 success-
ful, or 86 3 per cent 49 
The turnover ratio in the unicameral has been generally below 40 per cent, 
and in the last few years seems to be near the national average which was 
34 per cent m both houses m 1963 
The process of recruibng state legislators m Nebraska seems neither to be 
as uniform nor as systemabc as many state government observers \vould 
indicate. Some political writers would lea\<e the impressiOn that numerous 
pressure groups devote their time almost exclusively to fillmg legislative 
slates with fnendly candidates 50 \Vhile the professwnal lobbylSt in N e-
49 Compiled from Nebraska Blue Book, 1936-1962, inclusive. 
50 Senator Joseph D. Tydmgs. "The Last Chance for the States," 232 Harper's 
(March 1966) 71-79 Trevor Armbnster, "The Octopus in the State House," 
Saturday Evemng Post (February 12, 1966 ), 25-29, 70-80, Robert Sherrill, 
"Flonda's Legislature: The Pork Chop State of Mind," 231 Harper's (November 
1965), 82-97. 
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Table 7 
Twnover of Senators 
Session New Senators0 Per Cent Tumover 
1937 
1939 
1941 
1943 
1945 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1955 
1957 
1959 
1961 
1963 
First Unicameral Session 
23 
22 
19 
16 
17 
16 
17 
11 
15 
18 
15 
16 
13 
0 1ncludes former senators not serving in the preceding session. 
Source: 
Blue Book> 1938-1964. 
53.5 
511 
44.1 
37.2 
39 5 
37.2 
39.5 
25.3 
34.9 
41.8 
34.9 
37.2 
30.2 
braska takes an interest in those \Vho file for the unicameral, it would be 
difficult to prove that many groups actively sponsor their own men. Some 
groups are more aggressive than others. The labor unions endorse candi-
dates for public office each year. The teachers' associations of Omaha 
and Lincoln express more than a casual interest in those running for the 
legislature. 
More influential in the selection of candidateS than state-\vide pressure 
groups are the local organizations which feel that the incumbent legisla-
tor is not properly representing their interests. This situation will usually 
result in a meeting of the major groups and a subsequent attempt to draft 
a new legislative candidate. 
Election to a legislative office in Nebraska does not offer a fertile ground 
for advancement to a higher state office, since very few individuals have 
moved from the legislature to other state offices. Since 1951, the authols 
first legislative term, only one unicameral member has been elected to 
a higher office. 
The pay for senators is $2,400 a year (the unicameral meets biennially, 
except for special sessions) . 51 Fringe benefits given senators are mmimal. 
51 Article III, sec. 7 of the Nebraska Constitution provides that a senator shall 
receive ((not more than two hundred dollars per month" for his tenn of office. 
At the time of the adoption of this amendment in 1960, there were some charges 
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They are not provided offices and must conduct their affarrs from the 
desks on the floor of the unicameral Senators can call upon the legislative 
council, composed of a staff of SIX people, two of whom are available to 
mdiVIdual legiSlators for research dunng the session and the interim. In 
the 1967 sessiOn, law students from the Uruvers1tv of ebraska were 
ut:ilized by the legiSlative council on a part-hmc basiS to rud in research. 
Another service IS proVIded in the form of a bill-drafter's office Here, a 
legal staff drafts each bill mtroduced 1n the legislature In 1962, the office 
of a legislative fiScal anal\ st \'vas added to the staff of the legiSlative 
oouncil Responsible to the committee on budget and appropnations, the 
fiscal staff has provided Invaluable assiStance to the Implementation of 
program budgeting for the state 
The Legislator as Representatwe. Perhaps one of the greatest influences 
upon the representative as he functions m the legislath e aren!l is potenbal 
constituency pressure Elected on a nonpartisan basis, a ebraska legislator 
IS comm1tted to support specific groups or Issues, rather than to support 
a party platfonn.52 The influence of constituency pressure \\ill depend 
upon the position of the senator \-VIthin lus O\vn district Some believe 
that the mcrease m senatonal terms from t\\ o to four years, adopted in 
1964, "vill relieve some of the consbhtency pressure Tlus will permit a 
legiSlator to build a better record and to accept leadership in more sensi-
tive areas with less fear of immediate rcpercusswns 
Nebraska has been rated as a VIgorow; pressure-svstem state 53 A further 
analySJS of the ebraska pressure system would focus attenhon on a few 
maJOr groups Htgh on the list would be the Farm Bureau Federation and 
the Farmers' Uruon. Coorchnation between the Farm Bureau and such 
business-onented groups as the National Association of Manufacturers and 
chamber of commerce has long been known nationally and ebraska has 
not escaped the influence of thiS coahtion. The strong anti-labor, conserva-
tive spendmg pohcies of the Bureau and the associated industries-state 
chamber of commerce complex IS an obVIous fact 1n Nehraska politics. The 
farm onentation of the well-organued S01l and Water Conservation Com-
mission affords thiS group conbnuous favorable budgetary support 1n the 
unicameral. These and other groups generally support conservative status 
quo measures. 
One type of lobbymg originates from \.VItlun the legislative chamber itself-
that the wordmg of the amendment masked the intent of raising legislative 
salanes wh1ch prev10usly had been around 870 dollars per year. 
52 In the 1959 session, the author, on constltutlonahty grounds, voted against 
an Associated Industries of Nebraska-sponsored bill on secondary boycotts Sub-
sequently, he was forced to attend a spec1al meeting of his business constituents 
to explain h1s stand. 
53 Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vmes ( eds.) Polttics in the American States 
(Boston Little, Brown and Company, 1965 ), pp. 113-128. 
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Table 8 
Lobby Spendmg Reports, January Through May, 1967 
Category 
Public Power 
Labor 
Busmess 
Agnculture 
Governmental Agencies 
C1b.zen 
ProfessiOnal 
Souxce: 
Number Groups 
Reporting 
7 
5 
24 
2 
5 
2 
3 
Monthly reports filed With the office of the clerk of the legislature 
Amount 
Spent 
$14,536 61 
13,386.02 
47,747 29 
3,619.69 
9,522 88 
1,368 21 
3,909 21 
the ((occupation" senator, who by virtue of his past affiliations favors cer-
tam organiZations and may '1obby" for them. He may do so simply be-
cause he wishes to aid a cause, or he may be paid to support the pos1tion 
of an organization. If It is known that a man is a "prud lobbytSf' his m-
fluence within the legislature will be lessened. For this reason, or because 
of fear of public censure, most paid affiliations are kept relatively quiet 
W1th the ready access of the pubhc to the unicameral and the small mem-
bership, the professwnal lobbyist fmds that the most effective approach 
is cultivation of friendship . Because of the lack of technical assiStance, the 
legtslator is prone to tum to the lobbytst for information. ThiS fact alone 
may s1gnal success for a lobbyiSt. The importance of the information-
diStributing function of a lobbyiSt is increased in Nebraska's setting.54 
A questionnaire sent out by the author to lobbyists in 1959 indiCated the 
lobbyist felt he must frrst prove his honesty in all dealings \vith legiSlators. 
Only if they have the trust of a senator, many lobbyists feel, can a deeper 
relationship develop. As to technique, the questionnarre revealed that 
most lobbyists believe fnendship and personal contact are most effective 55 
54 Belle Zeller ( ed.), American State L egislatures (New York Thomas Y 
Crowell Company, 1954), p. 215. 
55 Th1s is not to say that lobbyists have always conducted themselves well. 
During the 1963 spec1al sessiOn, many out-of-state lobbyists buttonholed legiSla-
tors in the midst of serious debate on proposed changes in legislation regulating 
the mterest rates on money. As a duect result of this, the Legislative Processes 
Study Comnuttee of 1964 made a recommendabon to restrict the floor acbvibes 
of the pressure groups. LB 302, whtch placed the registration of lobbyiSts under 
the office of the clerk of the legislature, was one result Another was the require-
ment that lobb} Ists not be allowed free access to the main floor of the legislative 
chamber, and that they be restricted to the area under the balcomes along the 
sidelines. 
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In Nebraska, the countervailing power to interest groups has been a 
legtslab" e system '\vhose formal and Informal structures promote more 
effecbve representabon The ability and opporturut:y to establish a hve, 
two-way communication system between the legislator and lus consbtu-
ency has often resulted m the enacltnent of moderate deciSIOns \Xthich more 
truly reflect the \\ IShes of the people than would result m a system domi-
nated by 1nterest groups 
Only a small number of measures in any one session of the urucameral 
carry the endorsement of either of the political parties. On most measures, 
neither takes a pos1bon, and, generally speaking, the state party platforms 
have not taken strong positions on ke'r state problems Party leaders have 
shown little mclmation to offer any type of research services to mchVIdual 
legiSlators Two meetings \\ ith Republican legtslators and state Republican 
leaders which the author attended m 1963 offered httle evidence of co-
operation on the formation or direction of a st.tte-widc program 56 
It has been obvious O'\'er the years that the Democratic party leadership 
feels less strongly about legiSlative partisanship than does the Republican 
hierarchy Perhaps thiS IS due, in part, to the dorruna.nce of the GOP in 
state affarrs m past years A number of attempts to influence the legisla-
ture to submit a constitutional amendment on the question of a partisan 
legislature to the people has received little support within the unicameraJ.57 
How well do a partisan governor and nonpartisan legislature '\vork to-
gether? A poll taken In 196158 mdicates that a ma1onty of the present 
and past senators polled felt that the hvo got along "farrly well." SlX 
governors, however, felt that all was not well. As Go"ernor Cochran srud, 
"'There lS no formal leadership Ifs JUSt like a MeXIcan army-all gen-
erals "59 
Partisanship m most states proVIdes the connecting lmk between the gov-
ernor and the legiSlature. In Nebraska, the clue£ executive has the added 
burden of counsehng with mtroducers of maJOr legislatiOn and committee 
chairmen, regardless of their party pohucs 
Some Nebraska governors have made use of nonpartisanslup to gam use-
ful mfonnatwn from legislative leaders Others have used the same fea-
ture as an excuse for rcmam1ng in virtual ISolation. 
~ebraska governors generally do not endorse or take positions on bills 
56 Personal notes of author 73rd Session Nebraska legtslature 1.1arch 1 1963. 
57 In 1963 the motion was defeated 34-8 and failed in the 1967 sessiOn by 
a vote of 26-14. 1\lot only did the legiSlature defeat the move m 1963, but a 
resolution encouragmg Nebraskans to ignore the campatgn of the Federation 
of Repubhcan \\omen to place the partisanship ISsue on the ballot by the mttia-
tive petition route was approved. 
58 "Nebraska's U mcameral Legislature," Depth Report No 1 ( Lmcoln · School 
of Journalism, Umversity of Nebraska 1961) p 16 
59 Ibid , p. 17. 
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introduced in the legislature. This does not mean that the executive branch 
IS completely disinterested m leg.slabve affairs. Depatltnents or agencies 
of state government are most anXIOUS to include prominent legislators as 
part of therr clientele. The representatives of the depat bnents, while not 
officially recognized as lobbyiSts, do represent a special interest and do 
exert influence. Many departments furnish research facilities which are 
invaluable to the legislators Most legislators recognize the value of ad-
ministrators in furnishing technical information on the functioning of therr 
deprutments which is necessary for the legislators to make valid declSlons. 
The Legislator as Actor The newlv elected ebraska state legtslator 
quicklv becomes a\vare of some of the elements of the unicameral's in-
ternal system of pressures and mteractions-the (<rules of the game." 
The small group evidences a camaraderie more intense than found in many 
Similar bodies The tremendous workload and lack of tools necessitates 
that aJl share a part of the burden The role of committees is thus sub-
~ tanbal, and it is here that leadership and expertise are cultivated. The 
ne\v member finds that he can move in one of two ways in developing 
leadership-confine himself to a major interest area, or gain the limelight 
by being a generalist. In any case, he finds that compromise is an essen-
tial ingredient of success. Adapting to the needs of others is a fact of legis-
lative life which needs to be absorbed early by the new member. 
If a freshman legislator aspires to gain acceptance into the inner club 
(which in Nebraska may ordinarily come after two sessions), he must 
initially accept the apprentice role. Promotion is achieved after serving 
the leadership and remaming in the background. Attempting to bypass 
the route is to risk excommunication by the legislative guardians of the 
inner club domain. 
The small body encourages legislative friendships \Vhich are a major in-
fluence on decision making. The effect of the reduced size on lobbying 
has already been seen. Without party guidance, the freshman senator must 
tum to the more experienced legislator for aid in making important de-
cisions, such as election of the legislative leaders, making choices for 
committee assignments, and co-sponsoring legislation, from the beginning 
of the session. These legislative friendships become even more important 
during the process of "vote trading" to gain the necessary majority support 
to enact legislation. In many cases, timing and kno\ving the "mood, of 
the body can be the difference between success and failure. 
The basic contribubon, then, of these various aspects of the internal, or 
mfonnal, legislative structure IS that of allowing the political process to 
function adequately and effectively In the m1dst of conflict. As David B. 
Truman summarizes ~~Structural stab1ht\ is the result, in brief, of internal 
.; 
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processes which have sen. ed to keep the mstitution from tearing Itself apart 
while engaged m the business of declSton-making "60 
ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE BEHA'\IOR I~ ~EBRASKA 
Having exammed the state, or nature, of the environment for leglSlative 
decision making In · ebraska, the decision makers, and the mtertwlrung 
of informal influences, one can no"v turn to the question of JUSt what m-
fluences are determinative in the untcamerars declSlon-makmg process 
The previous sections have pointed to the main hypothesis of Nebraska 
legtslative behavior-moderation htghlights the dectston-makmg process 
A review of the htstor; of the state revealed the progress•" e and conserva-
tive strams that have ntn through the heritage of the people of ebraska. 
The formal structure revealed an intricate svstem of checks and balances, 
but \.\.'lthin the framework of great accesSlbtht) and visibthh This ,.open-
ness" mdiCates that confhcting forces meet freely on the legtslative floor 
and tend to negate any trend toward an extreme posthon. An examinabon 
of the mformal influences showed that lugh interaction occurs and that 
role levelmg is the result. When outside forces exert mfluence on the legis-
lators, the varied demands and philosophies must fmd a comprorruse as 
must the senators themselves m therr interacbon 
Utilizing the 1959 1961, and 1963 sessiOns and examining the key con-
troversial decisiOns of these sess10ns, an obJective, behav10ral approach 
further tested the moderation hvpotheslS. The insights gathered from a 
considerabon of the envuonment, the fonnal structure, and the informal 
influences, if correct, should be substantiated m an examtnation of the 
legislative voting behaviOr of these three sess10ns.61 
The Hypothesis The main hypothesis advanced was that the total, overall 
profile of the ebraska unicameral leg1slature would be moderate (Mod-
eration in the decision-making area implies a flexible organizational frame-
work of state government whtch allows the policy-makers the power 
to use the constructive qualittes of both conservative and progress1ve ele-
ments of the st ate's socml system ) A number of sub-hvpotheses were also 
postulated ( I ) a rural mfluence would be dominant, (2) the legislative 
profile would be slightly on the conservative s1de, ( 3) the voting pattern 
would follow strong Republican lines, ( 4) a strong anti-labor sentiment 
would be recorded, ( 5) a somewhat cautious approach to spending \.vould 
be revealed, ( 6) there would be slight attenbon paid to the chief ex-
ecutive's program, (7) support for transfer of powers from local to state 
60Davtd B. Truman (ed.}, The Congress and America's Future (Englewood 
Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1965) , p. 70. 
61 These sessions were singled out because a large number of sensitive ISSues 
were considered, the composition of the legislature was farrly stable, and the 
author, haVlng participated in these sess10ns, was intimate with the issues and 
personalities involved. 
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government would be mimmal, ( 8) pro-business legislatJ.on would reoe1ve 
strong support and record dommant influence, ( 9) measures supporting 
lugher education would tend to receive unfavorable consideration, ( 10) 
lobbying would not be a major influence, and ( 11) floor debate would 
have little influence on basic deciSions measured. 
Further, four sub-hypotheses relatmg to legislative voting clusters were 
advanced: ( 1) voting clusters would be isolated, indicating maJOr divisions 
of rural, conservative blocs opposed to urban, liberal blocs, (2) rural, con-
servative blocs \vould outnumber liberal urban blocs, and the Republicans 
would largely fall into the former and the Democrats into the latter, ( 3) 
any factors affecting votmg vanabllity behavior would indicate, in addi-
tion to an urban-rural spht, a conservative-liberal division, and, ( 4 ) since 
the overall legislative profile \\as hypothesiZed as moderate, a flexibility 
m the voting behavior of both blocs \vaS predicted. 
Methodology. Examirung all roll calls dunng the three sessions where more 
than 25 per cent of the membership voted e1ther for or against an issue, 
and selecting those senators .... vho served m at least two of the three sessions, 
the study involved 461 roll call votes and forty-one senators. After much 
refinement, thirteen maJor descriptive dimensions about bill characteristics 
were detennined.62 Working \.vith fifty-four variables (forty-one senators 
and thirteen bill characteristics ) and 461 roll calls, a total of 1,431 total 
relationships \Vere tabulated involvmg: ( 1) senator With senator, ( 2) sena-
tor with bill characteristics, and, ( 3) b1ll characteristic With bill character-
• ......: 63 J..'>uC. 
62 They included: ( 1) Legtslative Dec1S1ons-coded 1 if there were more "ayes·~ 
than "nays;~ 2 if more "nays" than "ayes," and 0 if a tie vote. Smular coding 
was used on the other categories of bill characteristics to represent favorable or 
unfavorable attitude· ( 2) Pohtical onentabon, ( 3) Business orientation, ( 4) 
Labor onentation, ( 5) Urban-Rural, ( 6) Spending, ( 7) Centrahzation, ( 8) 
H1gher Education, ( 9) Conservative-Liberal, ( 10) Lobbying activity, ( 11) Floor 
Debate. In the latter two, for mstance, a 1 would indicate a great deal of debate 
or lobbying in support of an 1ssue, a 2 would reflect opposition, and 0 an equal 
amount of support and oppos1t10n. ( 12 ) Perenrual-1 indicated an annual issue, 
2 an 1ssue of a perennial nature. ( 13) Gubematonal-1 indicated a great deal of 
gubernatonal interest, influence, or pressure for the bill, and 2 gubematonal in-
fluence to defeat the measure. 
63 The coefficient correlation of the response between var1ables was that used 
by J. P. Guilford's Fundamental Statistrcs m Psychology and Educatwn, and 1S 
referred to herem as r . The followmg chart Illustrates the mtercorrelation matnx 
and the relations it depicts 
There are 1,431 relationships, as follows: 
I 
820 Senator-Senator 1 41 : 42 - -- - - - -54 
533 Senator-Bill 1 I 
78 Bill-Bill I • I 
I 
41 rss I I 
-- -------~ 42 I rsb I 
I 
54 : rbb 
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Table 9 
Per Cent Agreement Between Senator and Bill Characteristics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 
64 fll 6siJ 6o 68 62 62 65 62 56 fll ss 
43 65 50 53 45 35 45 68 58 67 61 64 68 
43 62 55 56 52 41 53 62 57 58 63 59 64 
56 63 60 60 
67 35 68 33 61 
68 44 65 39 55 
54 28 44 47 23 so 64 49 37 36 31 44 31 33 23 40 52 33 68 46 
67 20 so 53 20 52 65 42 39 47 17 46 25 42 33 41 59 45 38 
67 35 57 56 24 67 . 60 50 39 23 56 28 51 33 53 64 48 68 29 
62 39 57 52 29 63 65 53 48 44 32 55 38 46 38 52 61 47 68 33 
1134 so 48 11 6611 57 39 32 36 s3126j42J2s 14s IJ s2 65@] 
62 34 51 53 26 61 65 53 41 42 31 49 32 44 35 46 63 45 58 35 
61 65 62 68 63 65 68 64 55 55 68 53 67 58 57 
62 66 62 69 63 66 68 65 56 55 68 54 67 58 58 
46 53 51 44 50 49 39 41 50 53 48 48 53 48 51 49 46 53 48 50 
52 41 57 43 ~56 60 45 54 31 45~ 43 34 47 67 48 . 32 
=70+ 0=30-
The reversed box is used to indicate positive agreements (indices where P = 70 per cent or higher) 
and the open box identifies negative agreements (indices where P ~'t30 per cent or lower). Thus, 
for example, Senator 2 registered low on labor and urban/rural (low = anh-urban), whereas 
Senator 25 was high on these two. 
Using the senator-senator relationship (rss), a sociogram was consbucted 
to illustrate significant voting groups or clusters. 
Using the highest correlation of voting behavior and grouping these to-
gether, nine voting "clusters" resulted, two major and seven minor ones. 
Using the second highest correlabonal values, it \vas possible to properly 
locate the seven minor clusters, no maJOr clusters, blocs, or types were 
developed. The conservative, rural bloc formed a total constellabon of 
twenty-one members, with a core group (Type IV) containing ten mem-
bers. The liberal, urban bloc fonned a total constellation of twenty mem-
bers, with Type I contain1ng ten members as the core group. Determina-
tion of conservative-rural and hberal-urban \.Vas aided by the senator-bill 
characteristics relationships (rsb). Table 9 shows the ccper cent agreement" 
between senator and bill charactenstics. 
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21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
63 69 68 63 66 51 63 64 55 61 63 62 63 57 67 56 61 59 71 71 
39 36 51 40~40 47 69 29 48 50 61 37 42 18 54. 
48 49 56 43 35 64 49 39 69 49 69 37 49 55 59 39 47 27 54 63 
67 61 46 69 26 61 20 68,24,53 40 53 59 31 54 50 33 
69 65 54 14 47 56 33 40 57 58 38 49 52 32 
60 55 64 66 38 43 61 66 33 69 55 45 31 
63 68 54 65 47 28 
55 59 56 56 26 55 54 61 39 62 50 52 14 74 75 
61 61 55 63 24 64 45 64 33 47 54 62 66 40 fl 54 46 32 
66 63 62 62 51 64 67 60 58 64 60 69 62 54 66 53 60 59 
66 64 63 63 52 64 66 60 58 63 60 69 62 54 66 53 60 59 
49 57 47 51 51 51 50 44 47 47 53 48 50 47 49 49 47 52 48 47 47 
64 68 48 58 62 31 19 12 54 39 63 67 69 53 58 581J4o 1251 
Finally, the bill charactenstic-bill characteristic relationships (rbb ), shown 
in Table 10, pemutted the development of a legtslatlve profile. 
1. Political (POL)-Any figure over 50 (per cent) mdicates pro-Repub-
lican. 
2. Business (BUS)-Any figure over 50 (per cent ) indicates pro-busi-
ness 
3. Labor (LAB)-Any f1gure over 50 (per cent) indicates pro-labor. 
4. Urban/ Rural (U/R)-Any figure over 50 (per cent) indicates pro-
urban 
5 Spending (SP)-Any figure over 50 (per cent) mdicates pro-spend-
ing. 
6 Centralization (CENTR)-Any figure over 50 (per cent) inrucates 
pro-oen trahzation. 
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LD POL BUS LAB 
LEGISLATIVE X 60 63 42 DECT~IONS 
POLITICAL 60 X 93 4 
BUSINESS 63 93 X 5 
LABOR 42 4 5 X 
URBAN/RURAL 50 30 36 79 
SPENDING 59 14 25 88 
CENTR 58 27 42 72 
HIGHER 55 0 19 94 EDUCATION 
CONSERV/ 56 12 25 89 LIBERAL 
LOBBYING 92 59 66 41 
FLOOR DEBATE 93 60 65 41 
PERENNIAL 48 49 51 52 
GUBERNATORIAL 50 8 19 86 INFLUENCE 
Table 10 
Legislative Profile 
U/R SP tENTR 
so 59 58 
30 14 27 
36 25 42 
79 88 72 
X 84 87 
84 X 95 
87 95 X 
90 100 100 
87 97 89 
49 63 62 
48 64 62 
53 47 53 
69 77 88 
HIED 
55 
0 
19 
94 
90 
100 
100 
X 
100 
55 
55 
44 
92 
C/L LOB FLD PER GUB 
56 92 93 48 50 
12 59 60 49 8 
25 66 65 51 19 
89 41 41 52 86 
87 49 48 53 69 
97 63 64 47 77 
89 62 62 53 88 
100 55 55 44 92 
X 56 57 47 81 
56 X 100 48 54 
57 100 X 48 53 
47 48 48 X 47 
81 54 53 47 X 
In this table, the figures relate the percentage of agreement between bill characteristics. For example, the second item in the 
column on the left is POLITICAL. Any figure over 50 (SO percent) represents pro-Republican. The correlation between PO-
LITICAL and BUSINESS is 93, indicating a high positive agreement between bills with a Republican and business orientation. 
On the other hand, the correlation between POLITICAL and LABOR is only 4, indicating a distinctly low or negative agree-
ment between bills with a Republican and a labor orientation. 
§ 
~ 
~ 
t"4 
tr1 
s 
i 
~ § 
(') 
V) 
• 
THE NONPARTISAN NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL 
7 Higher Education (HI ED )-Any figure over 50 (per cent) indicates 
pro-higher education. 
8 Conservabve/ Lll:>eral ( C/ L ) -Any figure over 50 (per cent ) indi-
cates pro-hberal. 
9 Lobb)'lng (LOB )-Any figure over 50 (per cent ) indicates a posibve 
lobbymg mfluence. 
10 Floor Debate (FL D )-Any figure over 50 (per cent) indicates a 
positive floor debate influence. 
11. Perenmal (PER)-Any f1gure over 50 (per cent) IndiCates pro-
perennial over annual ISSues 
12 Gubematonal (CUB 1-Any figure over 50 (per cent ) indicates pro-
gubematonal. 
To extract the least number of factors which might assist in explaining 
the common vanance in voting behaVIor, factor analysts was utilized 64 
Two factor analyses were earned out The first one utihzed the entire 
correlation matnx from all filtv-four variables and resulted In nine factors 
The second analvSis ·was camed out only for the relationships among the 
forty-one senators The use of h\ o analyses was to double check the validity 
of the bill characteristic vanables whiCh were more ((subJective, than 
were the voting record vanables Results from the two analyses were con-
sistent in the sense that sunilar factors tended to appear 1n both analyses 65 
Thus, the factor analysiS for the relabonshtps among the forty-one senators 
only (see Table 11 ), an eight-factor solution, was utilized for interpreta-
tion. 
Interpretation of the factors reveals that Factor I emerges as the most 
salient, representing approx:unately 22 per cent of the measurable van-
ance 66 ThiS factor may be classified as the general progressive category, 
with the major characteristics mcluding pro-urban, pro-labor, pro-spend-
ing, pro-centralization of education, and pro-liberal as the rna jor influences. 
Factor II may be classified as a pro-higher educab.on category Factors IV 
and VI are concerned with both higher education and spendmg measures, 
Factor IV shows liberal traits (favormg spending, education, and urban 
64 A special program for this study had to be des1gned. The author lS particu-
larly indebted to Dr Frank J. Dudek, former Professor of Psychology at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska, who gave numerous hours of his time to adVlsing and 
counsehng, and who helped plan and devise many of the specific computer pro-
grams required. Dr. Don Nelson, Director of the Computer Center, University of 
Nebraska, and his staff also made substantial contributions. 
65 Variable 7 14 18 24 28 32 39 
All Variables - 46 .32 .62 .33 .75 .63 - 30 
Senator-Senator - 35 .42 .62 .22 .84 .64 -.26 
66 Variance is the square of the correlation coefficient (a high value indicates 
a strong relation between the item in question and the factor, a plus, positively, 
and a minus, negabvely, while a low value shows little or no relation). Thus, .50 
or -.50 would indicate that one-half of the predictable variance can be associated 
with this factor. 
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Table 11 
Varimax Rotation 
SENATORS I n m IV v VI vn VIII 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0 
11 
12 
1 3 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2 4 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
4 0 
41 
~ 
% 
CUM / o 
.2210 .03 19 -.0 225 .207 3 - .0688 - .1 362 .1863 .7851 
.04 77 .285 2 .1192 -.2201 .0646 .7656 
--.7939 
--.3103 --.5631 
-.0560 .041 0 
.1 304 --.55 60 
--.3892 -.24 6 1 
, 1 3 7 5 --. 1 2 8 5 
I .531o l --.o922 
- . 0 3 9 5 --.14 8 4 
-- 0922 --.6906 
--.25 7 5 - .05 05 
--.5601 --.24 6 5 
.0664 -.2298 
-. 2 0 8 6 --, 1 8 8 8 
-.0 155 
-.060 3 --.2 7 08 
.0899 
.1500 .458 
-.0109 -.010 
. 9 .334 
- .041 
~~4~ .0370 
4 6 9 7 --.0 8 5 8 
.1359 -.228 1 
.5963 - 0659 
.9507 .2039 
--.55 91 
.2737 
-.2055 
-.2118 
.0993 
--.4162 
.1 7 09 -.005 1 
- .2287 ---.8078 
- .1807 .0930 
.2841 
.8947 
.1 026 .0669 
I .32471-.0377 
.266 1 .1124 
I . 6 7 8 3 1--. o 4 9 4 
. 11 9 8 --.0 3 8 3 
.2439 .1459 - .0098 .2745 .0273 .4826 
-.2 7 18 .045 3 .0944 - .2091 .0368 .0366 .4591 
.2 7 4 9 .1574 -.2344 .1761 .8884 
--.4462 
' --.5650 
-.2055 
.0 142 
- .106 7 
--.0203 
--.7461 
--.09 8 3 
--.1519 
-0404 
- .0376 
-.1059 
.0682 
.1928 
.1795 
.o21o I 
.1 4 05 
.094 7 
·-.0 3 96 
9 
.5627 .0092 .0202 .0218 .4340 
.16 4 -.3024 --.23 24 .7148 
.37201 -.0009 - .0752 .1454 .2013 
.2114 .0663 -.05 02 .1162 .5727 
-.1845 .0981 .0320 .0545 .6842 
.2356 .2725 -.1632 .7731 
.1 004 .2804 .2721 .6544 
.0897 .1974 - .0364 .8339 
.2895 - .0567 -.284 0 .3 .7062 
.2473 .0823 -.1048 .1222 .8067 
.1 087 .0238 .0216 -.1242 .2311 .. 7445 
.1214 53 - .0788 -.0329 .6958 
.1442 .0849 .0850 --.0 11 81 .6217 1 .5706 
.0 109 -.07 65 -.2328 .024 8 .1550 .6802 
--.o 151 -.0411 I .5341 I -.1819 -.0604 .7812 
- .05 2 7 .17 18 .2914 .0222 -.0461 1.0907 
.24 61 .1 .0948 .041 6 -.1595 .5425 
- .007 2 -. 11 68 5 .2086 .2877 .5076 
-.o1 25 .1344 -.o4o3 .265 o I .3282 1 .s1o3 
.--.4374 
.0027 .4381 -.054 6 - .0898 -.1084 1.2615 
-.13 28 .1246 -.2219 .1098 .7325 
- .1504 .5910 .11 90 .31 10 .5789 
- .034 1 .1 053 .1967 -.1380 -.2155 .74 74 .8941 
--.0637 1 .5766 1 .2637 -.2131 .0240 60 .4842 
.09 45 - .2559 - .1052 - .0178 -.28 16 .1898 .9097 
-.o3 36 0123 1 . 71 oo 1 .1oo1 -.025 3 - .11oo .5938 
.o 131 - .1085 -.1641 -.2879 .o3 82 I .6285 I .1ooo 
.0628 .18 -.0217 -.0635 -.1749 -.0891 .8849 
.1912 -.1666 - .1968 .0311 .5411 
4 - .106 4 - .1434 .14 86 .0762 .4218 
.oo12 1 .4185 1 .1803 - .06 14 .1494 .5286 
.07 24 - .0334 -.2842 I .3021 I .o5o7 .7025 
.0821 I .30181 -.2193 .1452 -.0737 .4648 
.1 44 3 .1826 .9412 
.05 42 -.0199 - .1607 .5864 I .40431 .30961 -.1215 
. 0 7 16 ·-.14 3 4 .1 3 3 9 
--.7337 --.0424 -.1759 --.35 3 3 -.224 2 .1330 -.155 7 .8510 
PER CENT VARIANCE ACCOUNTED FOR 
6.2892 
.2244 
.224 4 
4 .2684 
.1523 
.3767 
3.9420 
.1 406 
.5174 
2.8580 
.1 019 
.6194 
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2.5866 
.0923 
.7117 
2.7508 
.0981 
.8098 
2.7 472 2.4771 
.0980 .0883 
.9079 .9962 
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measures), and Factor VI conservative traits (opposing both higher edu-
cation and spendmg ISSUes) 
Factor III was perhaps the most interesting of the maJOr areas and the 
most difficult to mterpret. The only bill charactenstics pertment to tlus 
category are lobbymg, floor debate, and gubernatonal mfluence which 
seems to md.Icate that many legiSlators do not make up their mmds until 
all the facts and the debates have been recorded 
Factor V suggests a pro-business, anti-labor, and anti-spending component, 
while the dominant character:isbcs of Factor VII seem to be associated 
with oppoSitiOn to rugher education Factor VIII appears to be Idenb.fied 
with mdividuals who have a tendency to vote both Republican and pro-
business. 
The voting pattern tends to be complex and vaned; the voting of some 
legislators seems to be explained predommately by one factor, in other 
cases, the mdiVIdual picture contams several important parts. An overall 
view would seem to indicate that the vanability is mdeed complex and 
a result of many mterrelated factors. 
Factor analysis allowed the Identification o.f meaningful factors affecbng 
each individual senator It also suggested the relative unportance and pat-
tern of factors associated \vith each senator. This analysis also afforded 
an independent source of mformation about votmg clusters and character-
istics. Finally, the analysis called attention to such features as Factor III-
the pressure or fleXIbility trait-a dommant and common trait of Type IV 
(conservative-rural) and showed no stgrufiCant weight for Type I (liberal-
urban). (See Figure 1.) 
CONCLUSION 
The results tend to support the maJor hypothesis of moderate decision 
making in the Nebraska unicameral legislature. The legislative profile 
(Table 10) seems to indicate a composite voting record which favors no 
one category to any high degree. The composite would seem to indicate 
a record of deciSions that were pro-business, supported by Republicans, 
somewhat anti-labor, and slightly liberal in every other category. But, with 
respect to urban ISsues or issues which the governor favored, these were 
as often unfavorably as favorably coruidered. The high impact of lobby-
ing and floor debate in total legislative decisions indicates either that the 
system proVIdes access for the pressure system to operate before deciSions 
are made or that legislators make few decisions without giving consider-
ation to all groups and all arguments. In any case, the sub-hypotheses which 
predicted that lobbying would not be a major influence and that floor 
debate earned little influence were not substantiated. 
It has been seen that the pressure or flexibility factor (Factor III, Table 
11) had a decided influence upon the conservative group ( CR) and little 
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or no influence on the liberal-urban (LU). This was in contrast to predic-
tions. This could be explained by the fact that the L U group tends to 
represent the more homogeneous districts, and the more rigid lme held 
by this group during legislative "warfare" could mean that their major 
compromises on basic state issues are made prior to, and as a result of, 
legislative elections. Thus, the L U group can come to the legislature with 
its position on major issues already established. 
The CR group, on the other hand, tends to represent more heterogeneous 
districts, where a majority of the basic decisions cannot be settled prior 
to or during the electoral process. Thus, perhaps they come to the legisla-
ture without a rigid position on many issues, and the legislative arena 
must provide the final anS\.ver to the conflicting views of many of their 
constituents. 
Nebraska history seems to justify the contention that conservatives can 
be sold on progressive ideas. By being more flexible and seemingly more 
sensitive to pressure, the CR group seems to support the oontention that 
moderation is possible among major and diverse elements of the state's 
people. 
Thus, leadership for moderation must be credited to the qualities of both 
major voting clusters. By following a more doctrinaire approach to legis--
lative decisions, the LU group forces some liberal traits into the legislative 
profile. The pressure-group system-dominated by conse:I"Vative, agricul-
ture-oriented, business-dominated organizations-finds its basic influence 
in the non-urban areas. These rural areas, largely rep:re5ented by the CR 
cluster, still find it necessary to share the decision-making arena with the 
LU cluster. Compromise, or a tempering of the pressure-group demands, 
would be the natural result of this process or conflict. Moderation is thus 
produced, as predicted in the rna jor hypothesis. 
In reference to the sub-hypotheses, the legislative profile does not sup-
port the myth that the conservative influence is dominant in the decisions 
of the unicameral of 1959, 1961, and 1963. Only when issues are associ-
ated with the dominant labor characteristics does the conservative influ-
ence rear its head. Even there, it shows only -8 per cent. While the pic-
ture painted by the profile figures hardly shows strong liberal qualities, 
the Nebraska legislature divided evenly between the urbanites and the 
governor on basic issues, and showed a pro-liberal correlation in every 
other subject area. 
In order to overcome the "cautious" influences indicated in the political 
column (Republican) and in the business column, a dominant group of 
senators with strong liberal or progressive traits had to exert major effort. 
Both Republican and business charactenstics indicated little correlation 
with labor, spending, higher education, general liberalism, or the gover-
nor Without the liberal forces holding firm, the general legislative profile 
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would have shown the conservative bias of busmess and Repubhcarusm on 
maJOr ISSUes. 
Thus, it once more appears that the rigid and disciplined general liberal 
tendenCies of the LU cluster forced the more conservabve CR cluster to 
give ground. The VIctor was reasonable progressiVISm. The author would 
suggest that it was the conservatn.es of the Nebraska leg15lature, not the 
liberals, who showed the most flexibility. 
'I'BE NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL-CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
To be an active and accepted organ, a legislature must reflect the basic 
thought of a ma1onty of the state's opmion-makers It must derive sus-
tenance from the lifeblood of the envrronment of the state 1t serves The 
Nebraska system fuH1lls those quahftcabons, for it IS a creature, or a 
creabon, of the hiStory, the Wishes, the thoughts of the citizens 1t serves 
The legtslabve structure denves Its basic traits from the people, works 
with these same people m malang state pohcy deciS10ns, and, m turn, 
has Its own unpact upon the people once the deciSIOns are unplemented. 
The input to the legislature from the state and 1ts people IS received, r~ 
molded, and returned to the people m the form of legislative or deciSional 
output. 
The legislature IS considered to be an acbve and influenbal part of the 
soCial process of the state. LikeWISe, each of the elements exerting maJor 
rmpact upon the deciSIOns of the uniCameral IS to be considered a seg-
ment of the same social system. Thus, the environment exerts an influence 
on the legiSlabve body directly, and also through the formal and informal 
structures of the legiSlative system. LtkeWISe, the formal and informal act 
upon each other, as well as upon the environment and upon the legisla-
ture Itself. Fmally , the urucameral system, rece1vmg the total impact of 
these three rmportant pressures, by Its final deciSions, or output, com-
pletes the crrcle by exertmg Its own mfluence back upon the environment 
and the people of the state 1t serves. 
The decisions of the legtslature, reflecting the people's main character-
istics and behefs, produce moderate answers or conclusions to the maJOr 
problems Such flexibility IS present Within the urucameral legislative 
structure. 
The pressure groups, too, are products of the social system and must op-
erate within the same basic framework of a formal structure and an m-
formal process as the legislators bemg pressured. Both elements, the 
pressured and those exerting the pressure, are influenced by the same 
basic elements of the state's social system. 
The unicameral structure provides the governmental tools that the people 
of Nebraska need to confront present challenges. The system is stream-
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lined to eliminate obstacles which stand behveen the people and their 
goals of democratic representab.on. The worth of the unicameral has not 
always been fully understood, appreciated, or utilized. This is no reason 
to discount its value or underestimate its contribution in meeting the 
current need to upgrade and strengthen state government in the latter 
decades of the twentieth century. 
• 
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CHAPTER 
6 
Conclusion 
S A M U E L C. P A T T E R S 0 N 
T H E U N I V E R S I T Y 0 F I 0 \V A 
The precedmg chapters on the legislatures m Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and 
ebraska have utility in two dtfferent wa} s Frrst, they provide the basis 
for some mterestmg descnptlve generahzat10ns and speculatiOns about 
legiSlative msbtubons m these four state political systems Second, they 
provide a basiS for Cibzen consideration of legislatn e change Here, com-
ments '\\till be offered about both of these kinds of contributiOns. 
MID\\'EST LEG ISLA TI\'E POLITICS 
These four legislanve bodies have undergone substantial changes over 
therr his tones Reapportionments ha\ e brought about considerable changes 
in the 1960s, and some changes m legtslative facilities and organizational 
streamlmmg have also occurred In recent years These reapporbonments 
may have contnbuted to some mcreasc m the four-state region in inter-
party compebbon At least, legislative electiOns are more contested in 
Iowa m the 1960s than they \.\ere m the 1940s and 1950s and the same 
IS true to some extent in Mtssoun and Nebraska. In Kansas, competitiOn 
for legtslabve seats has been, and apparently <;tul IS, very low, reflecting 
the relatively low degree of party competition m the state generally and 
the very mmimal spread and intensity of political party organ1zanon 
Legislative reapportionment probably has not, as yet, improved the public 
unage of the legislatures in these states Judgmg from the data for Iowa 
and MISSouri, the pubhc evaluation of the legtslatures is, at best, only 
somewhere near the median for the country as a whole The Iowa and 
MISSoun legJSlatures get much lower ratings than do the governors In the 
two states, but it is interesting that Missouri cttizens rated the legislature 
somewhat better than thev rated Prestdent Johnson. Also, 1t does not ap-
pear that reapportionment has improved the pubhc VISibility of the legis-
latures. The low public visibility of the Missouri legislature observed by 
Professor Leuthold is, in all probabutty, farrly t) pical. Whether uni-
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cameralism in Nebraska actually rmproved the visibility of the legtslature 
there, as Senator Marvel speculates, we do not lmow from the public 
opiruon data. 
The structure of legtslaove vob.ng varies in some interesting ways in these 
states. The level of party confuct m the Iowa legislature has been fa.rrly 
high in the post-war years, and party voting has been on the mcrease. 
Party differences among Iowa legJslators certainly will explam more van-
anon in legislaove votmg than anything else. Professor Crumm's analysJS 
makes It clear that party Is the most rmportant factor in Kansas, and the 
same is evidently the case in Missoun. The Nebraska unicameral is for-
mally nonpartisan, and where party is not available to legislators as an or-
garuzmg base, regional or ideologiCal preferences usua11y acquire more 
prominence. The voting of .. ebraska legJslators does appear to gravitate 
pnmanly around a cleavage between conservative rural legislators on the 
one side, and liberal urban legiSlators on the other. The former clearly 
has the larger voice. lo\va and Kansas are not drastically different from 
Nebraska socially or economically, but the existence of party politics in 
therr legislatures has tended to blur or even erase the rural-urban, or 
regional, base of political cleavage. 
It seems to be the case that the role of the governor in state legislative 
politics has increased in recent years in all four of these states. The promi-
nence of the governor in legislative politics is most marked in Missouri 
where the formal powers of the governor are greatest, but recent gover-
nors of Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska ha\e laid a stronger hand on the legis-
latures than has been true at least for a long time. The analyses presented 
here for Iowa and Kansas demonstrate the rmportance of makmg com-
parisons regarding the effects of gubernatorial influence upon legislative 
parties. In Kansas, party cohesion \Vas higher for the legtslative party 
\vhose leader was in the go\ ernor's chair, but the same \vas not the case 
in Iowa. As Professors Hedlund and Wiggins show, the Republican legiS-
lators exhibited higher votmg cohesion than the majority Democrats dur-
mg 1965 ·when Democratic Governor Hughes \Vas In office The com-
parison suggests that some third factor, probably minority party status, 
was affecting party cohesion in the legislatures of both states. 
The increasing importance of party conflict and the leadership of gover-
nors, at least in Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri, appears to have led to re-
ducbons in the intensity of the influence of interest groups and associa-
tions In Nebraska, often characterized as a "high-pressure" state, the 
greater intensity of interest-group influence probably can be attributed 
to the lack of a partisan structure for legt'ilative politics. Agam, when po-
litical parties are not ava1lable to legtslators as structures of leadership 
and as cue-giving mechanisms for \.Otlng behavior, legJSlab\e conflict 
tends not only to reflect ecologtcal or regional differences more markedly, 
but also to be more sharply focused by a variety of competing private In-
terests and groups. 
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CONCLUSION 
The four states exhibit differences in legislative recruitment and profes-
Sionalism. In all, the educabonal level of legislators IS remarkably high, 
although it lS mterestmg to note that the educational le\ el of MISsouri 
legt.slators was relati\ ely low until salanes were increased in 1961. Of 
course, farmers play a much more important role in the legtslatures of 
Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska than in MISsouri. Interestmgly, m Kansas, 
unlike Iowa, lawyers compnse the largest group in the Senate, and there 
are more busmessmen m the Iowa legislature, perhaps because of the 
lower legtslabve salaries in Kansas Iowa and Kansas provtde other in-
tngwng contrasts Both legtslatures are made up largely of amateurs m 
the sense that tumo\ er IS very h1gh, though Kansas legislators tend to 
have had more prevwus experience in pubhc office Yet, the Kansas legts-
lature has been more Innovative in its policy enacbnents, has more pro-
fessiOnal management of legislauon and greater research assistance, and 
is more "efficient, m the narrow sense that It enacts a higher proportion 
of bills introduced. On the other hand, 1n Iowa a more vtgorous two-party 
system has developed, wlule m Kansas the mmority party is very 1mpotent. 
All of these legiSlatures have undergone structural changes-m the number 
of legiSlative comrruttees, in the organiZabon of sessiOns, m patterns of 
leadership, m the facilities and amenities avatlable to members. Whether 
changes m legislative structures or facilities have measureable effects upon 
legislative policy outputs is an unresolved questiOn The evidence IS not 
very good that structures or facilities make for progressive or backward 
puhhc policies By some standards 1\ebraska, \\<Ith a one-house legiSlature, 
is very up-to-date, but that unicameral legislature has fatled for many 
years to proVIde pubhc servtces for Nebraskans, and the tax structure of 
the state reached levels of near dtsaster before the unicameral adopted a 
modem tax program in 1967 At the same orne, there IS no eVIdence that 
the unicameral does not represent the people qwte as well as any other 
state legislature, and it permtts some economies of operation m a state 
with limited resources \\.hether what the unicameral does can be charac-
tenzed as "moderation, in some Aristotehan sense, as Senator Marvel hopes, 
is perhaps open to question 
CITIZENS AND REFORM 
Midwestern legiSlatures have, from time to bme, been innovabve m the 
area of legtslative organization, procedure, and representation. The Ne-
braska uniCameral stands as a untque mnovahon m state legislative or-
ganization. Now it IS no longer an expenment, the uniCameral has demon-
strated that a one-house state legislature works, and proVIdes a number 
of useful efficiencies in processmg legtslabon The Kansas legislature 
pioneered the leg1slat1ve council in the early 1930s, and its council 1s today 
a model of mstitubons of Its kmd It IS said that the Iowa House of Repr&-
sentatives was the frrst state legiSlative body to make use of a sutmg com-
nnttee to screen bills for floor consideratiOn dunng the final stages of a 
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legislative session. The 1965 Iowa General Assembly reorgaruzed the legis-
latlve committee system, reducmg the number of comnuttees by more than 
half and making the lo'\va legislative committee system one of the most 
modem in the country. The MISsouri General Assembly is more noted for 
policy innovation, particularly m 1ts approval of the so-called MISsoun 
Plan for the selectwn of judges to s1t on the state bench. 
State legislative reform is m the arr again. There was a wave of reformism 
m the 1930s, focused around un1camerahsm and the legiSlative council 
movement. Efforts were made m the 1950s to remold state legislatures, 
though the effort came to focus attention mainly on reapportiorunent. The 
reapportionment fight has been won, and only a few skirmishes remam. 
Seventy per cent of the state legiSlatures already have been altered, or 
are in the process of being altered, m therr representational basiS as a 
result of Baker vs. Carr and subsequent federal and state court decisions. 
The new reform efforts concentrate on legislative powers, perquiSites, and 
procedures. The program of the current legislative reform effort lS qwte 
adequately reflected in the eighteen points advanced by the Fmal Report 
of the 29th American Assembly. ThiS program involves the following prin-
cipal proposals: ( 1 ) relaxatiOn of state constitutional hmitations on legis-
lative powers to raise revenue and appropriate public funds; (2) adoption 
of a unicameral legislature in states where this is appropriate; (3) adop-
tion of annual legislative sessions Without time limitations; ( 4) mcrease4S 
in the compensation of legislators, (5) provision for competent professiOnal 
staffs for legislators and legislative comrruttees; ( 6) provision for adequate 
off1ces and equipment for legislators and committees; (7) reorganization 
of state legislaove comm1ttee systems, m general reducmg their number, 
and ( 8) encouragement of a compebbve hvo-party system in every leglS-
lature.1 
These proposals are not new, it might be said that they have been on 
the agenda for a long time. What may be new is the vastly increased 
demand for their implementation, at least in some parts of the country. 
Jesse Unruh, Speaker of the California Assembly, has argued that there is 
a "new majority" in the country-referring to the coming of age of those 
born during the baby boom of the 1940s and 1950s-and that this new 
majonty will increasmgly demand to be served by more modem legiSlative 
mstituhons. Speaker Unruh has argued that 
As a practicmg law-maker, I must admit that state legislators 
have yet to make substantial progress toward meeting the ob-
ligations and challenges whiCh confront us in our role as de-
cisiOn-makers in a rapidly changmg society. \Vho can observe 
the end-of-sessiOn legislative log-Jams-which provide such a 
bewildering spectacle to the public-and not admit that our 
1 See "State Legislatures in Amencan Politics," Report of the Twenty-runth 
Amencan Assembly, April 28-May 1, 1966, Arden House, Hamman, New York. 
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efforts at legtslative reform have been inadequate? Too often 
we have been gwlty of enacting minor-even triVlal-laws \vhile 
laggmg \\ oefully behilld m such major fields ( f state responsi-
bility as education, employment, public health, v.elfare, cnme, 
conservation, and tax reform. \Ve stand accused, as one oh-
server put it, of stall<Ing mosquitoes \\r hile bears are at large.' 
Unfortunately, our concept of legislative government has 
failed to keep pace \nth the ode of time and technology For 
while the US A has become a complicated and urban soc1ety, 
the legtslatures remaill geared to face the problems of an 
earher day 2 
LegtSlatures and State Politzcal Systems As the foregoing papers on the 
legtslatures m Iowa, Kansas, MISsoun, and Nebraska have amply demon-
strated, contiguous states ill the same region exhibit signifiCant differences 
in pohtical organization, traditions, pohtical styles, partisan loyalties, and 
public demands for policy decisiOns Progra.m.s for legislatn-e change will 
necessanly have to be taken differently in different state pohocal systems. 
For Instance, reapportionment was much easier in the ecologically homo-
geneous states hke Iowa and Nebraska made up mainly of small towns 
and cities, than in the more diverse state of MISsoun where two very large 
urban centers account for most of the population and \\here pohbco-cul-
tural differences \VIthin the pohbcal system are quite marked. 
Again, it IS rmportant to note that a state political S\ stem IS a pattern of 
interrelationshzps among mdiViduals orgaruzed into a variety of pnvate 
groups and pubhc agencies In thiS system, the legislature does not live ill 
isolation, and changes in 1t \vill often substantially affect other pohtical 
institutions, as well as organizations in the pnvate sector One fairly obvi-
ous danger m legislative reform lS that of creating more politically effective 
legiSlatures at the further expense of the capacity of state governors to 
exert leaderslup, or the capacity of state admuustraove agencies to imple-
ment state programs. The four states v .. e are oons1denng have relahvely 
weak admmistrabve systems; in 1966 only Kansas, for mstance, had a gen-
eral ment system for state employees. And, though the Missouri governor-
ship is relatively strong formally, the relaLive formal powers of state gover-
nors in Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska are weak It would be unfortunate If, in 
strengthenillg state legislatures, the powers of governors and admmistra-
hons were further diminished In sum, political modernization in the states 
must not focus blindly on one institution at the exclusiOn of others whiCh 
will be affected 
Fmally, state political systems differ sufficiently so that legiSlative change 
is likely to come about differently m different states. Proponents of legis-
2 Jesse M Unruh, "State Legislatures and the 'New Majority,' .. University of 
MlSsoun) Business and Government Remew, VII ( May-June 1966), 19 
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labve reform need to consider not only what changes should be made in 
state legtslatures, but also how such changes can be effectively brought 
about. In other words, the strategy for legtslative reform will vary from 
state-to-state dependmg upon its pohbcal culture, its influence structure, 
or Its partisan compleXIon. 
Legislatures as Symbols. It could be argued that the constitutional-legal 
form of the legislative body and Its procedural rules are not really as im-
portant as is the symbohsm the legislature provides for the people of a 
state. Legtslatures can be variably organiZed and do the public busin~ 
in vanous ways without affecting the confidence, respect, loyalty, or com-
mitment of citizens. A legislature IS much more than a law-making factory. 
It IS a symbol of representative democratic government. Its symbolic "out-
put, may be related to the kinds of pohcies it makes, but it is related also 
to the representative adequacy of the legtslature, to the respect citizens 
can have for individual legislators, and to the pride citizens can take in 
therr legislature. For example, legiSlative reapportionment may have very 
httle measureable effect on the policy output of American legislatures (at 
least directly); but it is possible that, by improving the representative 
adequacy of the legislatures, Citizen pride and respect will increase. Thus, 
the reapportioned legislature may not do things differently from the mal-
apportioned one, but it can be more effective because it has greater citizen 
support. Few citizens have much lmowledge of what the legislature is 
or does; but they do have vague feelings about the institution. Reappor-
tionment may make citizens feel more confident in their elected repre-
sentatives, and a more trusting and confident citizenry is likely to be more 
supportive, more participant, and perhaps more inclined to compliance 
with legislative authority. 
I do not suggest that earth-shaking increases in citizen support for state 
legislatures will come about through any immaculate conception of reap-
portionment, or the streamlining of legtslatures. Citizen confidence and 
trust 1n government is a complex matter. Still, it is an important dimension 
of legislative reform. 
Legislative Reform. At least some of the efforts to bring about state legis-
lative reforms involve attempts to engage citizens in reform campaigns. 
The American Assembly has sought to select leading citizens who can be 
engaged in discussions about legislative reform. The CitiZens' Conference 
on State Legislatures was orgaruzed by non-legislator citizens, and is 
d.Irected in part toward assisting m the organization of Citizens' groups 
m the states who will promote leg1slath e reform or support legislators' 
efforts at reform, or both. Citizen mvolvement of this sort IS vitally rm-
portant, and it can be meaningful to the extent that citizens are knowledge-
able and use fmesse, and to the extent that legislators can be convinced 
that legislative changes are desirable and politically acceptable 
Citizens and legislators often make a very uneasy mix when it comes to 
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discussmg how the legislature should be organiZed. Sometimes laymen 
have political conVIctions that far outrun their pracbcal knowledge, and 
they think they could run the legiSlature better than the legiSlators do. 
Furthermore, lay opmion about legiSlators often IS hostile. It is not dif-
ficult to fmd Citizens of better-than-average educations \.\ ho thmk that all 
legtslators are dishonest, if not downright crooked. In addition the general 
level of pubhc knowledge about the state legislature and 1ts members IS 
embarrassmgly low. OthenviSe fairlv "ell-mformed people often kno'" little 
about the \vay the legtslature works Legislators often report talking to 
promment constituents who \\'Onder what the} are doing in the home-
town when the) should be in the capital city (not kno\\.ring that the legts-
lature meets only a few months every other year), or \vorse, wondering 
\Vhy the legislator is not m \\ ashmgton! And, it is not unusual for legis-
lators to report discussiOns \VIth constituents in the course of which the 
good CitlZen Imphes, without either guile or gloss, that the legislator must, 
by defmition, ha\ e done somethmg unethical. LegiSlators think their work 
IS important, and thus do not appreciate public Ignorance about It And 
obviously, legtslators do not care to be thought of as immoral Legislators 
could probably Impro\ e their own understanding of the busy, relatively 
uninterested, ordinary Citizen, but on the whole most of the damage in 
legislator-citizen communication seems to be caused by poorly-informed 
and disoriented citizens. 
The legtslator' s main defense agamst a relatively hostile and poorly-in-
formed citizenry is in his camaraderie with other, similarly situated legis-
lators Legislators chng together in theu common exposure to a not very 
appreciahve constituency Legislatures, thus, have exceptionally high mo-
rale. TV Smtth, a phtlosophE>r who combmed a career as a umversity 
professor with service m the IllmolS Senate and the United States House 
of Representatives, once pointed out in a classic essay that legiSlators 
have "a magnificent protection agrunst external hostility m the friendly 
bosom of a 'we-group; none the less dependable because achieved ad hoc 
and perennially shifting in membership., He went on to point out that 
By making it possible for representatives amiably to 1Stand 
the gaff, this we-group bulwark gtves opportunity for a great 
many good citizens to do a great deal of criticizing harmlessly 
Legislators became scapegoats, as it were, to bear away with-
out much social damage vague aggressiOns which, chd they not 
achieve catharsis through expressiOn, rrught well totalize into 
attacks upon pubhc order. 'What, for mstance, would most 
editors have to work themselves into decent form upon were it 
not for the ~extravagance,' the 'waste,' the 1mefficiency,' the 
'stupidity,' the 'venality,' and, 1n general, ~the never-enchng 
audacity of elected persons?' Nor are editors alone in this need, 
or alone m the mdiScriminate way in which they improve their 
[127] 
MID\VEST LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 
opportunity. It is safe to say that no other institution today 
has half the effectiveness of the legislature in soaking up and 
sterilizing the wastage produced m society when the will to 
perfect:lon meets the will to power in the lives of good men 
and women. To have a 'show' that every citizen can 'show 
up' without fear of retaliation (since he supports it) maxi-
mizes the fun and minimizes the fury of the social process.s 
Legislators are considerably more high-minded and competent than most 
people think, and legislatures are more effective than is generally thought 
by the public at large. Many legislators realize that there are ways in 
which state legislatures can be improved, modernized, and made more 
effective in coping with the problems of an urban-industrial society. These 
legislators need intelligent, mformed, soplusticated citizen support and co-
operation. And these kinds of cibzens can look at the legislative body 
\Vlth a fresh eye; legislators ought to listen. The legislative institution 
powerfully socializes its members, and legislators may too easily tend to 
regard what is as unchangeable. \Vhatever can be done to encourage and 
"tool up" for enlightened dialogue between citizens and legislators seems 
utterly defensible, and may in the end help to save a rational society from 
destruction in the streets. 
3 T. V. Smith, "Two Functions of the American State Legislator," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 195 (January 1938), 187. 
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